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How does the politics of one country play out in other countries through
the presence and agency of migrants and their descendents? And how do countries
of high immigration cope with conflicts between ethnic or migrant communities
when those conflicts originate, or are strongly fueled by, homeland conflicts? This
dissertation explores these questions through close study of the Croat and Serb
diasporas in Australia and the United States in the 1990s. The answers to these
questions hinge on the politics of migrant homelands and the types of
opportunities that host countries provide to diaspora communities. The chief
empirical finding is that conditions ripe for producing Croat-Serb conflict in host
countries failed to do so. Why did diaspora groups rein themselves in? The short
answer is that host state institutions matter, but that those host state policies
usually championed by Australian and American politicians and academics, and
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formed to manage inter-ethnic conflict—such as multiculturalism and direct
policymaker intervention—had a negligible effect in the Croat and Serb
communities. Instead, ethnic elites credit liberal political cultures, self-policing,
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Chapter 1: Diaspora Politics and Inter-ethnic Relations
THE PUZZLE
Events in the Balkans in the 1990s fragmented and recast the lives of the
people who lived there, and the war between Croats and Serbs from 1991 to early
1996 was, both directly and indirectly, a global catastrophic event. That conflict
was perhaps the most complex and confused, arguably the most violent, and
without a doubt the most closely watched, clash of the 1990s (Huntington 1996).
Television and newspaper reports relayed images of horrific scenes and stories of
rape, forced starvation, and mutilation into living rooms on a daily basis. While
many global citizens were armchair spectators to the conflict, far-flung migrant
Croats and Serbs experienced a tremendously distressing life event of “vicarious
suffering,” accompanied by a raft of associated physical and mental health
problems (Procter 2000).
The spiral of nationalist violence began before the war in the Balkans and
there was, in fact, good cause to believe that ethnic tensions could not be
contained within the borders of the former Yugoslavia. That country was a
modern, complex society wherein ethnicity was only one of several forms of
identity, and often not the most important. Yet, throughout the 1980s and 1990s
neighbors increasingly came to reduce each other to “ethnic enemies,”—“Serb
Chetniks” and “Croat Ustashe”—making reference to World War II nationalist
movements and struggles for the salvation of their respective nations. Tim Judah,
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for example, chronicles Serbs at the beginning of the fighting in the 1990s as
enthusiastic conscripts who
genuinely believe[d] they were waging a defensive war to prevent a ‘new
genocide’ of the Serbian people but they were borne aloft by their early
victories, intoxicated with the joy of the military triumphs which they
believed were their generation’s contribution to Serbian martial history
(Judah 1997, 297).
For Croats, suggests Bogdan Denitch, Serbs represented “the barbarian
non-European hordes of treacherous ‘Byzantines’ who are presumably out to
destroy Western civilization and Christian (that is, Catholic) culture” (Denitch
1994, 159). On both sides, this was the politics of identity reduced to its crudest
form of “Us” versus “Them” and rife with the intellectually and morally lazy
conviction that hardship can be explained by conspiracies against one’s own
impoverished, persecuted nation.
Critically, a similar level of emotion, a belief in the righteousness of their
cause and a desire to play a key role in their homeland, was also present in Serb
and Croat expatriate communities where “the forces of darkness—separatists,
racists, war criminals, and crooks” could be found in considerable numbers
(Holbrooke 1999).  Overseas Croats and Serbs, reports Misha Glenny, often
provided invidious and shadowy support for nationalists at home, and, contrary to
conventional wisdom,
“[a]s a rule, émigrés from Yugoslavia who were free to nurture their
prejudices outside their home country were less forgiving towards their
traditional enemies than those who were confronted with the delicate
reality of relations between nationalities” (Glenny 1992, 122).
Most Serb and Croat political émigrés since 1945 were, and still are, right-
wing, nationalistic, and clerical in political orientation. During the more intense
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periods of the Cold War, this position was useful for gaining acceptance as loyal
anti-Communists in their new countries in the West, but in the post-Cold War
period when inter-ethnic relations were a pervasive concern in many migrant
receiving states, this hyper-nationalist politics raised eyebrows.
Hence, with the history of barbaric violence in the Balkans and the revival
of memories from the brutal Ustashe-Partisan-Chetnik war of the 1940s, there was
understandable fear in some quarters that Milosevic’s campaigns against Croatia
and Bosnia in the early 1990s, and the subsequent expulsion and flight of Serbs
from Tudjman’s Croatia, would ignite violence in neighboring states where
irredentist communities resided, and perhaps even abroad among overseas Balkan
communities. Indeed, for a brief period in the early 1990s it seemed that the
homeland conflict might overflow in a wave of inter-ethnic tension and violence
to engulf the migrant, exiled, and refugee Yugoslav communities living across the
ocean in North America and as distant as Australia.
In the United States, leaders of the Croat and Serb communities lobbied
federal, state, and municipal officials strenuously on behalf of their homelands. A
war of words was fought in ethnic language newspapers and in the backrooms of
government office buildings. Meanwhile, a furtive cycle of tit-for-tat threats and
violent muggings and beatings with ascribed ethnic motives heightened tensions,
worried both the elderly and the young in the Croat and Serb communities, and
regularly filled police reports, if only occasionally splashing across the local
papers in Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Milwaukee (Paul 2002).
In Australia, Serb and Croat passions appeared even more intense.
Marring perfectly legitimate competing marches on Parliament House in Canberra
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and angry, but legal, demonstrations in Sydney and Melbourne, Croatian Catholic
and Serbian Orthodox churches were routinely firebombed. Serbs in Melbourne’s
outer suburbs leveled charges of “Croatian terrorists” attacking Serbs at local
community centers, while Croats in Sydney complained that their youth were
continually set-upon and beaten by roaming bands of “Serb thugs”.1
Since violence tends to beget violence, the accusations and counter-
charges forced many Australian public officials and political pundits to wonder
publicly whether the rancor and acerbic speaches at Serb and Croat public
demonstrations, and the attendant violence, might spell the end of the country’s
official policy of multiculturalism and pose a significant threat to the development
of a common Australian identity among migrant communities. Indeed, by early
1993, acknowledged leaders from both the Croat and Serb communities warned of
“a war on our streets” and pleaded for assistance from local and federal
authorities to address community fears, lest “extremists” in each community get
out of hand.
Wars, Rumors of Wars, and Non-wars
Tensions in the 1990s between migrant Croats and Serbs and their
respective descendants in both the United States and Australia sprouted from the
same homeland-generated hopes and fears. But of course, the war on Australian,
or American, streets never occurred. Violent conflict did not rise between rival
                                                 
1 Multiple newspaper articles in The Age (Melbourne) and the Sydney Morning Herald in 1992
and 1993 flagged for the Australian public the “importation” of conflicts from the former
Yugoslavia into Australia’s Croat, Serb, and Bosnian Muslim communities.
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migrant communities to levels seen between homeland cousins. Despite the
mutual hostility, former Australian parliamentarian Andrew Theophanous
contends, “the tensions between the communities were much less than might have
been expected, given the emotions that this issue arouses in the different peoples
of the region” (Theophanous 1995, 206). And indeed, the tention between Croats
and Serbs was remarkable as much for the avoidance of violence as for the
potential for conflict to spiral out of control.
These facts alter a common line of reasoning about ethnic conflict and
constitute this study’s central puzzle. Instead of asking why ethnic violence, in
these cases and others, is so persistent, it may be more significant to ask why it is
often not more severe. A cursory review of Croat-Serb relations in migrant host
countries reveals a series of critical, interrelated questions that demand reflection:
• How was “war on our streets” averted?
• What effects do host state institutions and policy processes play in
exacerbating or mitigating inter-ethnic tensions?
• What strategies and actions, if any, did American and Australian
policymakers adopt in order to channel migrant community
relations in peaceful directions?
• To what extent, and how, did activists in ethnic and migrant
communities aid and abet, or hinder, such efforts by policymakers?
To the extent that satisfactory answers can be found for these key
questions, this study’s implications go well beyond merely understanding the
Croat-Serb conflict. That conflict may provide clues to the successful
management of other instances of ethno-national or inter-diasporic conflict. More
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specifically, the successful management of Croat-Serb tensions and conflict may
reveal a political method for containing other inter-ethnic conflicts that are fueled
by homeland disputes in the United States, Australia, and other countries of high
immigration.
Why did tensions not spiral out of control in the United States and
Australia? A more expansive explanation for why more potent conflicts were
expected and predicted and theories about how those fears and concerns were
restrained is provided in the next chapter. But the short answer, I argue, is that the
solution to the puzzle is grounded in politics—in particular political institutions,
which vary from place to place and have profound consequences for the way
ethnic or migrant groups interact.
Political science provides the tools for explaining how inter-ethnic
tensions translate into conflict, but rarely do political scientists look beyond the
boundaries of conventional domestic and international political models. While
some scholarly and journalistic observers now agree that migrants and their
descendants in countries of high immigration play vital roles in influencing
international relations, attention is usually focused on the key influence of
migrants on homeland political and economic development. There are only
limited and inconclusive studies that test whether, and how, migrant communities’
dedication to their homelands affects host country foreign policies or otherwise
bears on host country interests.
Even less attention is paid to the issue of how migrant and ethnic group
involvement in homeland politics affects the contours of inter-ethnic relations
within host states (see Shain 1999; Smith 2000). What scholarship on this topic
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exists only tangentially addresses the most complicated examples of conflict
diffusion through migrant communities. A central argument of Yossi Shain’s
notable work in this area, for example, is that the negative effects of ethnic group
influence on host country foreign policy are often overblown, or misrepresented,
and that an increased foreign policy role for diverse ethno-national communities
in liberal democracies is “likely to reflect positively in [host country] civic culture
by reinforcing the values of democracy and pluralism at home” (Shain 1999, x).
That is, a migrant focus on homeland politics is more likely to soothe and
moderate, rather than intensify and accentuate, domestic inter-ethnic conflicts
because long-distance migrant politics “discourages tendencies toward
balkanization inside liberal democracies” (Shain 1999, x). Shain’s claims are
based on the relations between American Jews and African Americans. I believe,
however, that more evidence is required.
This study takes up the challenge to fill the gap and demonstrate how
political institutions shape and may curb inter-ethnic social conflict by
constraining the choices of ethnic and migrant group leadership in host countries.
Shain’s study attempts to explain how diaspora politics affects inter-ethnic
relations in the United States. But Shain, nonetheless, locates the core sources of
inter-ethnic contention in American domestic affairs and policy. The sources of
contention between Serbs and Croats, in contrast, are located almost exclusively
in the homeland context and not rooted in structural—financial and
social—competitions within either the United States or Australia. Croat-Serb
relations in Australia and the United States are thus more critical and natural cases
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for exploring inter-diasporic conflicts sparked by foreign policy considerations
and homeland related concerns.
The present study addresses how the politics of one country play out in
other countries through the presence and agency of migrants and ethno-national
kin. It focuses on the interaction of domestic and foreign policy issues and on the
politics of migrant homelands. The project studies the transnational, or long-
distance, mobilization and strategies of ethno-national communities; and,
importantly, it also analyzes policymakers’ perceptions of migrants’ homeland
ties in migrant receiving countries.
Moreover, this study presents a theoretical inquiry that is pregnant with
significant implications. Without doubt, ethno-national politics and migrant
transnational networks and practices gnaw at the bone of one of the central and
defining issues in political science: the fading separation of domestic and
international politics. Long-distance nationalism challenges state-bound
assumptions about the limits of political communities that undergird so much of
the political science literature, and it constitutes an increasingly important feature
of domestic politics and contemporary international relations (Adamson 2002;
Huntington 1997; Sheffer 1986).2 It raises doubts that geographical location or
lines on a map bind participation and accountability in politics, since the
assumption that people will live their lives in one place, according to one set of
cultural norms in countries with impenetrable borders no longer holds. Diaspora
                                                 
2 “Long-distance nationalism,” suggests Benedict Anderson, spans states, crosses territorial
boundaries and is facilitated by modern global communications and transportation technologies
(1992; 1994).
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politics and inter-diasporic tensions in host states also cast doubt on the
effectiveness of public policies that ignore the influences of homeland politics and
other exogenous factors on migrant and ethno-national communities.
A DIASPORA POLITICS PRIMER
Before analyzing the particular confluence of factors and strategies for
conflict management manifested in the American and Australian cases, it is
essential to locate and place this study in the migrant, settlement, foreign policy,
and conflict management literature.
A traditional understanding of migrant incorporation into host societies is
informed by examining migrant political mobilization and participation in
domestic politics. This understanding tends to maintain the customary distinction
between domestic and foreign, or international, levels of politics. When looking at
the political activities of domestic ethnic communities, it makes perfect sense that
research tends to focus on political participation and political opportunity
structures at the domestic level, such as ethnic minorities’ efforts to better their
living standards and employment situations, opportunities to influence policy
about political and social rights, and protests against discrimination.
There is another and, for the purposes of this project, more important
sense in which the concept of political opportunities and ethno-national politics is
inherently multilevel. I contend that the effects of transnational politics
increasingly drive contemporary concerns about identity, national fealty, and
citizenship. To the extent that ethnic and migrant communities are also ethno-
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national diaspora communities, a paradigm shift is necessary to account for a
world in which ethnic groups straddle borders and reside in several states, and in
which migrants, exiles, refugees, and their descendants no longer make a sharp
nor definitive break with their country of origin.3
Contrary to conventional Marxist and liberal theories that suggest the
gradual substitution of ethnic or sending country identities with class affiliation or
increased engagement with the host state and society, migrant political identities
today transcend geographical and political borders. Cheap and fast international
travel, digitized satellite communications, and the Internet render geographical
distance less and less significant. At the same time, host societies are becoming
generally more receptive to ethnic pluralism, if not always multiculturalism. Past
conceptions of immigration have generally assumed permanent settlement and
political, if not full cultural, assimilation. But today’s technological, economic,
and political realities make it less likely that migrants, as well as the native-born,
in host societies will settle in the old way. Ethnic diversity is now “celebrated”
and recognized as an integral part of life in many migrant receiving states. Laws
that required immigrants to switch their allegiance or primary identity from their
                                                 
3 Gabriel Sheffer usefully defines a diaspora as “an ethno-national diaspora is a social-political
formation, created as a result of either voluntary or forced migration, whose members regard
themselves as of the same ethno-national origin and who permanently reside as minorities in one
or several host countries” (Sheffer 2003, 9). I often preface the term diaspora with the hyphenated
term “ethno-national” to narrow discussion and differentiate relatively specific formations from
any number of “global tribes”—groups whose hyphenated, hybrid or multiple identities are not
connected to a given territory. For example, diaspora is used by others to describe trans-national
ideologies such as communism, or members of pan-diasporas such as Asian Americans or Arab
Americans, or religious denominations such as Anglicans, Muslims, or Mormons.  A second
reason for using the term “ethno-national” is to stress that this study deals with the politics of
groups who regard themselves as one people and that share common ethnic and national traits,
identities, and affinities.
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ethnicity or former country of origin are increasingly uncommon and generally
recognized as unenforceable (Schuck 1998; Spiro 1997).
These changes have several implications. Since they are less inhibited by
charges of disloyalty, ethnic or migrant community leaders and their followers are
more inclined to retain or develop new interests in, and connection with, political
developments in their homeland, and to do this with greater intensity than in
previous eras. This can result in a sense of solidarity with persecuted groups under
the homeland regime, overseas assistance to struggling homeland governments or
opposition parties or organizations, pressure for homeland political reform, or
financial remittances to individuals and communities “back home.” It may even
lead in the most extreme cases to martial defense of homeland regimes and
policies.
Diaspora politics also introduces the polities of migrants’ homelands into
their host countries. It raises sensitive issues about the influence, both real and
theoretical, of transnational and sub-national politics on international (and inter-
state) relations: namely, questions about dual loyalties, the manipulation of state
policy by foreign governments, the sometimes problematic role of foreign policy
pressure groups and their lobbying strategies, the demands of naturalization, and
the control of labor and capital flows across borders (Huntington 1997; Shain
1999; Sheffer 1986; 2003; Smith 2000). In these ways and others, migrants and
their descendants become links between their receiving or host country, and their
sending country, or homeland. Further, transnational migrant politics add an
external dimension to the politics of migrants’ countries of origin by acting as a
resource for political allies.
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Diaspora Politics in Migration and Settlement Literature
Diaspora politics is not, of course, a new phenomenon. In the early 1900s,
for example, European immigrants returned to live in their home countries or
remained active in the politics and economic affairs of their homelands from
locations in the Americas or the Antipodes. Elite level transnational networks
linking migrant leaders with homeland states are also hardly novel (see Shain
1989; 1991). Cohen describes the grounds for the propensity toward diaspora
politics as follows:
The idea of a diaspora … varies greatly. However, all diasporic
communities settled outside their natal (or imagined natal) territories,
acknowledge that ‘the old country’—a notion often buried deep in
language, religion, custom or folklore—always has some claim on their
loyalty and emotions. That claim may be strong or weak, or boldly or
meekly articulated in a given circumstance or historical period. But a
member’s adherence to a diasporic community is demonstrated by an
acceptance of an inescapable link with their past immigration history and a
sense of co-ethnicity with others of a similar background … Even within
settled liberal democracies, the old assumption that immigrants would
identify with their adopted country in terms of political loyalty, culture
and language can non longer be taken for granted (Cohen 1997, ix-x.)
Safran (1991), and Cohen (1997) argue that diasporas in the United States
have long been dedicated to political causes in their homelands. Some have been
involved in the struggle for political independence of their “stateless” nations, and
others have taken active roles in supporting various homeland factions or securing
the well-being of their independent home countries. Various ethnic group
mobilizations, such as American Jews’ efforts on behalf of kin in the former
Soviet Union, have been a driving force behind broader efforts to liberate kin in
third countries. Still other diasporas, such as Cubans, Poles, and the Baltic
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communities, worked to weaken dictatorial rule of their homelands during the
Cold War.
Yet sustained scholarly focus on migrant transnational links with the
country of origin is relatively new and may be explained by increased recognition
of the ease of transportation and communication, and especially by sending states’
increased dependence on remittances and the policies they put in place to
encourage migrants’ long-distance nationalism (Poros 2001; Vertovec 2001).
Some previous American studies of diasporas focused on their policy effects,
while more recent analysis of migrants, especially those emigrating from Latin
America, show how migrant communities often bridge homeland and host
country welfare politics (Constas and Platias 1993; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt
1999; Sheffer 1986; Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Vertovec and Cohen 1999). Much
of this scholarship sustains a traditional assimilationist model, however, because it
suggests that the more integrated these immigrant communities are, the more they
participate in host country politics and the less they engage in the political affairs
of their homeland (see Esman 1992; 1994; Layton-Henry 1990; Miller 1981;
Weiner 1986).
There are also important and interesting contributions by comparative
analyses of migrants’ political participation in various European countries (see
Hammar 1985; 1990; Ireland 1994; Koopmans and Statham 2000; Layton-Henry
1990). These studies show that migrants in Europe by and large engage in the
politics of their host country with increasing frequency and effort, often claiming
political rights, despite sometimes ambiguous citizenship or residence status.
These studies, nonetheless, also largely maintain the common distinction between
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domestic and international politics and the effect of political conflict in countries
of origin is dealt with in only a tangential way.
When studies take the political activity of migrant groups into account, the
focus is generally on their level of participation in the politics of their receiving
country, and the degree of engagement is generally correlated with the degree of
inclusion in the host country political system and the extent to which migrant
communities are integrated or assimilated into their receiving society. Similarly,
these studies also suggest that more integration and more engagement in host
country politics leads to less participation in homeland politics (see Esman 1994;
Miller 1981; Weiner 1986). But this conclusion runs counter to the diaspora
literature in Canada and the United States, in which levels of host country
integration and financial success are seen—as in the Jewish, Greek, and Armenian
cases—as conducive to political influence on host country foreign policies
towards homelands (see Shain 1999; Sheffer 1986; 2003; Smith 2000).
Diaspora Politics and Foreign Policy
The explosion of ethnic conflicts around the world, the increasingly
“global” economic environment, and calls for American or Western intervention
in trouble spots abroad have increased the number of pressure groups focusing on
foreign policy and boosted scholarly attention to the domestic sources of foreign
policy. Given the relative success of the Israeli, Cuban, Armenian, and Irish
lobbying efforts in the United States, ethnic and diaspora communities are now
regarded as frequent and expected voices in today’s pluralist foreign
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policymaking process. Correlatively, political parties and interest group politics in
liberal democracies, perhaps especially in the United States, are now seen as
encouraging ethnic group participation in foreign policymaking. (Ahrari 1987;
Ambrosio 2002; Gerson 1964; Shain 1999; Smith 2000).
There are reasons why diaspora-based pressure groups draw considerable
attention from the press, public officials, and scholars who are keen to understand,
first how they form, attract members, and mobilize; and second, why some groups
successfully mobilize their communities to produce powerful ethnic lobbies,
while others remain politically dormant or ineffective despite considerable
resources at their disposal (Ambrosio 2002).
Homeland Challenges and Concerns
There is no doubt that diaspora politics is a controversial political activity.
Nationalism in diaspora settings often seems to have a life of its own, independent
from political developments in the homeland, but constantly making reference to
them. Long-distance nationalism and the political engagement of migrants in their
homelands raise justifiable and sensitive concerns about dual loyalty, the limits of
national security, the manipulation of political power by foreign governments, and
the role of the state in identity formation.
Rogers Smith usefully distinguishes between “homeland
policies”—whereby sending states aim to orient migrants towards a return to their
countries of origin—and “global nation policies”—whereby homeland states
encourage migrants to stay in touch, but to stay abroad. Overseas ethno-national
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kin can provide important remittances for the homeland economy, an insider’s
access and foreign policy lobbying in the host country, and vital “social capital
upgrading” by which expatriates leave their homeland as superfluous workers and
are reformed into educated, well-to-do national kin abroad (Smith 1997).
These remittances may provide both opportunities and causes of concern
for homeland states. Migrant sending societies and states are historically
cognizant and frequently wary of expatriate communities and so-called
governments-in-exile. But they are also aware of the potential for migrant
communities or national kin abroad to be sources of political strength and
economic support. There are several well known examples of how sending
countries’ political elites wish to tap into the resources of national communities
abroad (see Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Shain 1989). Mussolini’s Italy, for
example, replaced the word “emigrant” with “citizen” more than a half century
ago in an effort to “redeem the emigration from the political ineptitude and social
irresponsibility of the liberal state” and achieve “the spiritual recovery of all
Italian communities abroad by strengthening material and moral contacts between
Italy and the citizens abroad” (Shain 1989, 51).
Interest in homeland current affairs, continued affiliation with homeland
organizations such as churches and schools, and financial remittances sent in
support of kinsmen still in the homeland or in some third country are usually
benign phenomena. Yet, dissident political activity from abroad can constitute a
potential threat to homeland regimes (Fearon 1998; Gagnon 1994/1995; Gurr
1993; Saideman 1997). Yossi Shain and Martin Sherman suggest that diaspora
efforts to affect political issues in their country of origin, kin-state, or symbolic
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homeland stem from a variety of motives (Shain and Sherman 1998). Diasporas
may be motivated to remit monies out of a desire to change the character of the
prevailing homeland regime, improve the image of the diaspora in the minds of
homeland ethnic kin, enable themselves to be part of the homeland experience, to
assuage guilt, or provide a focus for activity on the part of diaspora organizations.
These ties increasingly take political forms and occasionally lead to strife
and violence. Some members of diaspora communities, out of empathy for the
predicament and well-being of their ethno-national brethren in the home country,
mobilize to provide financial assistance to groups associated with ethno-national
secessionist or liberation movements. And departed refugees, exiles, political
migrants, or re-nationalized overseas kin may, in extreme cases, use host
countries as “springboards” to mount political actions aimed at weakening or
overthrowing the government of home countries (Shain 1989). James Rosenau
argues that members of diasporas with origins in regions suffering war and ethnic
tension will often engage in violent, subversive, or terrorist activity given that
[t]hose who leave are no less likely than those who stay behind to carry a
wide array of psychological baggage, deep-seated emotional ties to the
homeland and enduring fears about its well-being. Their lives may end up
in new physical settings, but their psychological landscape remains
essentially the same composite of cultural premises, ancestral loyalties,
and subgroup commitments (Rosenau 1993, xv-xvi).
Indeed, throughout history, political exiles have challenged traditional
boundaries of authority and loyalty. Émigrés from Sri Lanka, Turkey, India, and
Nigeria, for example, often play key roles in those countries’ internal conflicts
from their bases in the United States, Canada, Britain, Germany, or Australia.
And as external opponents to the regimes of their homelands, political exiles have
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always served as “ready instruments for host governments wishing to intervene in
the affairs of their enemies” (Shain and Ahram 2003, 662).
Host states, for their part, can hamstring homeland outreach efforts or,
alternatively, lend support for exile and diaspora efforts to unseat homeland
regimes. Additionally, affiliation with countries hostile to the home regime can
brand political exiles as nationally disloyal or at least cast doubt on exiles’
trustworthiness and credentials as victims when compared with those opposition
leaders who stayed behind. A prime example of homeland kin suspicions about
expatriates’ loyalty and obligation to homeland national interest was recently
evident in the attempts of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), headed by Ahmad
Chalabi, to promote the removal of Saddam Hussein from the safety of
Washington and Detroit and through close interaction with the Pentagon (Shain
and Ahram 2003).
Host Country Challenges and Concerns
Earlier studies of inter-ethnic conflict and migrant politics in countries of
high immigration have usually been limited in focus to well-established groups’
efforts to integrate, garner public or official attention, or compete with similarly
situated ethnic communities for material and social resources in their country of
settlement. These studies often offer detailed descriptions of cultural traits, myths
and language. Although descriptively thick, most provide few conceptual tools to
apply to the transnational spillover of ethnic contention, and they fail to account
for how ethno-national conflict is exported from homelands to host countries
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(Horowitz 1985; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996). The transnational factors
that determine ethnic group political activity in a host country are thus often
relegated to peripheral roles as factors in the analysis of political integration rather
than as subjects of study in their own right.4
Yet, policymakers in many countries of immigration are increasingly
subject to demands of migrants or refugees who pressure them to pursue a
particular policy towards their homeland. At the same time, immigrant receiving
states face petitions from homeland governments of diaspora communities to curb
the political dissidence of such communities or facilitate tighter relations between
homeland societies and their kin abroad (Shain 1989; 1999).
These developments create critics of the growing “cult of ethnicity” in
education and civic culture who worry that devotion to homelands undermines
national cohesion by exacerbating ethnic strains. Samuel Huntington and Arthur
Schlesinger, for example, both argue that the rise of American ethnic groups in
the United States foreign policy arena constitutes a threat to the national interest
and is evidence of a fragmenting of American identity (Huntington 1997;
Schlesinger 1992). This threat has ostensibly been reinforced by post-Cold War
immigration and the rise of “the cult of multiculturalism,” whose mainly elite
proponents “deny the existence of a common culture in the United States,
                                                 
4 There are, for example, precious few studies of inter-ethnic conflict involving even those
diaspora communities, such as Greek Cypriots (vs. Turks) in the United Kingdom, or Armenians
(vs. Azeris and Arabs) in France, or Jews (vs. Arabs) in the United States, which conventional
wisdom suggests are “successful” at influencing host country foreign policy (see Østergaard-
Nielsen 2003).
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denounce assimilation, and promote the primacy of the racial, ethnic, and other
sub-nationals cultural identities and groupings” (Huntington 1997, 31-32).
In this perspective, diaspora politics reveals troublesome aspects of
political participation. When migrants and their descendents participate in
domestic political affairs they do so in particular institutional contexts and their
agency is to one degree or another constrained or facilitated by their immediate
and local surroundings. By contrast, diaspora involvement in homeland politics is
often unaccountable participation, with no clear delineation of specific rights and
responsibilities (Smith 2000). For one thing, it is not readily obvious which
state—host or homeland—takes responsibility for particular aspects of
transnational migrants’ lives. Which state assumes the primary responsibility for
migrants’ protection? How can dual citizens’ interests best be represented? And
what should states expect in return?
These important questions and concerns are buttressed theoretically by
Huntington’s much-debated thesis about clashing civilizations, which stresses the
persistence of “kin-country” loyalties that run much deeper and darker than either
assimilationists or multiculturalists are willing to admit (Huntington 1996).
Stanley Renshon, too, argues that it is quite impossible to have two, possibly
conflicting, core political attachments, and that the likelihood that first-generation
immigrants conceivably “choose” host country loyalties is significantly
constrained by early childhood political socialization and unconscious
psychological attachments (Renshon 2002).
Concerns of these kinds need not be limited to first generation migrants. It
is unlikely that the children of immigrants will be involved in their ancestral
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homelands in the same ways and with the same intensity as their parents. But
since many migrants’ offspring are raised in homes saturated by homeland
influences, even second and third generation descendents can reasonably be
viewed as latent diasporas. For instance, children of Mexican immigrants in the
United States who continue to send remittances to relatives in Mexico exhibit
their membership in a diaspora. The children of Indian migrants who go back to
India to find marriage partners, or even third-generation Pakistanis or Egyptians
who begin to study Islam and homeland values when they have children do so as
well.
Hence, migrants’ transnational practices are not only interesting in the few
instances where they directly challenge states’ authority. They are also interesting
because they uncover previously unrecognized boundaries of political
participation. When migrants engage in the political affairs of their country of
origin they do so in an ambiguous political and institutional context. Their
mobilization and agency remain facilitated or constrained by their local
surroundings, but they are energized by bonds to distant events, people, and
places. In other words, there are both homeland and host country influences on
migrant behavior.
And while only a fraction of contentious diaspora communities may
actually engage in radical ethno-national activism, the phenomenon has added
importance in light of immigrant receiving countries’ post-9/11 concerns about
the importation of fifth columns, terrorists, and the escalating debates about dual
or multiple citizenship. Transnational political practices may make migrants the
object of public concern and fear, and state scrutiny, if such activities are viewed
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as out of step with the host state’s political culture and heightened concerns about
national security. As early as 1965, Louis Gerson described the double-edged
hazards of long-distance nationalism:
Many ethnic leaders have been increasingly successful in making
Americans believe that they and their children and their children’s
children are duty-bound to act in the interest of their ancestral land–that
the emotional umbilical cord can never be severed. A belief is thus being
perpetuated that the United States is a multinational state which cannot
and should not be fully united. The doctrine, “once hyphenated, always
hyphenated,” is a threat to American unity, but it is more than a threat to
the majority of immigrants and their descendants, whose loyalty and
devotion to America–a sanctuary from the ills of their homelands–is
unbounded (Gerson 1965, 235).
Echoes of the fear that migrant and ethnic devotion to ancestral homelands
exacerbates domestic inter-ethnic tensions reverberate nowadays. Some scholars
discern a specter in the increasing role ethnic communities play in shaping—at
times “capturing”—the foreign policy of host states. Diasporic communities in
migrant-receiving societies have indeed engaged in activities ranging from fund-
raising and lobbying to flag-burnings and fire-bombings in connection with
homeland conflicts, and it is largely accepted that some ethnic groups punch well
above their weight—in terms of population and resources—to successfully
influence foreign policy toward their homelands. Cuban refugees and their
diasporic youth, for example, have had a crucial and lasting effect on American
policy toward the Castro regime for more than a generation, forcing American
administrations to maintain a hard line against Cuba.
Some homeland governments regularly make direct patriotic appeals to
their respective diasporas and recruit them to influence host state foreign policies
in their favor. For example, the Israeli government proposed and funded the
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creation of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which touts
itself the “most powerful, best-run, and effective foreign policy interest group in
Washington” (Smith 2000, 110-112). Tony Smith, much like Gerson, suggests
these and similar efforts to tap diasporic resources in order to gain access to, and
pressure, host state foreign policy amount to a “special problem” for liberal
democracy and reveal
a striking peculiarity of American political life that foreign leaders be they
Polish, Czech, Irish, Israeli, Greek, or Armenian feel they have a right to
address their American kinfolk directly, over the head of the U.S.
government, encouraging these ethnic citizens to take positions that
promote the interests of the ancestral homeland as defined by these
foreigners. It is equally striking that many with strong ethnic identities
rally to these foreign leaders’ views of what U.S. foreign policy should be
(Smith 2000, 134).
Huntington and Schlesinger may exaggerate the threat of division created
by ethnic lobbying over foreign policy issues, but Smith provides a more nuanced
view and acknowledges that this and related concerns are not new. The essential
problem of self-rule, James Madison argued in “Federalist No.10,” lies in
reconciling the natural pursuit of self-interest with the dangers of any one faction
or interest using government for its own narrow purposes, be the faction
economic, racial, religious, or ethnic. Smith accepts Madison’s “republican
remedy,” but he is concerned that “foreign attachments” of ethnic lobbies in
particular mean that domestic rancor and factional bickering no longer “stop at the
water’s edge,” and the resulting “capture” of foreign policy is increasingly
antithetical to the public good.
For example, the INC assisted the United States in an effort to make the
case for war on Iraq in 2003. A significant portion of the intelligence used to
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support the argument for invasion came from Iraqi defectors, including former
weapons program scientists and intelligence officials who left Iraq with assistance
by the INC, which lobbied vigorously for war and was paid by the United States
government to assist with a congressionally-mandated regime change policy. The
limited value of the intelligence gleaned from the defectors, and the apparent INC
manipulation of defectors’ testimonies about the types, quantities, and locations of
weapons of mass destruction held by Baghdad, are now public knowledge (Barry
2003; Hersh 2003).
While there is no reason why “ethnic” agendas and the “national interest”
are necessarily incompatible, there is reason to suspect incompatibility. Concerns
over perceived threats to national security and social cohesion are not easily
dismissed, particularly in light of an apparent post-Cold War increase in violent
“spillovers” of homeland violence to diasporic communities. Kurds in Vienna,
Paris, Bonn, and Copenhagen rioted in fury at the arrest of Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan by Turkish commandoes in Nigeria in 1999;
British Hindus and Muslims repeatedly clash over Kashmir in northern and
midland English cities; Arab and Jewish communities in France now regularly
come to blows after escalated violence in Israel and the West Bank; and
contentious diasporic Greeks and Slav Macedonians squared off in the faraway
streets of Melbourne in the mid-1990s. These examples and others support the
assertion that diasporic devotion to ethno-national homelands is often divisive and
can exacerbate domestic inter-ethnic conflicts.
Evidence for the extent to which inter-ethnic conflict is a result of
transnational politics is patchy and difficult to compile because it is often hidden
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in one way or another. The lack of empirical research in this area thus probably
has less to do with the actual occurrence of the phenomenon than with the extent
to which it is observable given the subterranean political context in which it often
occurs. Yet, as more and more journalists, scholars, and policymakers recognize
the ability of ethnic groups to influence international affairs, especially by
affecting the foreign policies of migrant receiving states, it is necessary and
prudent to examine more closely how such influences relate not only to a host
state’s national interests abroad but to assess their effect on ethnic relations inside
a host country. This re-orientation leads to questions related to those posed earlier
in this chapter:
• What is the relationship between an ethnic group’s effective voice
in foreign policy creation and its adoption of host country political
values?
• What functions do ethnic lobbies serve in a host country’s
promotion of an international image?
• Does ethnic commitment to ancestral countries or homelands, and
the development of a diaspora identity, impede host country
domestic cohesion by encouraging sub-national loyalties?
CONFLICTED LOYALTIES?
How to maintain a stable political system in a multiethnic society while
remaining committed to liberal democratic norms is a perennial problem of
political theory. Since Aristotle, democratic theory, extensive empirical evidence,
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and common sense regard both ethnic heterogeneity and immigration from
diverse sources as disruptive to a democratic polity (Dahl 1971; Lijphart 1984).
The difficulty lies in the fact that ethnic groups tend not to get along. Disparate
ethnic groups and dissimilar nationalities, according to John Stuart Mill,
necessarily view one another with distrust, and undermine the formation and
maintenance of common national identities within multinational or multiethnic
states.5 Culturally divided communities are unlikely to share core values and may
be quite literally unable to speak with each other. Incorporating several ethnic or
national groups into a single political system, it seems evident, means
incorporating the basic problem of ethno-national contention as well. This is a
concern echoed recently by Robert Putnam, who suggests that greater ethnic
diversity usually means fewer personal connections and less trust between
citizens:
The bottom line is that there are special challenges that are posed by
ethnic diversity to building social capital. Since ethnic diversity is in the
future of the U.S. and Canada, this means we need to devote special
attention to how you build connectedness or social capital in that context
(Delacourt 2001).
Added to this is the fact that while migrants may regularly be willing to
accept naturalization and offer allegiance to their new country, “an individual’s
national identity is not necessarily the same as the passport she holds” (Schuck
1997, 18). Whether through fixation on a “homeland hangover” or lack of
acceptance by new neighbors, some migrant communities remain almost
                                                 
5 Mill (1867), in his On Representative Government, wrote that, "Free institutions are next to
impossible in a country made up of different nationalities."
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completely alienated from their host societies, while others reach only partial
political and social integration.
Britain’s Home Secretary in the Blair Labour Government, David
Blunkett, recognized the challenges this poses and appointed a team of experts to
devise a "Britishness" course for all immigrants and asylum-seekers in the United
Kingdom. Those aliens who wish to become residents or British citizens will be
taught about the tolerance of different ethnic groups, unmarried couples, and
homosexuals with the hope that the schooling will lower the inter-ethnic
community tensions that were behind the rioting in Bradford, Burnley, and
Oldham during the summer of 2001 (Denham et al 2001; Cantle et al 2003).
Members of diasporic communities, by definition, often exhibit multiple
loyalties that produce new challenges for multiethnic host countries, as intensive
transnational contacts alter conceptions of citizenship and belonging (Foon
1986)). First, the host state and society exert an “internal-national” pull on
immigrant identities. Second, specific ethnic communities within the host society
also provide an “internal-ethnic” pull. Third, the country and state from which
immigrants originated simultaneously exert an “external-national” pull on
diasporic communities. Finally, particular ethnic communities in the homeland
society may also exert an “external-ethnic” pull.
Wherein migrants “settle” and leave older or original political
identifications behind, few controversies develop. Where external loyalties
compete with, instead of complement, internal loyalties, events in the homeland
states or efforts by homeland governments to mobilize local diasporic
28
communities may weaken host state national integration and social cohesion in at
least four ways, as summarized in Figure 1.


















In cell A, the pull of loyalty toward homeland states may lead members of
diasporic communities into conflict with the host state and society. The
circumstances propelling such conflict are perhaps rare–suspicions of German and
Italian immigrants during the Second World War as “fifth columns” being one
prominent historical example. But the World Trade Center and Pentagon terrorist
attacks in the United States once again raise this specter. In a recent study,
Kambiz Ghanea Bassiri (1997) found that 80 percent of his sample of Muslims in
Los Angeles and fully a third of those Americans who converted to Islam felt
more allegiance to a foreign country than to the United States. Fears of terrorism
and a similar identity crisis developing in other high immigration countries result
in current official and public suspicion of Middle Eastern and South Asian aliens
(Gunaratna 2001).
In cell B, external-national mobilizing efforts, usually state driven, may
redefine or re-nationalize diaspora members within immigrant host countries.
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Governments of sending countries increasingly perceive their expatriate
communities as a source of remittances, investments, markets for home country
companies and political representation abroad. Many countries now actively
encourage dual citizenship or dual nationality, and they attempt to mobilize
diasporic communities for homeland political purposes. This change represents a
departure from earlier times, when emigrants were regularly regard as defectors
and when naturalization in another country entailed the automatic loss of the
original citizenship.
The dramatic shift in policy is motivated by the desire of homeland
authorities to retain the loyalty and, hence, the economic and political
contributions of their expatriates. For example, Italy’s Christian Democrats
support extending voting rights to gain support from southern Italian migrants;
Albanians journeyed “home” from Germany and New York at the behest of
homeland political organizations to support ethnic kin in war and rebuild war-torn
economies in Kosovo and Albania (Winland 1995); and Athens brokered a
reconciliation among left/right political factions in the Greek-Australian
community to ensure diasporic unity on the Macedonian question (Jakubowicz
1994).6
 Better known in the United States is the resurgence of intensity and
expansion in scope of the Mexican state’s professed interest in the eight to ten
                                                 
6 Con Sciacca, former Labor Party Shadow Minister for Immigration in the Australian Parliament,
shared insights regarding Italian efforts to “re-nationalize” Australians of Italian descent during
several interviews with the author in June and July 1999. He was then personally opposed to
Italian outreach efforts.
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million Mexican nationals in the United States and in Americans of Mexican
descent. In recent years, Mexican political leaders reversed their previous mistrust
and intensified relations with American-based lobby groups such as the National
Council of La Raza and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund. Mexico now
funds more than 500 community-of-origin clubs in the U.S., provides national
identification cards to émigrés to ease banking and housing challenges, supports
an Office of Emigrant Affairs in several high-emigration Mexican states, and flirts
with the idea of offering voting rights to non-resident nationals and their
American-born descendents in a bold effort to effect U.S. policy (de la Garza  and
Szekely 1997; Shain 1999; Smith 2003).7
 In cell C, external ethnic pulls may bring diaspora members into conflict
with host state interests. For example, Armenian lobby groups in the United States
achieved surprising success in gaining political and material support from
Congress, including roughly $90 million in annual foreign aid for the Armenian
state, blockage of aid to Armenian rival Azerbaijan, and delay of an arms deal
with Turkey. American national interests towards the Caucasus do not suggest
that Armenia is the most important state to target in that region. Azerbaijan holds
important oil and natural gas reserves, in addition to a passage for transport of
these fuels to Turkey. Turkey, an historic and contemporary foe of Armenia, is a
regionally important NATO member and key U.S. ally (Gregg 2001).
                                                 
7 Huntington points out that Mexican officials used to look down on migrants to the United States
as “pochos” and traitors. Now Mexico’s leaders “drench with encomiums those who leave the
homeland” and are saluted as “heroes” (Huntington 2004, 280).
31
Finally, in cell D, external ethnic pulls, including lingering enmities
toward other ethnic communities, may influence inter-ethnic relations within host
countries. Often these tensions are between distinct ethnic communities. For
example, American Greek and American Turk contentions over the Cyprus issue.
Other times conflicts may be intra-ethnic in nature, such as internal division
among the Chinese Americans regarding Chinese-Taiwanese relations.
STRATEGIES FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
Scholars and journalists who study and write about ethnic politics and the
management of ethnic conflict approach the subject from one of two perspectives.
The social-psychological perspective focuses at the local and interpersonal levels
of interaction. Its practitioners attempt to foster empathy among individual
members of the contending parties, establish interpersonal trust, and facilitate
notions of reciprocity and mutual respect. These, in turn, are believed to be
prerequisites to negotiated compromises and peaceful coexistence.
The alternative perspective is favored by political scientists and depends
on institutions, on rules, policies, and political structures to shape individual and
group behavior and establish terms and conditions for regulating relations
between contending ethnic communities. Scholars and practitioners adopting this
perspective do not deny the importance of psychology and interpersonal
dynamics, but argue that behavior is conditioned decisively by opportunities and
constraints provided by the institutions that people encounter. Locating the key
institutions, however, proves difficult.
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While for host society political actors, rendering domestic ethnic conflict
less virulent is a perennial challenge—it is one made all the more difficult by an
“internationalization” of quarrels. Understandably, police and local officials in
multinational democracies, suggests Paul Brass, are particularly hesitant to
recognize the significance of foreign or external factors in domestic inter-ethnic
conflicts and
[o]ften prefer to define local incidents of violence, whether between
members of different ethic groups or not, simply as crimes and to treat
them as such, that is, to localize and confine them. Such localization,
however, becomes more difficult when isolated incidents of interethnic
violence become transformed in to something broader…(Brass 1997, 4).
What this suggests is that homeland state involvement and the nature of
homeland politics constitute important variables that influence the way diaspora
communities develop their politics in advanced democracies. If a sending society
is relatively homogeneous, and its government actively involves itself in the
affairs of its expatriates, then diaspora politics is probable. And if the homeland is
relatively heterogeneous or conflict ridden, and its government neglects the
diaspora community, then fragmented diasporic organizations are likely to pursue
diaspora politics considered taboo in the sending country.
Different mixtures of these factors will yield diaspora politics that is more
or less divisive and threatening to both the host and sending country regime. If,
for example, the homeland is heterogeneous, but its government is actively
involved in the diaspora community, then that state may be able to prevent the
development of threatening exile organizations and ask diaspora members to
lobby their host government on the homeland government’s behalf.  A fractured
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homeland and active diasporas, in turn, portend competing lobbies and the threat
of domestic inter-ethnic contention.
BACKGROUND FOR THE STORY
The processes that explain the formation and persistence of each type of
conflicted loyalty, the effect of each on host societies, and the means by which
host states are able to manage these challenges are too great for one project to
encompass fully. As a first cut, analyzing the tension between external ethnic
loyalties and internal ethnic loyalties (Category “D”, in Figure 1) is this study’s
primary focus. It explores the key interests and alternatives for diaspora
community leaders and host country political officials, and it identifies ways in
which ethnic violence between Serbs and Croats was avoided in migrant host
country contexts.
Sydney Tarrow maintains that social conflict is the product of popular
responses to state policies, and he contends that social movements often represent
a backlash against a consolidation of power by the state that seeks to “standardize
discourse among groups of citizens and between them and their rulers” (Tarrow
1998, 196). Many groups dissatisfied with the political climate in their home state
can opt to migrate (exit) to other countries, especially if they cannot find viable
avenues for dissent (voice) in their homelands (Hirschman 1970; 1978). Further,
the choice of destination is often informed by the political opportunities provided
by host countries, while communications technology and rapid transportation
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provide a conduit for the diffusion of conflicts from homelands to related kin
abroad.
The primary research conducted in this study also indicates that the
presence of a large community of ethno-national kin from one country in another
can lead to the spatial diffusion of domestic homeland politics.8 Specifically, the
presence and political activities of Croat and Serb expatriate communities in
Australia and the United States introduced domestic Croatian and Serbian politics
into the receiving countries. Hence, this study’s emphasis is on interactions and
relationships at the local level; yet, it also demonstrates how ethno-national
politics and conflicts in migrant sending countries affect migrant host societies
through the presence and agency of migrants, refugees, and their descendents.9
I provide a partial explanation of why Croats and Serbs traveled from the
former Yugoslavia to havens in the United States and Australia while still
engaging with homeland politics. Missing from the explanation thus far is
elucidation of how American and Australian soil became the settings of “second
fronts” on which to “wage a battle” for ethnic kin back home in the Croatian and
Serbian states. The dynamics of how homeland conflict was transferred to inter-
                                                 
8 I borrow the concept of spatial diffusion of domestic politics from Mark Miller (1981) who
argues that foreign workers increase the “permeability” of political systems in both migrant
receiving states and migrant sending countries. Migration, in other words, always has the potential
to expose migrant receiving states and societies to the exogenous political influences of homeland
events and developments.
9 Ted Gurr defines political diffusion as the “processes by which conflict in one country directly
affects political action in adjoining countries” (Gurr 1993, 133). Refugees, exiles, and asylum
seekers—those seeking protection, or safe haven, or political opportunity elsewhere—become the
most obvious conduits of diffusion. Further, Gurr posits that disadvantaged groups in homelands
are able to increase their potential for mobilization and rebellion at home by drawing on their
kinship ties across borders and attempting to recruit and mobilize far-flung diaspora communities.
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diaspora conflict in host country settings are illustrated below in Figure 2 and
explained in more detail in Chapters 2-5. The dotted lines portray traditional
understandings of ethnic conflict in distinct countries. The solid lines represent
the animating dynamic of transnational conflict diffusion from the homeland to
the host country.
Figure 2: Transnational Conflict Diffusion
Former Yugoslavia                                                              Host Country
Serbs                                                                                   Serbs
Croats                                                                                 Croats
                                                               Conflict Diffusion
                                                               Inter-ethnic Conflict
Recapitulation
With the end of the Cold War and in light of the terrorist attacks on New
York and Washington D.C. on 11 September 2001, the concept of what
constitutes national security has changed dramatically and acquired a new and
complex significance. Considerations of security have expanded from traditional
military and interstate political issues, such as ensuring protection of borders or
monitoring external threats, to encompass new concerns about the connection
between foreign policy and international developments, on one hand, and ethnic
identity, migration, and political empowerment, on the other.
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As people migrate, they carry with them their experiences and particular
models of conflict. And while there are many instances of inter-diaspora violence,
there is still much more antipathy than there is violence, which leads back to the
question posed at the beginning of this chapter: why do peoples who nourish
enmity, not violently harm each other even more often than they do?
Part of the answer lies in the transnational mobilization and domestic, host
country strategies of diaspora community elites. Migrant community leaders
increasingly respond to external homeland events and political outreach. But the
story is more complex than this. Host country officials—aware of migrants’
homeland engagement and often wary of its effects—also react to diaspora
politics and have key roles to play. This study is, thus, at once an investigation of
ethnic elites at the local and domestic levels and an analysis of foreign or
exogenous factors that influence the adoption and utility of host country policies.
My research raises important questions about “how international
phenomena influence domestic ones”, especially the effects of international
politics on immigrant host societies and culture (Gourevitch 1986, 63). It taps into
the large and still growing theoretical debates about how globalization affects
domestic politics and how mobilized ethno-national diaspora communities
increasingly shape the foreign and domestic policies of multi-ethnic democracies.
Roadmap for the Study
Chapter 2 presents the cases and methods used in this study. It discusses
critically categories and theories germane to inter-diasporic conflict. It explores
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the conditions under which inter-diaspora conflict and violence might have be
expected, and why, ultimately, the “dog didn’t bark” and the worst possibilities
were avoided in both the United States and Australia.
Chapters 3-4 present empirical findings from the Croat-Serb dyad in
Australia. Chapter 3 outlines the history of these communities in Australia and
Chapter 4 reviews the more contemporary era when inter-ethnic tensions and
violence were briefly manifested. I then move beyond the origins and outcomes of
contention to reveal the key turning points, to note the range of plausible
counterfactuals about what might have happened, and to trace the critical role of
leaders in guiding the process of diasporic Croat-Serb contention to particular
outcomes.
Chapter 5 reviews the history of Serbs and Croat interaction in the United
States, and presents evidence on their contentions and cooperation in the 1990s.
The key findings presented in this chapter reveal differences and similarities in
the Australian and U.S. contexts for nationalized Croat and Serb communities and
the host country mechanism that successfully curbed inter-diasporic contention.
The final chapter, Chapter 6, reviews what I believe to be the more important
findings of the study and considers the implications of these findings for both the
study of transnational politics and contention and for policies on the ground in
migrant receiving countries.
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Chapter 2: Why Some Dogs Don’t Bark
THE CASES
Croat and Serb diaspora engagement in homeland politics in the 1990s
was problematic for the migrant receiving countries where they lived. But Croat
and Serb transnational relations in Australian and American migrant settings, and
especially their interaction with each other, are generally under-researched despite
the press attention the communities received in the early and mid-1990s. For
several reasons, nonetheless, these cases are paradigmatic for studying the effects
and control of long-distance nationalism and migrant politics.
First, domestic political developments in the former Yugoslavia during the
Twentieth Century’s second half provided opportunities for Croats and Serbs to
make common cause with their political, ethnic, or religious counterparts in their
country of origin. These included the socialist reformation of Yugoslavia under
Tito after the Second World War, the suppression and attendant exodus of Croat
nationalists during the Croatian Spring in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
development of state-based emigration and remittance schemes to encourage the
flow of resources from abroad back to the country of origin, and the political and
later military upheavals following the death of Tito and Yugoslavia’s
disintegration into separate states during the 1990s. The ways in which these
events and developments affected Croats and Serbs abroad highlight the role of
the homeland state and society in the construction and maintenance of diasporic
identities.
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Second, Croats and Serbs in Australia and the United States are
heterogeneous groups, and their heterogeneity is a continuous source of political
intrigue and mobilization. The vast majority of both communities in both host
states have been at least tangentially engaged with homeland politics. Significant
numbers of each community, moreover, have had decidedly negative relations
with both the former Yugoslavia, as well as contentious relations with members
of the rival ethnic community. But only minorities of even these most actively
engaged and passionate about homeland politics ever considered violent or
otherwise direct action against their rival community in either host country. In
fact, suggests Paul Hockenos,
The reactions of Croatian Americans or Serbian Australians, for example,
were as diverse as the patchwork diasporas from which they hailed. Many
émigrés consciously chose to remain separate from the nostalgic or
militant exile groups. Dissenting voices in diasporas, however, tend to be
muffled by the willful, mobilized actors in the communities who push
their own agendas to the fore (Hockenos 2003, 7).
I, too, found that much of the story of long-distance nationalism lies in the
diversity of Croat and Serb migrant politics and the variety of political agendas
promoted by ethnic community leaders. Cross-cutting these communities were a
handful of key activist minorities. Most notable were the “non-nationalist” Croats
who identified with Tito’s Communist Party and developed Yugoslav identities
during the post-Second World War period. The American Serb and Australian
Serb communities also contained numerous pro-Yugoslav groups during that era,
though their numbers paled in contrast to groups that espoused support for a more
Western-style regime or, just as often, restoring the old Serbian monarchy. This
meant that, besides the overtly nationalist-oriented Croat and Serb communities,
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there were several other homeland political agendas pursued by sub-groups within
the communities prior to the disintegration of the Yugoslav state in the early
1990s.
Third, to the extent that diaspora communities from the former Yugoslavia
engaged in homeland politics in the 1990s, this raised interesting questions about
the policies of migrant receiving countries. Diaspora communities imported
homeland conflicts, despite the fact—or perhaps because of it—that the
Australian and American migrant incorporation regimes were among the most
inclusive in the world. The result was that issues such as dual nationality, social
exclusion, multiculturalism, and fear of international terrorism—especially in a
post-9/11 context—generated considerable political heat and public debate in
each country.
The different policy choices that each host state confronted and their
diverse institutional structures produced multiple approaches for coping with
long-distance nationalism and managing inter-ethnic conflict. The main questions
to be addressed in this regard are: How did Australian and American political
actors perceive and act upon the homeland-centered political activism of the Croat
and Serb communities? Which groups or sub-groups and which activities or
strategies were deemed acceptable, or even useful, to policymakers? And were
these interests and strategies static or dynamic?
Comparison of rival communities of Croats and Serbs in Australia and the
United States also complements studies that examine one migrant group in several
countries, and those that consider several different migrant groups in a single
country. Studies of one group in several countries highlight the significance of
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receiving country political institutions (Koopmans and Statham 2000; Østergaard-
Nielson 2003). Studies of several groups in one country demonstrate the
significance of the countries of origin and transnational influences (Shain 1999;
Smith 1998). This analysis complements both  approaches because it reveals
various dynamics of diasporic political mobilization among migrants from two
homelands (Croatia and Serbia) living in two different host countries.
The Method and Caveats
Even a rough investigation into the dynamics of intra- and inter-diasporic
relations  sheds light on the ways transnational politics are anchored and put into
operation in local contexts. The research method employed in this study does not
aspire to the quantitative sophistication necessary to place the thesis on the firmest
empirical basis. Because this project covers new theoretical ground distinguished
by a lack of alternative frameworks and hypotheses to test, my approach is
consciously exploratory—which is an appropriate method given the speculative
nature of the hypotheses under consideration—and is not intended to provide
generalized nor definitive answers to causal questions. Rather, my conclusions are
narrowed to preliminary explanations of sets of decisions: why they were taken,
how they were implemented, and with what result. I concentrate on operational
links that need to be traced over time, rather than to mere frequencies or
incidences.
This study’s method is not simply a narrative, although useful narrative
elements and structures are used. I do not focus inordinately on the personal lives
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of individuals and the stories they tell. Instead, I survey in depth the choices and
behavior of several individuals who acted in concert. My cases are bound by time
and activity, and I collection detailed information through a variety of methods
and procedures over a prolonged period.
A couple of terminological notes are important. First, the labels for
migrants from the former Yugoslavia are often confusing—not only to scholars,
but often for community members themselves. For example, not all Croats are
Croatian and not all Serbs are Serbian. I try to maintain these distinctions by using
“Croat” and “Serb” to refer to self-ascribed ethnic labels. Use of “Croatian” and
“Serbian” are more accurate to distinguish ancient and current countries and
states, which may comprise multiple ethnic communities—Croats, Serbs, Slavic
Muslims, Albanians, Macedonians, et cetera. In general, it is a futile exercise to
draw sharp dividing lines between even the Croat and Serb communities in the
their Australian and American diasporic contexts, since some community
members engage in this sort of line-drawing even within their own nuclear
families.
Further, political distinctions between right-wing and left-wing ideologies
and party affiliations overlap to varying degrees with ethnic distinctions. There
are Croat and Serb communists, though many of these—and especially those with
ties to Tito’s Communist party—historically, and still today, refer to themselves
as Yugoslavs. By contrast, the vast majority of both diasporic Croats and
diasporic Serbs studied in this project were (and still are) staunchly anti-
communist, though this political commonality fails to unite nationalistic Croats
and Serb migrants in any meaningful way.
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Fieldwork
The study explores not only how migrants’ political practices “trickle up”
through the host country political systems, but how host state and homeland
political actors’ perceptions of, and reactions to, such activities are part and parcel
of migrants’ mobilization, participation, and inter-relations. The study probes how
“transnational” ties with homeland politics influence migrant community
ideologies, interests, and agendas. It also reveals how migrants’ transnational
political practices are articulated within the political institutional context of both
countries of settlement.
I am concerned with how migrants go about their transnational political
activities rather than why they embark on such a course in the first place. My
findings derive from detailed empirical analysis of the scope and forms of Croat
and Serb community political engagement with their respective homelands, with
each other, and the reactions to such engagement by Australian and American
authorities. The empirical research was undertaken in several rounds of fieldwork
between 1999 and 2003.
I conducted qualitative interviews with more than 50 leaders of Croat and
Serb ethnic and migrant organizations, representing the two communities at local
and federal levels. I also interviewed Australian and American political officials,
organizations, and state agencies. A handful of additional interviews were
conducted with Croatian and Serb homeland officials—embassy and consulate
officers—in Canberra and Melbourne. Some interviews were guided
44
conversations, but most were open-ended and conversational, while following a
predetermined set of questions aimed at clarifying and corroborating specific facts
and events. The research emphasis was on how diaspora elites and leaders of
Croat and Serb ethnic associations, newspapers, and clubs, perceived their roles
and on the scope of their relevant activities in the host societies. Another main
line of questioning sought to uncover the extent to which, and how, host state
policymakers perceived and reacted to Croat and Serb diaspora politics.
In general, interviews of this sort are the best tool to probe political
commitment and levels of intervention by various ethnic community actors and
authorities. This is especially the case when addressing sensitive questions about
political affiliation, national loyalty, and participation in, or knowledge of, violent
and criminal acts. When I undertook my research I found little prior research
materials. I often found that I was the first non-Croat or non-Serb investigator to
pose questions to Croat and Serb community leaders about homeland ties and
inter-ethnic relations between the two groups in Australia and the United States.10
In May 1999, I conducted pilot interviews with the editors of the major
Croatian and Serbian language newspapers in Melbourne, and I spent the better
part of June 1999 asking Australian federal parliamentarians and immigration
officials about Australia’s inter-ethnic relations. I was surprised and perplexed by
the diversity of views and explanations for why tensions between Croats and
                                                 
10 I used the Delphi method in an effort to mine the perspectives and memories of case
participants, or others who experienced the case first-hand and who could provide hypotheses
about why diasporic Croat-Serb relations did not spiral into the horrors witnessed in the former
Yugoslavia. My working assumption was that “those who experience a case often observe
important unrecorded data that is lost to later investigators” (Van Evera 1997, 26-27).
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Serbs did not spiral out of hand given the fears and suspicions expressed by
community leaders and followers.11
In July 2001, I returned to Australia and completed more thorough
interviews with relevant leaders in Melbourne, Sydney, and Canberra. Upon
returning to the United States in May 2002, I met with Croat and Serb community
leaders in Chicago, and conducted phone interviews with ethnic community
leaders in Los Angeles and Pittsburgh. On average, the interviews in 2001-2002
lasted two hours and were staged in homes, participant-run businesses,
government offices, or ethnic community clubs and hotels.
All interviews were conducted in English and verbatim transcriptions were
made for each interview in which the participants agreed to be audio taped,
although on more than one occasion the interviewees who were taped asked me to
turn off the recorder when they wanted to talk about particularly sensitive issues. I
respect this and other requests for anonymity throughout this project. Hence, my
interviews are usually only referenced briefly in footnotes.
I also observed community organization meetings and attended Croat and
Serb community conferences where I listened to speeches and discussed,
informally, the subjects of this study with participants and other observers like
me. This provided me with an enhanced perspective of the quality and reliability
of the information gathered during more focused interviews. In fact, many times it
was at these events when I witnessed or overheard—as the proverbial “fly on the
                                                 
11 My initial interest in this topic and these communities in particular was sparked in 1991 and
1992 when, as a visitor in Australia, I witnessed first-hand several of the more public clashes
between Croats and Serbs in Melbourne.
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wall”—evidence of the extent of Croat and Serb diaspora engagement with
homeland political affairs and the degree of intra- and inter-diasporic contention
in the various locales.
In order to supplement interviews and first-hand observations, I collected
and poured over Croat and Serb community publications. Where available, I also
mined police records, parliamentary and congressional transcripts, immigration,
intelligence, and security agency archives, and newspaper databases in both the
United States and Australia. Australian immigration officials in Canberra, in
particular, generously provided access to archives and reports long locked away in
basement storerooms. Other official documents utilized include homeland and
host country political party reports, policy statements, and press releases. In
between the more formal parts of my research, I enjoyed the hospitality and
goodwill of Croat and Serb friends and acquaintances, and participated in
community club functions, dinner parties, and luncheons.
These multiple sources are utilized to triangulate the more
ethnographically gathered data. They add to the internal validity of the project,




Louis Kriesberg argues that the escalation of social conflict, ethno-
national or otherwise, often occurs inadvertently and without opponents carefully
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considering the implications of their actions. Particular contexts, institutional
settings, and the internal structure of conflict-prone groups may enhance the
possibility of conflicts escalating to violence and accelerate the pace of such
escalation. That is, conflict escalation is driven by dynamics within each of the
conflicting parties, by changes and patterns of interaction between them, and by
third parties who may join the struggle or intervene to contain it (Kriesberg 2003).
This understanding illuminates the cases in this study.
For example, Gresham’s Law of Conflict Escalation, whereby extremist
leaders increasingly replace moderate ones as a conflict heats up, appears to hold
in these cases (see Coleman 1957, 14).12 Croat and Serb hardliners, in
competition with community moderates, aggravated tensions between the Croat
and Serb communities in both host countries.13 And to the extent that staunch
nationalists persuasively waved the “bloody shirt” of homeland violence and
successfully generated fear among within their respective communities, increased
feelings of being attacked, shamed, and humiliated followed. Anger is normal
under these circumstances and might reasonably be expected to generate vengeful
acts that, in turn, fueled further conflict.
Lessons from cognitive dissonance theory flesh out the processes. Leon
Festinger, for example, suggests that people desire consistency between what they
                                                 
12 Gresham’s Law of Conflict Escalation is an analogy based on the economic principle that “bad
money drives good money out of circulation.” That is, harmful and dangerous forces tend to drive
out those that would keep the conflict within the bounds of community and interpersonal
standards.
13 Internal struggles for leadership of ethnic communities results not only in more militancy or
aggressive action, but also in more frequent and intense public demonstrations not organized to
exacerbate tensions (see Bracey, Meier and Rudwick 1971).
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do and what they believe and think they should do (Festinger 1957). Once
committed to a particular action, persons seek to justify it in their own minds. To
the extent that this is an accurate depiction of behavior, it follows that as diaspora
community members expend resources that hurt or offend enemies in homelands
or rivals next door, they tend to regard the cause for which they do so as more and
more important. In turn, as the cause becomes more highly prized, ever more
harmful costs—especially those born by others—become more justifiable. This is
especially the case given that people tend to notice phenomena that fit their
expectations so that “once a struggle has entered a stage of mutual recrimination
and contentiousness, even conciliatory conduct by the adversary is likely not to be
noticed or, if noticed, be discounted as considered deceptive” (Kriesberg 2003,
162). After all, a bestial adversary presumably can only understand brutish acts.
Given the social psychology of conflict escalation, two factors in
particular pointed to the probability of intense conflict between diasporic Croat
and Serb communities in the 1990s. The first was that the specific nature of Croat
and Serb homeland political experiences and the levels of political sophistication
required by the Australian and American host societies were mismatched, if not
incompatible. For example, many adherents to, and purveyors of, Yugoslav
identities recognized lingering homeland influences on expatriates so that,
Yugoslavian migrants have retained a high level of national and cultural
homogeneity. … They socialize abroad in Yugoslav clubs and sports,
recreational, folklore, and educational organizations, where they form
friendship groups, celebrate national holidays, read national literature and
newspapers, and see Yugoslav films and theater performances. Close
cooperation has been established between such institutions in foreign
countries and their counterparts in Yugoslavia. … The Yugoslav
government gives considerable attention to the preservation of national
identity and social homogeneity among migrants. On the basis of bilateral
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agreements, Yugoslavia forwards large quantities of newspapers, books,
films, and textbooks, and broadcasts radio and television programs to
migrant associations, particularly in Germany and Sweden, countries in
which such associations are numerous (Tanic 1979, 179).
But this description of social homogeneity and harmony in the diasporas
was quite unbelievable. Whereas American and Australian domestic politics have
been essentially been about the definition of liberty and the production and
allocation of wealth within liberal democratic frameworks, nothing could be
further from the nature of Croat and Serb political experience. Politics in the
Balkans, and within the diasporic communities, was and is about national and
ethnic identity, acute class struggle, and the maintenance of authority. Violence
and suppression were regular features of homeland politics and the bulked
potentially large in intra-community politics in both host countries (Jupp 1992).
Second, if diaspora or ethno-national communities act on the basis of
some common aspiration and sense of justice, more intense conflict and violence
is probable. The crusading element of ethno-national conflicts allows for the
commission of violent acts in good conscience. When rivals are portrayed as
aggressive, godless, sadistic, or uncivilized, moral ambiguities fade (Coser 1956).
Diaspora communities may feel they are acting as avenging knights, fighting not
for self but for the ideals of the group and the homeland kin they represent, and
they are likely to be more radical and merciless than if fighting for personal
reasons.
Croat and Serb inter-ethnic conflict in diasporic contexts reflected a sense
of victimhood, and fear and distrust of the “Other.” Diasporic community leaders
refer routinely to fellow Americans and Australians by ethnic and homeland
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labels, and not as fellow citizens or neighbors to be believed, respected or trusted.
In the early 1990s, both the Croat and the Serb diasporas also fit into a stateless
diaspora category because they had weak relations, at best, with the former
Yugoslav state. Between 1991-1996, while war raged in the former Yugoslavia,
there were hundreds of accusations and counter-claims of physical intimidation,
threatening and offensive graffiti, pig heads stuck on church gates, defaced and
decapitated statues, drive-by shootings, pipe bombings, and a regular barrage of
threatening phone calls made to diaspora members in Australia and the United
States.
Why Not Inter-diasporic Conflict?
The existence of conditions for conflict escalation between Serbs and
Croats in Australia and the United States can only represented a variant of what
Donald Horowitz calls “near misses” (Horowitz 2001). These are situations in
which violence doe not occur amid what seem to be fertile conditions for
violence. In near misses, there is evidence of strong ethnic conflict, intimidation,
and even some limited violence, but the conflict does not spiral out of control or
mirror the violence perpetrated by the same communities in their homeland or
elsewhere. Diaspora community leaders and rank-and-file members fear that
violence may become unmanageable, but this does not happen. The question is
why.
There are several possible reasons. First, extremist organizations may not
be present, and perhaps the likely spread of ethnic conflict remains a figment of
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the imagination of a few extremists. Second, changes for the better in the
international environment may affect inter-group relations (Horowitz 2001).
Third, homeland government policies—efforts to channel political attention and
economic resources back to the homeland—may direct diaspora energies away
from inter-ethnic rivalries in the host country. Fourth, host country
experiences—either host country government policies, or social interaction and a
constructive environment—may prevent a replication of the violence experienced
in the homeland. Fifth, diaspora members in the host country may simply avoid
each other. Finally, engagement across ethnic group lines may promote
interactions that are mutually profitable, so that intra-group policing of
“troublemakers” prevents inter-group violence (Fearon and Laitin 1996).
Some of these reasons for the absence of violence contradict one another,
some are circular, and most of them overlap. Inter-group avoidance may promote
peace, as may inter-group interaction, but both cannot do so at the same
time—they are mutually exclusive courses. Likewise, a lack of violence may be
present because of effective intra-group policing, or intra-group controls may be
visible simply because there is no significant violence. Moreover, there is
considerable debate about whether or not migrants’ diasporic involvement
depends on the extent to which they have obtained political rights in their host
country. Perhaps the old assimilation models hold and it can be expected that
when migrants acquire citizenship and political rights they concentrate on
exercising them and leave homeland politics behind.
The evidence mustered in this study challenges the convention wisdom
that inter-ethnic violence is ubiquitous. In accordance with Fearon and Laitin, I
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argue that inter-ethnic violence is in fact a rarity (Fearon and Laitin 1996). By
whatever calculus the Croat and Serb communities in the United States and
Australia computed their interests, they concluded that the cost of violence was
greater than the price of compromise and concession. Sometimes, as Robert
Axelrod has shown, cooperation emerges where it is perhaps least expected; and
elevated levels of hostility and seemingly incompatible goals do not necessarily
produce violence. Somehow, the “shadow of the future” may have loomed in the
mind’s eye of these communities (Axelrod 1984, 129). Somehow, inter-
community conflict led to the effective mechanisms for controlling it.
The Unwitting Control of Inter-Diasporic Conflict
The particulars about how control and regulation of conflict occurred are
examined in the next three chapters, but the root of the story begins with the
recognition that political identity, and the self-ascribed nationality of migrants,
and often their descendants, is not simply the result of the extent of integration
into their host society.
My key contentions are policy prescriptive, and alternately
commonsensical and counter-intuitive. Inter-ethnic violence in diasporic contexts
is a learned response to frustration, and inter-diasporic conflict is regulated by
modifying the environment giving rise to it or by controlling the context in which
it occurs.14 The stability of inter- diasporic relations depends therefore on the
                                                 
14 Primordial and naturalist theories of violence, of course, posit that inter-ethnic conflict and
violence is not a learned behavior, but inherent in the human condition. To the extent that inter-
groups violence occurs everywhere and among all human societies, there is merit to this claim.
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promotion of types of group behavior that have little potential to cause instability,
and migrant receiving states and social institutions have the capacity to constrain
most types of diasporic behavior in most cases. However, the most effective
mechanisms in this regard, as manifest in these cases, are not official state
policies, but those political norms that arise from the mundane influences of the
liberal values in each host society.
 I argue that in migrant receiving advanced democracies, diaspora elites
from contentious communities generally tend to make local accommodations
which modify their own hostility, and the hostility of their followers, and manifest
a common desire to live without suspicion and without shame, as minority
populations in multiethnic countries. In other words, Serb and Croat leaders in
both the U.S. and Australia essentially “saw the writing on the wall,” calculated
their interests, and chose to de-escalate and temper the inter-ethnic conflict in
their host societies in an effort to improve their public image in their host
countries and to maintain intra-diaspora cohesion. Migrants are thus not simply
pawns controlled by ‘invisible hands” nor compelled by systemic factors in
homelands or host countries. They are, rather, active political and social actors
whose decisions are based partially on rational—predetermined and
predictable—considerations, but also shaped by subjective feelings and emotional
considerations.
                                                                                                                                      
But, of course inter-ethnic conflict is not ever-present, so either violence or non-violence must be
a learned behavior. See Sorel (1950) for a primer on naturalist theories of violence.
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I argue, moreover, that inter-diaspora violence in the cases of Croats and
Serbs in the United States and Australia was principally self-limited and that
diaspora elites worked strenuously to direct group behavior according to the real,
though often ambiguously stated, expectations of their host societies. An
important lesson is that different host state and society opportunity structures do
channel diaspora behavior in diverse ways (Ireland 1994). And this study
confirms that an increased perception of access for ethnic community leaders to
policymakers in conjunction with diaspora community opportunities to voice
group concerns and interests regarding host state foreign policies muffles
troublesome inter-group tensions.
Not Your Average Inter-ethnic Conflict
My approach mirrors the suggestion of Gabriel Sheffer that the most
promising avenue for the study of diaspora politics demands a combination of
approaches “with emphasis on personal and collective choices, albeit not pure
rational choice” (Sheffer 2003, 19). And the findings of this study are consistent
with the political opportunity structure literature in that legal conditions and
political institutions—at both the local municipal and state levels—shape, limit
and direct forms of socio-political mobilization and participation among
immigrants (see Ireland 1994; Miller 1981).
Patrick Ireland, for example, usefully focuses on the ways in which the
institutional framework and “linking processes” embedded in them structure the
participation of immigrant groups in Western Europe (Ireland 1994, 10). The host
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country context includes such formal institutions as laws and legal statutes,
parties, trade organizations, and unions as to the extent they control access to
policymakers. Ireland finds that the more inclusive the political system, the more
institutionalism can be expected to mollify contention regarding immigrant
politics; namely, activity directed at bettering migrants’ situation and
circumstances in their receiving country.
The focus in this study, however, is to examine how host countries
political context affects the scope and influence of transnational political
practices. And the migrant politics model is less useful for explaining homeland
politics: diasporic activity directed specifically at the domestic or foreign policy
of the homeland state. That is, expatriates’ efforts to provide support to, or
opposition against, their homeland regime and its goals. Nor does the immigrant
politics model adequately address emigrant politics, and specifically in these
cases how homeland politics influences politics within and between overseas
diaspora communities.
For the purposes of this study, what are significant are the host society and
host state frameworks, policies, and institutions for capacity for containing and
resolving conflicts within and between immigrant and diaspora populations.
These include special community relations institutions set up to facilitate common
communication between groups and between minority groups and the state. On a
more mundane level, social services such as police and welfare departments may
also perform successfully many conflict assuaging roles on a day-to-day basis.
However, those policies and institutions most often coupled with effective
management of inter-ethnic conflict, and most championed by public officials and
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academics in both Australia and the United States, ironically carry little currency
in the Croat and Serb communities. They appear instead as a mixed blessing at
best, or a malignant complication at worst, for the development of positive inter-
diasporic relations. Rather, it is necessary to consider a broader notion of political
structure, which not only addresses formal or official, but also fuzzier dimensions
of legitimate behavior, informal channels, and political space for dialogue. More
specifically, I find that Croats and Serbs in both host countries employed different
means and strategies because they had varying and changing degrees of access to
policymakers. That access was dependant, in turn, on how controversial diasporic
interests appeared to be to host country authorities and, importantly, the general
publics of Australia and the United States.
The experience of Croats and Serbs in Australia and the United States
suggests that the mobilization strategies that contentious diasporic communities
employed to advance their causes are largely a function of the opportunities, or
lack of opportunities, provided by the host political system. But the evidence also
leads to the rarely claimed assertion that governments’ pro-active
efforts—including official multicultural and settlement policies—are less
significant than the distinctive features of the political systems, and political
liberalism in Australia and the United States more generally.
Where political legitimacy of the political system is widely accepted by
diaspora community leaders, conflict between the community and the host state is
minimized. The same holds true for inter-diasporic conflict: when the legitimacy
of the host state increased in the view of Croat and Serb diaspora community
members, conflicts between rival and competing ethno-national communities are
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controlled at minimal levels of intensity.  I find that host society political cultures
and values, in tandem with the positive effects of access to policymakers, were
the crucial factors that restrained Croat and Serb diaspora contention, encouraged
ethnic community leaders to make constructive decisions, and eased the efforts of
Australian and American policymakers to discuss and manage the inter-diasporic
tensions.
This is not to minimize the role of migrant sending countries or homeland
states. Homeland states may become involved by helping their nationals abroad to
improve their legal or economic status. Croatia and Serbia, with varying success,
tapped resources abroad among ethnic kin and attempted to co-opt their diasporas
in Australia and the United States for homeland agendas. But the homeland
outreach efforts by both the Tudjman and Milosevic governments were often
reactive rather than proactive, and depended both on listening ears among
diaspora community members and also on the permeability of migrant host
country institutions.
The puzzle addressed in this study, however, is more tightly fixed on the
communal defense functions of the diaspora: the defense from hostile segments of
the host society generally, and defense against other ethno-national communities
or diasporas specifically. This demands some attention to the proximate causes of
conflict (homeland), but even more to the proximate controls of conflict which are
found almost entirely in diaspora host countries.
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Multiculturalism and Cultural Space?
Whether policies such as Australia’s official multiculturalism exacerbate
or provide a foundation upon which to resolve domestic ethnic conflicts is hotly
debated. Former Australian Labor MP Andrew Theophanous suggests that
“multiculturalism serves as an instrument to reduce or overcome” inter-ethnic
conflicts that originate in overseas troubles through the “enormous power that its
central doctrines of tolerance, respect for human rights and commitment to social
justice have been able to exercise” (Theophanous 1995, 195, 209). That is,
Australia’s policy of multiculturalism explains why Croats and Serbs manifested
restraint in their dealings one with another.
This claim is specious on two counts. First, the 1977 landmark report on
Australian multiculturalism did indeed advise that if a policy of multiculturalism
was to add to national unity and social cohesion, the right to express and share
cultural identity must be accompanied by responsibilities to do so within the rule
of law and with a primary commitment to Australian national interests and fellow
Australians (see Zubrzycki 1977; Jupp 1990). While Australian multicultural
policy thus codifies liberal principles and, in theory, does not respect any element
of a culture that contains within it notions of racial or ethnic superiority, the
reality is that some ethnic and migrant communities utilize the political space
generated by the policy to defend ethnocentric distinctions and historical enmities,
and to perpetuate these attitudes to their posterity. The statement of one executive
of the Serbian National Federation of Australia (SNF) is representative of the
common perspective among Croat and Serb community leaders: “We were never
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taught to hate Croatians when I was a child in Yugoslavia. We learned that here
[in Australia]. When the war started, I learned that it was best that we did not
know them.”15
Australian Croat and Australian Serb leaders generally view official
multiculturalism as a benefit that has allowed them to more fully concentrate on
homeland affairs and to maintain homeland identities. They do not deny that a
homeland fixation may be locally divisive and impede the development of a
strong Australian national identity, nor that homeland ethnic affinities are often
ranked before allegiance with fellow Australians. A leader of the Croatian
Students Association (CSA) expressed the sentiment this way:
I was born in Australia, so that’s a given. But Croatia is in here (hand over
heart) and that is where my loyalty is. You know, it’s always Croats
versus Serbs, or wogs versus Aussies. I probably live more like Serbs or
Greeks or Italians here, but I don’t feel for them what I feel for Croatia.16
When ethnic community leaders perceive multicultural policy to permit to
the maintenance of homeland hatreds and ethnic separation, the policy is at best
ineffective for containing inter-diasporic conflict.
Second, the United States may be a place where Americans are “all
multiculturalists now,” but the federal government takes a laissez faire approach
to the maintenance of ethno-national identities and no official policy of
multiculturalism exists (Glazer 1997). If Theophanous’ thesis held, and other
things being equal, inter-ethnic conflict between Croats and Serbs in the United
                                                 
15 Author interview with George Marincevic, 20 November 2001.
16 Author interviews with CSA members from Adelaide, Canberra, Geelong, and Melbourne at
the Croatian Younger Generation Conference in Geelong, Victoria, 8-9 December 2001.
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States—without the active promotion of Australian multiculturalisms values of
tolerance and social justice—should have been more intense that inter-ethnic
relations in Australia. But this was not the case. By all observable measures in this
study—participants’ statements, public officials’ analyses, press coverage, and
police reports—inter-ethnic conflict between Serbs and Croats in Australia was
more intense and caused more unease among officials attempting to control for its
effects than in the United States.
The Answer Part A: The Double-edged Sword of Participation
In liberal democracies such as Australia and the United States institutional
configuration theoretically affords ethnic groups opportunities to shape and
participate in the policy process. Politically organized communities often pursue
their interests through electoral politics, lobbying, or control of local or regional
governments. In general, the United States and Australia allow ethnic and migrant
communities to mobilize and there are few legal barriers to political action by
ethnic groups through such things as their associations, churches, the hiring
lobbyists or public relations firms, and the political roles played by official and
unofficial ethnic leaders. But mobilization regarding diasporic interests represents
a change in kind from run-of-the-mill domestic issues. Political opportunity
structures still bound the range of choices available to diasporic community
leaders, but these preferences are themselves generated by dynamics often
external to the foreign policy process of the host country (Putnam 1988).
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The Australian system centralizes the foreign policy apparatus and the
formation of foreign policy is highly concentrated in a few hands. This insulates
foreign policy elites from diaspora community lobbying and pressure. This study
suggests that a byproduct of this institutional structure is that a lack of access to
policymakers, especially those able to further diaspora community foreign policy
interests at the national level, motivates more extreme efforts by diaspora
communities to voice concerns and influence host country policies. The American
system, in contrast, is more easily penetrated by diaspora or ethnic interest groups
due largely to the division of power and “sharing or overlap of responsibilities
that works to see that no single branch, much less individual, can monopolize
power” (Smith 2000, 87).
Ignorance of, and frustration with, host country political systems, coupled
with a lack of access to policymakers conceivably could be partly responsible for
Australia’s more intense levels of conflict between the rival diasporic
communities than in the United States. The fact that both Croats and Serbs
perceived that they had little or no “voice” in the Australian foreign policy
process explains the pursuit of interests and venting of community concerns
outside the institutional and organizational frameworks established by the state,
using means such as marches, demonstrations, and at the fringes of the
communities, violence to express their pain and anger.
This evidence suggests that simply listening to diaspora community
concerns is important in host country contexts. The opportunity for each diaspora
groups to relate—to vent—the history and present state of the inter-ethnic conflict
as they see it to policymakers helps placate fears and suspicions. To the extent
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that Croat and Serb contention in either Australia or the United States became a
debate with established rules of participation about host country foreign policy
towards the respective homelands, the level of inter-group conflict waned.
This line of reasoning comes with an obvious and difficult trade-off.
Inviting contentious ethno-national communities to participate in host country
foreign policy lobbying efforts appears to direct community energies towards host
state and society involvement and structures positively inter-ethnic competition.
Most importantly for the questions of this study, access to policymakers provides
an incentive to impress host country officials and to steer clear of inter-ethnic
conflict within the host society. Diaspora lobbying, however, leads to the broader
concerns raised in Chapter 1 regarding host country “national interests” and the
“capture” of host state foreign policies by sub-national groups acting on behalf a
foreign state or provincial interests, rather than broader, shared host state welfare.
The Answer Part B: Self-Policing and Segregation
This research also suggests that features of the American and Australian
systems had a positive, if indirect, influence on the containment of Croat and Serb
contention. The liberal political values and the right to legally voice even
unpopular views in both the United States and Australia allowed the Croat and
Serb community leaderships to better manage tempers and tensions.
My findings suggest that the leaders of communities were most interested
in favorable reputations within mainstream Australian and American populations
and regularly preached restraint in speech and deed to diaspora community
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members. To this end, community leaders routinely used public forums to channel
the passions of community members. These demonstrations and public marches
or organized lobby activities, such as letter-writing campaigns, provided diaspora
community members space to vent or  “blow off steam,” “kept people’s hands
busy,” and “expended energy that could otherwise boil over.”17
While the real battles were thus fought by surrogates thousands of miles
away, Croats and Serbs in Australia and the United States were allowed to voice
their concerns and interests without direct involvement with each other. Distance
was a blessing, not a tyranny. In fact, Serbs and Croats in Australia and, to a
lesser extent, the United States went to great lengths to avoid each other.
Obviously, the principal advantage of self-imposed segregation is the reduction of
inter-community violence. But what this means for each host society is unclear.
Two exceptionally tense communities effectively reduced the level of local
violence, not through conference or compromise, but by turning their backs to
each other. They decided that since they could not be better neighbors, they could
at least be better strangers.
ARGUMENT RECAP
Long-distance ethno-national political mobilization is inherently rational,
predictable, and understandable because it is premised on individual calculations
of what is in one’s best interest. Individuals behave rationally within institutional
limits in order to gain the most benefit at the least cost. The Croat and Serb
                                                 
17 Author interview with Tom Starcevik, editor of the Croatian Herald, 19 November 2001.
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communities habitually responded to the actual and anticipated moves of their
opponent given their particular host country context. This process may, and in
these cases did briefly, intensify conflicts by creating a spiral toward unrestrained
violence.
In the cases of Croats and Serbs in the United States and Australia,
however, the same reciprocal process eventually controlled rather than stimulated
the spread of violence. This was the consequence of these rival diaspora
communities lack of opportunity to directly and violently confront each other
without significant chastisement and castigation by host country policymakers
and their fellow host country citizens. Croat and Serb community elites
recognized these costs and chose to labor to enrich their own positions and to
improve the public image of their respective communities in their respective host
societies. Simply put, the development of diaspora leaders’ commitments to
Australian and American society dampened the fighting spirit of extremist
factions and reduced the level of violence between their communities.
A policy lesson of this research, discussed more fully in Chapter 6, is that
policymakers in host societies face real trade-offs: less access to policymakers
and policymaking results in less “capture” of foreign policy and a clearer
articulation of national interests. But this policymaking structure is also correlated
with more diaspora frustration and possibly more contentious inter-diaspora
relations.
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CHAPTER SUMMARY AND A LOOK AHEAD
The statement of the problems, approach, and preliminary discussion of
the numerous issues pertaining to the effects of long-distance nationalism and
inter-diasporic conflicts presented in Chapter 1 and in this chapter indicate that
diaspora politics are complex and puzzling phenomenon. This chapter provided
an explanation and rationale for why the study of Croat and Serb conflict is
important. An argument was offered for why the Croat-Serb rivalry did not spin
out of control and, importantly, how Australia and the United States managed to
curb it. A fuller explication of how this happened is presented occurred are
addressed in the empirical chapters that follow.
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Chapter 3: Long-distance Enmities
AUSTRALIA: A NURSERY OF NATIONALISM?
Cold War Australia was an anxious country in which intelligence officials
vigorously monitored potential threats to security and constructed elaborate
schemes to keep an eye on of the flood of immigrants that arrived between the
late 1940s and the late 1960s. Some contemporary historians argue that much of
the information gathering was part of a draconian plan to intern thousands of
immigrant left-wing sympathizers should a major war break out (Aarons 2001).
But when political terror arrived in Australia, it came not from the Left but the
Right.
On New Year's Day, 1967, an explosion ripped through the Yugoslav
Consulate in Sydney. This climaxed a wave of attacks on Yugoslav property that
had lasted for more than a decade. By 1970, bombs had torn into the Melbourne
consulate, as ell as Yugoslav clubs, businesses, churches and homes. Australia’s
major cities were hotbeds of Croat and Serb liberationist literature. They served as
a “cradle of nationality” for anti-Yugoslav exiles, refugees, and political migrants,
who in varying degrees supported efforts to defy Tito or re-establish a Serbian
nation-state, on one side, and remove Croatia from “Communist-Chetnik slavery”
on the other.
 Despite the local violence and other evidence that ethno-national conflict
had diffused into Australia, the importance of continuing contacts between
migrants and their homelands was publicly downplayed. This was especially true
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in Canberra where official rhetoric slighted transnational ties that influenced the
ethnic communities. A 1977 Green Paper, Immigration Policies and Australia’s
Population, cautioned that “ministers are under pressure from ethnic groups to
favor one side or the other in international disputes to which Australia is not
directly a party, but in which migrants’ countries of origin are involved” (APIC
1977, 88). A search of more recent federal documents, uncovered little official
attention to homeland-migrant relations.18
Australian newspapers and television programs are suffused with
discussions of immigration issues, and scholars continuously debate whether
increasing ethnic diversity undermines or enhances national cohesion and civic
culture (see Jakubowicz 1994; Jayasuriya 1997). Studies assess domestic ethnic
political representation, ethnic group efforts to influence immigration policy on
behalf of ethnic and national kin, and government attempts to facilitate migrant
integration and assuage conflicts between recent immigrants and native-born
Australians.19 However, there is a paucity of Australian immigration literature
acknowledging that the globalization and democratization of communications
technology, manifest in mass use of the Internet and relatively cheap and rapid
long-distance travel, enables immigrant communities to maintain closer contact
with their homelands than in the past.
                                                 
18 Unofficially, Australian public officials, and security and intelligence organizations were
cognizant and watchful of several migrant communities.
19 See Zappalà (1998a; 1998b) for useful examples of increased ethnic group representation in the
Australian federal parliament. Jupp and Kabala (1993) offer a quality review of ethnic group
lobbying in Australia.
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Since the Second World War Australia has demonstrated an extraordinary
capacity to absorb migrants and turn them into generally law-abiding citizens.
While Australian history does contain important instances of political violence,
group discrimination, and the exclusion of ethnic groups from the political
process, there has also been a dearth of long-term and severe threats to basic
liberal norms and a near complete absence of system-threatening violence. In this
context, Croat and Serb community relations might reasonably be considered an
historical anomaly—especially the extent to which that Australian soil became a
“second front’ in battles for an independent Croatia and, on the other side,
protecting the Serbian nation.
The Croat-Serb conflict was not singular in Australia, however.
Anthropologist Loring Danforth reports that the Greek Consul General in
Melbourne told him during the early 1990s that “Australia is the first line of
defense in the battle for Macedonia” (Danforth 1995, 7-8). Over the last two
decades, Greeks, Chinese, Kurds, Timorese, Turks, and a host of other
communities in Australia have engaged in activities ranging from fund-raising
and lobbying Parliament to flag-burnings and fire bombings in connection with
homeland concerns. Of course, only individuals at the extreme fringes of these
communities participated in the criminal and most contentious types of behaviors.
But even more politically and socially acceptable forms of diaspora behavior, also
clearly manifest in the Australian Croat and Australian Serb diasporas, constituted
challenges to national integration and social cohesion.
This chapter analyses these challenges at two levels. First, it reviews the
historical enmities between and among Australian Croats and Serbs in light of
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shifting interests and concerns during the Cold War period and into the 1990s. It
provides a backdrop for better understanding Croat-Serb relations during the
1991-1996 war in the former Yugoslavia.  The bulk of the chapter focuses on
Croat diaspora politics because this community received the greatest attention by
Australian government officials and intelligence personnel.. The review of Serb
diaspora mobilization is shorter, but it provides points of comparison and helps to
pinpoint key factors that led to inter-diasporic conflict during the 1990s.
Second, this chapter also considers the pressures that long-distance
nationalism and diaspora politics placed on host country institutions and
policymakers. It shows that long-distance nationalism and diaspora politics are
potentially serious threats to immigrant receiving societies. The focus throughout
is the behaviors of ethnic community leaders, their ties to their respective
homelands, as well as rank-and-file Croat and Serb migrants’ efforts to balance
their homeland interests with the political and social realities of life in Australia.
The efforts of Australian government to manage inter- and intra-ethnic tensions
and control the effects of long-distance nationalism also receive considerable
attention.
AUSTRALIA’S CROATS
The first likely Croat settlers are traced back to the 1850s when Dalmatian
sailors, lured by the gold fields, left their ships in Melbourne or Sydney. Charles
Price records that some 4,000 of the male settlers in Australia between 1890 and
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1940 were from Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina (Price 1963, 22-23). But
these figures are difficult to confirm.20
The earliest Croat migrants to Australia largely consisted of agricultural
workers, some of whom had suffered through war in their homeland and
experienced hardships during the 1920s and 1930s at the hands of the Serb-
dominated Yugoslav regime under King Alexander.21 Croatian emigration in this
early period was also prompted by hostility to Austro-Hungarian rule in Croatia
proper, poor economic opportunities in Croatian cities, and agricultural crop
failures.22 Pre-Tito homeland concerns about the diaspora focused especially on
Croat political dissent, and the Yugoslav monarchy encouraged loyalists abroad to
                                                 
20 Accurate statistics for both Croats and Serbs in contemporary and historical Australia are
fuzzy. For example, until 1996 Croatia-born residents were included within data for the Yugoslav-
born. The 1933 Census listed 2,826 Yugoslavia-born in Australia. In the period immediately after
World War II, the Australian Yugoslavia-born population quadrupled—from 5,888 in 1947 to
22,856 in 1954. In the 1960s, Yugoslavia opened its borders to emigration, and between 1961 and
1976 almost 100,000 Yugoslavia-born persons took advantage of the opportunity and migrated to
Australia. It is believed a majority of these immigrants were Croats. The Yugoslavia-born
population reached 129,616 by the 1971 Census and 160,479 by the 1991 Census. Nearly 30,000
additional settlers from the republics of the former Yugoslavia migrated to Australia since 1991.
In the 2001 Census, 45,340 foreign-born (Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina) residents in Australia
declared that they were of Croatian ancestry and the Croatian community is estimated to number
more than 90,000 through the second generation. However, Census officials suggest this number is
likely to be somewhat understated, as some Croatia-born likely still felt inclined to answer that
they were ‘Yugoslavia-born’, perhaps because they still held current passports issued by the
former Yugoslavia. By comparison, 69,173 people declared in the 1996 Census that they spoke
“Croatian” at home. In any case, these official Australian figures are substantially less than the
300,000-person community claimed by the Croatian Consul-General in Melbourne in 1999 (author
interview with Zeljko Sikic, Croatian Consul-General, Melbourne, 23 June 1999).
21 In 1934, for example, Croat nationalists working in conjunction with Macedonian separatists
assassinated Alexander during a state visit to Marseilles, France. Hockenos (2003) suggests that
this “success” of exiled Ustashe leaders abroad set a precedent for later generations of nationalist-
minded diasporic Croats that “anything is possible” and that exile is a fruitful condition for
nationalist incursions against unfriendly regimes in the homeland.
22 Plagues of phylloxera, an aphid-like insect that feeds on grape roots, ravaged the Dalmatian
wine industry through the late 19th Century, encouraging urban population growth and emigration.
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form political associations in order to gather information on both Croatian
communist and nationalist tendencies (Winland 1995).
Post-war Intra-diaspora Troubles
With the arrival of some 24,000 Yugoslavian refugees after the Second
World War—many of whom arrived from war-torn Europe as displaced persons
(DPs) under the direction of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) and
later under formal migration agreements with Yugoslavia—homeland political
divisions sparked increased political activity in the Croat diaspora. Much of this
Cold War era activity derived from lingering nationalist aspirations and anti-
communist, anti-Yugoslav activities.
The post-War Croat political migrants generally either supported the Axis-
allied “Ustashe” Croatian regime during the war, or were later victims of Tito’s
“Croatian Spring” crackdown. They did not leave homeland political concerns
behind.23 This politically radical core of Croatian migrants provided the context
for absorbing and “re-educating” economic migrants who followed in subsequent
migrations, and it nurtured ideologies and a worldview centered on the re-
establishment of an independent Croatian state and the question of Croatian
ethno-national survival amid the perceived threat from Serbia in the 1990s.
                                                 
23 “Croatian Spring” refers to the late 1960s and early 1970s revival of Croatian nationalism and
the efforts by some more liberal members of the Croatian Communist Party to challenge the
centralist policies of the Yugoslav government. Accurate statistics on the political motivations for
emigration are difficult to obtain without extensive surveying. However, for a review of immigrant
political affiliation and the high level of homeland political interest in the diaspora in the post-War
era see Skrbi_ (1999).
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The older and disparate Balkan communities that made their homes
outside the former Yugoslavia long before highly charged, nationalistic political
exiles escaped to the West were generally either moderate nationalists or partial to
left-wing causes or a Yugoslav identity, and thus viewed the newcomers as
sinister right-wing provocateurs. Some members of the more left-leaning groups
and strains of diaspora Croats in Australia branded the greenhorns as “brownshirts
and Hitler’s fifth column.”24
Back home, Tito took exiles’ fantasies and nightmares as seriously as the
exiles did. He used the image of the neo-fascist émigré to discredit all
anticommunist opposition coming from abroad, and his regime vilified politically
active diaspora Croats as counterrevolutionaries, henchmen of accused war
criminal and Ustashe leader, Anté Paveli_, and a reactionary “sixth column” that
plotted to overthrow the socialist state.
Australian Reactions to Intra-diaspora Activities
In the 1960s, and especially the early 1970s, media reports, police
officials, and Australian intelligence services regularly investigated the violent
activities of pro-Ustashe Croat groups in Australia, as well as the “possibility that
amongst their numbers [were] ‘agents provocateurs’” whose aim was to stir up
trouble within the Croat community and report back regularly to the communist
Yugoslav government (Aarons 2001, 401).
                                                 
24 Author interview with pro-Yugoslav, Australian Croat leader, Marin Alagich, 4 March 2002.
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In the course of my interviews, Australian Croat community leaders
voiced numerous rumors, suspicions, reports, and stories about the Yugoslav State
Security Administration’s use of informers and spies to disrupt peaceful Croat
community activities in Australia and intimidate Croat nationalist figures abroad,
as well as their extended families in the Yugoslavia. Under Tito suggested one
Australian Croat, a package from the wrong great-uncle in Milwaukee, Toronto,
or Adelaide could result in a visit by his secret police, while the great-uncle was
“put on a watch list and shadowed by Tito’s spies.”25 Another prominent
nationalist Croat community leader from Melbourne summed up the level of
suspicion this way: “It’s the other Croatians you can’t trust. Some people were on
every side. To be divided, that’s what it means to be Croatian.”26  As if to
confirm the lived experience of his Croat community rivals, the pro-Yugoslav and
Australian Croat writer, Steve Kosevi_ suggests that “there was far more violence
between left-wing and right-wing Croats during the Cold War than there ever was
between Croats and Serbs during those years.”27
In one famous 1978 case, seven members of the Croatian Republican
Party in Sydney were charged with conspiring to bomb buildings and destroy a
pipeline connecting the city to its main water supply, and to murder two rival
Croat community members. The men were convicted primarily on evidence
provided by another Croat who confessed to the conspiracy and tipped-off
authorities. After pleading guilty to all charges, the tipster was then curiously
                                                 
25 Author interview with Fabien Lovokovic, 5 March 2002.
26 Author interview with Mato Tkalcevic, 7 March 2002.
27 Author interview with Steve Kosevi_, 3 March 2002.
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returned to Yugoslavia by Australian authorities, leaving the impression that the
entire case was a “set-up” by Yugoslav authorities, perhaps in conjunction with
Australian intelligence officials eager to put a lid on the “Croatian Problem” and
the possibility of wider ethno-political violence in Australia.
Suspicions and conspiracy theories were mirrored by homeland and host
country observersl. There is significant evidence, in fact, that both Australian
authorities and Yugoslav authorities had cause for concern about certain elements
of the Croat diaspora in Australia. A 1951 Australian Security Intelligence
Organization (ASIO) investigation of the Croatian Club in Adelaide conclude that
It is anti-Communist, if not, in fact, a fascist group … A first class
informant has advised that the Ustacha is operating on a world wide basis
with headquarters in Argentina. The same informant stated that the
Croatina Club in Adelaide has about seventy-five members and of these
seventy-five percent are former members of the Ustacha.28
A 1963 article in the popular news magazine The Bulletin detailed the
activities of a legion of Croatian nationalist organizations such as the Croat
Liberation Movement (HOP), the Croatian Peasants’ Party (HSS), the Croatian
Republican Party and the Croatian People’s Council (HNV).29 The article
revealed for the first time to the Australian public paramilitary training camps,
established to prepare young Australian Croats for defense of the Croatian
homeland, formed in the Australian bush. The Australian Croat nationalist press
also ran articles at the time about the cultural and military training camps with
                                                 
28 Records of ASIO investigations into the Croat nationalist community, including this quote, are
thoroughly reported, documented, and analyzed in historian Mark Aarons book, War Criminals
Welcome (2001).
29 The Bulletin, 26 January 1963.
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headlines such as “Today on the Murray River Tomorrow on the Drina.”30
Historian Mark Aarons records one participant describing the camps in the
country town of Wodonga as “the nest of the Croatian Ustashe” and a place for
those prepared to “drive out the Serbians” and “who are prepared to die” for
Croatia (Aarons 2001, 413).
As early as 1955, footnotes in ASIO reports warned that the existence of
nationalist groups fostering militant youth movements to keep old hatreds alive
and training in the Australian bush threatened domestic social order and that “the
peaceful Serbian community [was] becoming disturbed at the steady growth of
the Ustashe movement in Australia,” and that “Croat incidents” could spell
trouble for Australian-Yugoslav inter-state relations (Aarons 2001, 405).
This concern was not off the mark. Even more peaceful nationalist Croat
forms of protest became international incidents. In 1977, Australian Croats
opened an unofficial “Croatian embassy” in Canberra with financial help from the
Croat diaspora in the United States and Canada. The opening of the “embassy
without a country” had “repercussions as far away as Chicago” and in Belgrade.31
Under the direction of Australian civil servant turned Croat activist, Marjo
Despoja, the embassy represented “boldness and a thumb in Tito’s eye.”32
Despite immense pressure from Yugoslav authorities to shut the offices down,
Australian policymakers, wary that hastily shutting down the operation might
                                                 
30 “Danas Na Rieci Murray-Sjutra Na Drini,” Spremnost (Fabijan Lovokovi_, ed.), January-
February 1963.
31 See Tyner, Howard. “An ‘Embassy’ Without a Country,” Chicago Tribune, 14 January 1979.
32 Author interview with Marjo Despoja, 12 March 2002.
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antagonize the Australian Croat community, allowed the “embassy” to function
for nearly two years.
Other forms of Croat diaspora mobilization were more ominous. After
secret paramilitary training in Australia, another Croat nationalist group, the
Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB), launched an unsuccessful armed
uprising in communist Yugoslavia in 1963. A Croatian nationalist assassinated
the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden in 1971, and letters exchanged between pro-
Yugoslav Australian Croats and then Australian Prime Minister, William
McMahon, reveal a mutual fear that Yugoslav officials in Australia were also in
similar danger.33 At the height of the Croatian Spring in 1972 another Australian-
based insurgency into Yugoslavia failed, and that same year Commonwealth
police also foiled an HRB plot to assassinate the visiting Yugoslav Prime Minister
(Aarons 2001; SBS Television 2001).
In fact, pro-Yugoslav Australians of all backgrounds were threatened or
rhetorically targeted by extremist diaspora Croats during the Cold War. The
Croatian National Resistance’s founding declaration and constitution, for
instance, states that “[w]e regard Yugoslavism and Yugoslavia as the greatest and
only evil that has caused the existing calamity … We therefore consider every
direct or indirect help to Yugoslavia as treason against the Croat Nation.”34 This,
                                                 
33 Miro Baresic was convicted of assassinating Ambassador Vladimir Rolovic and was paroled in
Stockholm in 1987. M.M. Alagich, former president of the Sydney’s Yugal Club and
representative of the Coordinating Committee of National Communities from Yugoslavia,
provided full access to his private archive of letters and reports documenting nationalist Croat and
pro-Yugoslav Croat relations in Australia. Copies of all papers and letters referenced are in the
author’s possession.
34 A copy of the Croatian National Resistance constitution is in the author’s personal collection.
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of course, made targets and “traitors” of anyone doing business with the Yugoslav
government, foreign embassy staff, the Australian Labor Party, and especially all
Australian Croats or Australian Serbs sympathetic to the former Yugoslavia’s
Communist government.
No known study has tabulated the precise number of extremist Croat
terrorist incidents in Australia during the Cold War period, but by 1972 the
Australian Commonwealth Police had detailed more than fifty significant Croat-
Serb incidents, including at least 15 bombings and what was described as
“professional assassinations” and murders, over the previous ten year period
suspected of being the work of pro-Ustashe or Chetnik Serb organizations or
individuals (Aarons 2001, 427).35
Troubles continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The following list of
incidents, gleaned from ASIO, DIMIA and Australia’s foreign language press, is
representative of the perhaps hundreds of incidents of violence and intimidation
within the greater southern Slav community since the 1970s:
• 1970 bombing of Yugoslav Consulate General, Melbourne
• 1970 bombing of Serbian Orthodox Church, Melbourne
• 1972 bombing of Serbian Orthodox Church, Melbourne
• 1972 armed assault at the Yugoslav Consulate, Perth
• 1972 bombing of two Yugoslav tourist agencies, Sydney
                                                 
35 Descriptions of intra- and inter-diaspora conflict confirmed in author interviews with Tony
Juri_, President, Australian Croatian Association, 29 October 2001; Tom Starcevik, editor of the
Croatian language newspaper Hrvatski Vjesnik, 19 November 2001; and Croatian community
activist Marjo Despoja, 12 March 2002.
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• 1972 bombing of pro-Yugoslav political figure, Melbourne
• 1972 bombing of Serbian Orthodox Church, Brisbane
• 1973 arson at Croatian newspaper offices, Melbourne
• 1975 bombing of Yugoslav tourist agency, Melbourne
• 1977 bombing of Yugoslav Airlines office, Melbourne
• 1977 bombing of Mihailovic (Serb) statue, Canberra
• 1978 arrest of Croats for paramilitary training, NSW
• 1988 Yugoslav Club firebombed and vandalized, Adelaide
• 1988 shooting death of 16-year-old Croat outside the Yugoslav
consulate, Sydney
Croats as Public Enemy?
For much of the period since the Second World War, the Croat community
in Australia was subjected to public pressure and the stigma of fascism and
terrorism, and today it is still frequently viewed as ‘extremist’ and violent in its
relations with other Southern Slavs. For example, ethnic violence at soccer
matches, now a characteristic feature of the code in Australia, is routinely
recognized as a “Yugo” import.
These disapproving public labels were patently evident as anti-Communist
Vietnamese “boat people” began to arrive in Australia after the fall of Saigon.
There was fear among both Australian political elites and the broader Australian
public that like the Croatian migrants before them, the Vietnamese in Australia
would seek to ‘liberate their homeland’, thus causing the problem of legal control,
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diplomatic headaches with the government in Vietnam, and a backlash among
other Australians. This was the origin for the particularly pungent epithet for
Vietnamese refugees, ‘Yellow Croatians’; in one phrase, the “sum of all fears”
(Viviani 1984, 56).36
The Australia media also played-up the potential for Croats to disrupt
ethnic relations and regularly conveyed images of the Croat community as an
ethnic group whose collective actions were politically driven and “un-Australian.”
For example, an analysis of 116 articles concerning Croats that appeared in the
Sydney Morning Herald from 1955 to 1988 (on the eve of the Yugoslav state
collapse) reveals the negative ways in which Croats were presented to the
Australian public (see Hockenos 2003). Not one of the 116 articles takes a
positive stance towards Croats or Croatia. Most of them focus in some way on
either acts of terrorism or demonstrations and protests. Even the more neutral
articles deal in some way with the heightened level of passion political events in
the homeland engender among Australian Croats and the highly charged emotions
and actions of the Croat community in Australia. “With an anti-Croat Australian
press,” suggests Marjo Despoja, “is it any surprise Croatians felt alienated,
singled out, and targeted for more than a generation?”37
No doubt, some Australian Croats remained alienated from Australian
society in part because Croat, and also Serb, political activity is, in fact, largely
hidden from “outsiders” as it takes place in languages unknown to virtually all
                                                 
36 Prime Minster Gough Whitlam and the Australian Labor Party also feared Vietnamese
migrants would vote right-wing.
37 Author interview with Marjo Despoja, 19 March 2002.
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other Australians and within a cultural inheritance, which is also by and large
unfamiliar. James Jupp opines that Australia’s Croats and Serbs alike are Balkan
culturally, though citizens of Australia, and that
for many Yugoslavs political life centers around the communities and their
concern with homeland affairs. As Yugoslavia’s politics have always been
conducted on a totally different basis from those of Australia, these
concerns may insulate Yugoslavs from local political reality as well as
alienating them from local institutions (Jupp 1988, 23).
Many Australian Croats added to this homeland-oriented mindset the
perpetual belief that Croatia was oppressed within Yugoslavia and that once this
oppression ceased and Croatia was “free” again, the majority of Australian Croats
would return to their homeland (Skrbi_ 1999). In this belief, Australian Croats
mirror Jewish views of the “Babylonian exile” and the expulsion of the Jews from
Jerusalem in the sixth century B.C. Nebuchadnezzar, according to tradition, exiled
the Jews to Babylon where they languished in captivity and were thereafter
dispersed to other foreign lands, compelled to live as outsiders in an often alien
and hostile world. “Babylonian exile” connotes forcible expulsions, persecution,
and enslavement, and implies the prospect of return. By definition, those in exile
are to cultivate their native traditions and culture in preparation for a return to the
Promise Land. This is, in fact, a near perfect description of many first-generation
Australian Croat nationalists.
A Generational Shift?
This “victim syndrome” is found even among Australian Croat youth.
When asked whether they identify themselves as Australians or Croatians, almost
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all state that they are Croatian first and Australian second. To be “Australian” for
most of the younger generation interviewed for this project, means Australians of
English or Irish ancestry. One Croat youth club leader from Geelong, Victoria
explained that he is “really a little of both since I am Croatian, but I live in
Australia.”38 Another twenty-something Australian Croat offered, “Australians
don’t have too much in common. That’s what multiculturalism really means. You
only know who you are because of your blood.”39
The idea of a Croatian homeland offers to younger generations of
Australian Croats a sense of identity and a connection with parents and
grandparents. Most second and third generation diaspora community members,
however, claim they are, nonetheless, different from the “oldies”—their parents’
and grandparents’ generations—because they expect to remain in Australia.
Although there are numerous cases in the community of young people who have
gone to Croatia—especially since independence—many quickly returned
disillusioned. It was not the place their parents spoke about and did not provide
the creature comforts of Australian life. In fact, I was repeatedly told during a
Croatian “Younger Generations Conference” in December 2001, when
Australians visit Croatia they “discover just how Australian they are.” On
numerous occasions globetrotting, younger Australian Croats repeated that they
“felt like Mark Viduka,” a reference to the Australian soccer star and son of
                                                 
38 Author interview with Ivan Juki_, 8 December 2001.
39 Author interview with Ivan Sutalo, 8 December 2001.
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Croatian immigrants, who once reportedly said that “In Australia, I’m Croatian;
but in Croatia, I’m Australian.”
In reality, during the long Cold War both “oldies” and “youngies” in the
Croat nationalist diaspora managed to put down some roots in Australia, but as
Edward Said observes,
Exile can produce rancor and regret, as well a sharpened vision. What has
been left behind can either be mourned, or it can be used to provide a
different set of lenses. Since almost by definition exile and memory go
together, it is what one remembers of the past that determines how one
sees the future (Said 2001, XXXV).
What was remembered most by the Croat diaspora in the 1990s was the
unresolved legacy of the Second World War. Given the political experiences in
the former Yugoslavia and their relevance for the Croat diaspora, it should come
as no surprise that many Croats simply prefer politics they can understand or that
seems important to them. This was never more evident than during Yugoslavia’s
disintegration in 1991, when animosities between the different Yugoslav
nationalities in Australia intensified and when in April 1993 leaders of both
communities warned of “a war on our streets.”
Homeland Calling
These events and mobilizations, and energized debate about the future of
the Croat nation, helped transform Australia’s Croat community from a
disenchanted, sometimes fractious ethnic group into a powerful and relatively
wealthy diaspora with a new sense of purpose and confidence in the 1990s. The
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shift is well explained by Ilija Sutalo, a Croatian Club student leader at the
University of Melbourne in the early 1990s:
I think Croatians are like Chinese: they’re always out for themselves and
their family first. Serbs are like Japanese, they’re more cohesive. Even if
they’re enemies they’ll stick together. Even during the war. Karadicz and
Milosevic were enemies, but they decided to get along. Croatians aren’t
like that. If you get five Croatian together you’ll get five different political
viewpoints. Even in Geelong where there are about 5000 Croats, they have
two completely different clubs. Then you have the soccer club, which is
neutral. Then you’ve got the Church. And then you have completely
different cliques. Only during the war did people get along because for
once their was a common purpose, a reason to see past political
differences and personal slights. It was really amazing.40
Paul Hockenos records another exchange between a right-wing émigré
Croat and then Croatian President Tudjman about Tudjman’s past affiliation with
the Yugoslav Communist Party:
One man stood up and defiantly announced that he had carried a rifle for
the Ustashe. “If I had caught you in the forest forty years ago,” he assailed
Tudjman, “you’d be dead now. And if you caught me, I’d be dead.” The
hall stood still. “But whatever the case,” he continued with a nod, “I’m
behind you now” (Hockenos 2003, 47).
Indeed, many Australian Croat communal organizations that until the
1990s called themselves “Yugoslavian,” promptly changed their names and
allegiances, to reflect their newly identified ethnic difference from Serbs. At their
private clubs, and back-room meetings at diaspora community festivals and
conventions they fantasized about returning together to an independent
Croatia—one that stretched to cover the Croatian republic, half of Bosnia, and all
the way to the Drina River, just at it had in the 1940s.
                                                 
40 Author interview with Iljia Sutalo, 16 Novermber 2001.
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A key cause of this change was intensified transnational links. But these
homeland-diaspora relations were complex. Did homeland politicians control the
purse strings of the diaspora? Or were the political forces in the homeland spurred
on by militant exiles? Ample evidence indicates that the overseas ethnic
communities mobilized to aid nationalist political factions in the homeland well
before the shooting started. And Tudjman and other homeland politicians boldly
reached out to the diaspora during exploratory trips to Australia in the late 1980s.
A key component of Tudjman’s Croatian National Policy was the concept of
“Iseljena Hrvatska” or “Exiled Croatia” which implied that all ethnic Croats
living outside Croatia proper were in fact political exiles who still “belonged” to
Croatia. The goal was to repatriate and re-nationalize diaspora Croats to Croatia
and the national cause.
Tudjman’s literature, posters, stickers, and badges sold like hotcakes in
Australia. Touring HDZ politicians and cultural troupes collected cash for T-shirts
and videotapes.41 Australian Croats who had never before participated in Croatian
community life were urged to join existing and newly created ethnic organizations
and reaffirm their ethnic identity.  The Melbourne-based bi-lingual newspaper
Croatian Herald estimated that the diaspora community raised more than three
million Australian dollars for Tudjman. All told, by 1991 overseas Croats had
raised US$30 million to fund the war for independence and over the next few
                                                 
41 Sometimes real hotcakes of considerable value were sold. Rumor in Melbourne’s Croat
community has it that one fruitcake adorned with Croatia’s coat of arms went to the highest bidder
for seven hundred Australian dollars in an HDZ-sponsored bake sale.
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years the Tudjman government received more than US $4 million for the HDZ
election campaign in 1990 (Glenny 1996; Masanauskas 1991).
Some observers intimate that diasporic Croats, in essence, bought their
right to vote (see Glenny 1996; Hayden 1992). Following independence, the
Croatian government under Tudjman established rules by which up to 400,000
Croats with no permanent residence in Croatia were eligible to vote in national
elections. Polling stations were periodically erected by the Croatian government
in its Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth consulates, as well as in community
centers, clubs, and churches designated by Zagreb. No accurate figures exist
regarding how many Australian Croats have voted in Croatian elections, but
estimates from Croatian officials suggest as many as 150,000 Croats around the
globe may have done so.42
Australian citizens of Croatian origin participated in the 1990 Yugoslav
election without holding Yugoslavian citizenship and in the 1992 Croatian
election without holding Croatian citizenship. This constituted a departure from
the practice that acquisition of citizenship in a host society denotes a new political
allegiance, and it indicated that the Croatian state viewed the adoption of
Australian citizenship by the diasporic community as a formality. Croats’ 95.9%
naturalization rate indicated that many Croats took out Australian citizenship to
improve their position in Australian society or affirm a new loyalty.43 But this act
                                                 
42 Estimates based on author interviews with Tony Juri_, 29 October 2001, and Tom Starcevik,
19 November 2001.
43 At the 2001 Census, the rate of Australian Citizenship for the Croatia-born in Australia was
significantly greater than the 75.1 per cent rate for all overseas-born.
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did not necessarily mean that they renounced their loyalty to their homeland.
Additionally, in 1992 the worldwide Croatian diaspora was granted representation
in the Croatian parliament. Initially, twelve seats out of 92 were reserved for
diaspora Croats, as compared to only seven for national ethnic minorities, so that
non-resident ethnic kin were provided more political representation than the
resident non-Croat population.
The relations between Croatian officials and Australia’s diaspora Croats
are not always congruent, and signs of some old fissures continued to exist.
Beyond the common desire for homeland independence, diasporic Croat unity
was difficult to fashion and
[f]rom early on, Croatians were divided along ideological lines as to the
fate of Croatia. For example, although most Croatians were united in their
opposition to the Serbian government…conflicts still erupted over the
events leading up to that war. Accusations of pro-fascist or Communist
sympathies were commonly exchanged by different diasporan factions
(Winland 1995, 9).
A senior Croatian Minister reported in 1991 that well-funded and
organized Australian Croats returned to Croatia intent on undermining peace,
frustrating negotiations between Serbian and Croatian officials, and pressing the
Croatian government to declare full independence immediately, and to forcing a
military solution to the Yugoslav conflict (Clark 1991). Croatian officials, perhaps
including Tudjman, believed that Croat acquisition of Serb-held land could be
gained peacefully, perhaps through some sort of swap. The émigrés objected
vigorously and believed that conflict could not be solved without bloodshed. That
is, whereas homeland Croats, perhaps including Tudjman, who had lived for years
in Belgrade and better appreciated the cost of war, felt that a political solution was
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possible, anti-Serb Croat émigrés were more prepared to demand independence,
even at the cost of Croat lives and the destruction of property in the homeland.
Home and Back Again
Accurate statistics regarding return migration are difficult to obtain
because many Australian Croats who emigrated to Croatia maintained their dual
Croatian and Australian citizenships, something that is not apparent in
immigration or other official government statistics in either country. However,
simple observation suggests that second and third generation descendents in the
diaspora were so caught up in the fervor of the early 1990s that they returned to
Croatia in significant numbers.
Australian columnist Frank Devine recounts how during a vacation to
Croatia in 1997 he was surprised to hear English language news bulletins read by
“a woman with a strong, pleasant Australian accent” and that the newsreader,
Kate Marijan was one of about 3,000 young Australians of Croat descent who
returned to live in the country of their forebears. After that episode, Devine more
readily noticed young Australian Croat investment bankers in Zagreb, a young
building contractor from Melbourne on his way to meet a few other Australian
Croats for a few beers after mass (very Australian), and even an Australian-born
Zagreb University professor who returned to Croatia at age twenty in 1990 and
learned how to make Molotov cocktails during the war.44
                                                 
44 See Frank Devine, “They Still Call Croatia Home,” The Australian, 26 May 1997, p.13.
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The number of Australian Croats who left Australia to fight for an
independent Croatia is also not officially known, but anecdotal reports suggest
that there were at least several dozen.45 A common rumor in Melbourne is that six
such young men from Australia, Germany, and the United States earned the rank
of general. Croatia’s Minister for the Interior suggested in 1991 that thousands of
Australian Croats arrived back in their homeland and joined the proxy war against
the communist led Yugoslav Army.
That “thousands” of young Croats returned to fight is probably an
exaggeration, though the Croatian Democratic Union of Australia acknowledged
that some young Australian Croat men “have gone over there and come back full
of hate.” Colorful press accounts abounded in the early 1990s regarding a
Melbourne resident, “Tony”, who was fighting in Dubrovnik for his homeland.
His parents, still in Melbourne, thought he worked for the Red Cross, but he
admitted his participation in a crack paramilitary unit. He said he knew of more
than 20 Australians fighting as hired hands for Croatia and recounted,  “one of my
mates loves to go in really close range with a sawn-off shotgun and blast their
brains out when they least expect it. And he’s a knife man, too. I’m not.”46
What is more certain is that diaspora Croats spent millions of dollars to aid
Croatia in its hour of need—on arms, humanitarian aid, and on political lobbying
to push their host countries to recognize Croatia’s statehood. The most
                                                 
45 Daphne Winland (1999), for example, reports that about 100 Canadian Croats returned and
fought for Croatian independence while nearly forty times that number returned from around the
globe returned between 1991-1998 to settle in their homeland.
46 See news coverage of Australians returning from war in the former Yugoslavia in The
Australian Financial Review, 11 July 1991, p. 12; and The West Australian, July 14, 1992.
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nationalistic among them helped shift popular discourse in Croatia to the right and
promoted the use of nationalist symbols in Australia and elsewhere. The effect of
this mobilization on relations among Croats and Serbs in Australia will be
examined after a review of the Australian Serb diaspora community below.
AUSTRALIA’S SERBS
Amid a sea of Serbian, Montenegrin, Macedonian and Greek flags and
chants of “Serb-ia”, fifteen thousand Australian Serbs and their supporters
demonstrated outside American consulates in Australia’s major cities on 29
March, 1999. The demonstrators vented their outrage at the American-led attacks
on Yugoslavia and Serb interests in Kosovo the preceding week. Australian Serb
youth clashed with riot police in both Sydney and Melbourne and several hundred
demonstrators wrestled with security guards in an attempt to gain entrance to the
U.S. consulate in Sydney. They were unsuccessful, but the American flag was
hauled from its pole and burned. Across the street shop windows were smashed
and a car parked in front of the consulate was vandalized. Two police received
wounds needing medical attention after confronting the protesters.
A larger, and more peaceful, protest occurred simultaneously in front of
the Sydney Opera House where Prime Minister Howard was scheduled to speak at
a celebration rally honoring Australia’s Greek community. This more somber and
gray-haired protest was organized by the ad hoc “Movement for the Protection of
Kosovo and Metohija” whose spokesman, Ilija Glisic, was also head of the
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Serbian National Federation of Australia (SNF).47 The dominant theme of all the
protests, suggests Glisic, was comparison of the 1999 bombings with the Nazi
attack on Yugoslavia in 1941.48
In this effort, banners at all the rallies denounced the hypocrisy of the
Western powers who, Serbs contend, turned a blind eye to Serb suffering, just as
they did during the Croatian military operation that led to the expulsion from their
homes of tens of thousands of Krajina Serbs in 1995. One senior citizen protester
in Sydney carried a sign, with attached photocopies of a newspaper story about
his reception as a hero at an Allied forces reunion in America, stating he had
personally saved the lives of 15 American airmen during the Second World War.
American jets, he proclaimed, were now dropping bombs on his grandchildren.
Among the banners critical of the United States and the Howard
Government’s support for the American bombing of Yugoslavia were other flags
that made liberal use of the symbols of the Serb nationalist Chetnik forces of
World War II. Scores of younger demonstrators wore distinctive Chetnik caps
with the military symbols of the old Serbian monarchy. Others carried Serb flags
with royalist emblems. Some youth even carried the black flag and skull symbol
of the more notorious Chetnik units side by side with the icons and crosses of the
Serbian Orthodox Church.
                                                 
47The SNF of Australia (founded 1991) is the largest umbrella organization of Australian Serbs
comprising delegates of Serbian national, cultural, sporting, social and humanitarian organizations
on a state-by-state basis. Each state branch elects representatives for the federal body. The SNF’s
objectives revolve around political and media lobbying, representation and defending community
needs and also humanitarian fundraising. The SNF also works in close contact with the two
Serbian Orthodox Dioceses in Australia.
48 Author interviews with Ilija Glisic on 3-5 March 2002.
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The 1999 protests of Australian Serbs reveal much about the formation
and evolution of Serbian identity in Australia in the 1990s. First and most clearly,
the trauma experienced by Australian Serbs in witnessing the television and
newspaper images of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 was, according
to Nicholas Procter, doubly injurious to the Australian Serb psyche. In the early
and mid-1990s the Serb community had already witnessed the Yugoslav wars
with shock and horror. Throughout the decade, diasporic Serbs felt like
scapegoats and outsiders in Australia since when almost the entire world
“believes that one of the groups is the main perpetrator of war, there are increased
feelings of alienation and discomfort” (Procter 1998, 1). This sentiment mirrored
Australian Serb criticism of the United Nations, the Australian government, and
the Australian press during the Bosnia crisis:
The Serbs have been bombed by NATO forces for indiscretions that they
have committed but the Muslim and Croat forces have never even had the
threat of bombing when they have committed similar indiscretions.49
Serbia’s forced withdrawal from Kosovo was, therefore, another
devastating loss in a decade of losses to the nationalists in the Serb diaspora,
whose conception of a mythic “Greater Serbia” had never wavered. Many
Australian Serbs watched in disbelief as their dream of a Serbia that stretched
across most of the former Yugoslavia receded with every successive defeat of the
Serbian armed forces—in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and then in Kosovo.
More often than not, Australian Serbs felt they, too, were also literal
victims of the homeland wars, but that their pains were either ignored or forgotten
                                                 
49 Author interview with Glisic, op cit.
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by the wider Australian community. Melbourne healthcare workers and ethnic
community activists verify this circumstance and report that Australian Serbs who
fled Croatia and Bosnia in the mid-1990s make up the bulk of the caseload of
Victoria’s Foundation for the Survivors of Torture and Trauma patients.50 Many
Serb refugees reported that they were beaten with baseball bats and rifle butts by
Croat and Bosnian Muslim paramilitaries. Others report rapes, being forced to
watch the torture of family and neighbors, and being forced to commit sexual acts
with family members. These traumas, Australian welfare authorities suggest, are
regularly manifest in mental illnesses, high suicide rates, and marital discord in
the Serb community.
Second, like the concomitant mobilization of the Croat community in the
1990s, Australian Serbs gained an increased identification with Serbian
nationalism and revived old symbols used in previous Balkan wars. Just as
diasporic Croats maintained a belief in a unified, independent Croatia throughout
the Tito years, so pockets of the smaller Serb diaspora were true believers in the
Serbian royalist dreams of restoring the Karadjordjevi_ monarchy of Yugoslavia.
The state they envisioned encompassed all of Serbia proper, as well as
Montenegro, most of Bosnia, and large swathes of Croatia and Macedonia.
On the precipice of the Yugoslavian disintegration, thousands of diaspora
Serbs joined the estimated one million pilgrims who descended on Kosovo’s Field
                                                 
50 Several stories in The Age, 26 April 1999, document Serbs and the “forgotten victims” of the
Balkan war and tell their stories and of the efforts of Australian social and welfare workers to
mend physical and psychological wounds of Serb refugees.
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of Blackbirds on the Serbs’ revered St. Vitas Day in 1989 to celebrate the six
hundredth anniversary of the Serbian defeat at the hands of the Ottomans. The
date 28 June 1389 is etched deep in the collective memory of the Serbs.
According to legend, it was on that day that the medieval Serb army fell to the
Ottoman Turks, ushering in four centuries of foreign rule over Serbia. The story
of the valiant and hopelessly outnumbered Serb commander, Prince Lazar, who
waged war against the Turks and perished—rather that surrender—is an epic
passed sown in Serbia from generation to generation. The defeat at Kosovo Field
launched four hundred years of persecution and oppression at the hands of the
Ottomans, which the Serbs broke only in the nineteenth century after years of
rebellion. The key lesson entrenched in the Serb collective psyche is the
conviction that Serbia was, and remains today, a holy Christian bulwark against
Islam and the frontline nation in the centuries old battle between East and West.51
Among the numbers of pilgrims in 1989 were several hundred émigrés
from Australia. The thought that armed battles would soon engulf Yugoslavia
seemed alarmist to the Australians. In contrast to the Australian Croats’
spectacular bombings and paramilitary campaigns in early decades, Australia’s
Serbs were relatively docile during the Cold War. They were not in the 1980s
pondering war, but after years of hibernation the diaspora was awakening from a
                                                 
51 Scholars familiar with this history are not surprised by Serbia’s offer to send troops to
Afghanistan to aid in the hunt for Islamists and Bin Laden in 2002, nor by Serb paramilitary
fighters predilection to fight to the death rather than surrender in the face of overwhelming
Western firepower in both the Bosnia and Kosovo campaigns.
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long national slumber and reviving pernicious myths and symbols that would
erupt once the Cold War was over.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Serb community throughout the
1990s grew increasingly incredulous at their reversal of fortune. Since the Second
World War, Australian Serbs had viewed themselves as allies with the anti-fascist
powers of that war. They were dumbfounded at the lack of sympathy for a greater
Serbian state and dismayed to discover that in the 1990s their homeland kin and,
by extension, themselves—and not Croatian nationalists nor Albanian or Bosnian
Muslims—were viewed as the aggressors in the Balkans. Many Australian Serbs
maintained that Australia, and other Western countries, had been badly duped by
a coalition of adversarial forces ranging from the Vatican to Islamic-paid lobby
groups.
Nascent organizations such as SNF, the Serbian National Council (SNC)
and the Cause of Australian Serbs (CAS) were hastily founded to counter the the
lobbying and public relations efforts of the Australian Croat community. The
Australian Serb organizations desperately tried to challenge the conventional
wisdom that the war that ravaged such large part of the former Yugoslavia was a
war of Serbian aggression, but admit their efforts largely failed.52
Forgotten Brothers or Serbia’s Little Helpers?
The single most striking trait of the Serb diaspora in Australia, and
elsewhere, is that most of its members do not come from Serbia proper at all. The
                                                 
52 Author interview with SNF president Ilija Glisic, 3-5 March 2002.
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first influx of Serb émigrés to Australia in the 1880s came almost entirely from
the Austro-Hungarian territories north of Serbia and in Dalmatia. And a large
number of Australian Serbs trace their family origins to present Bosnia and
Croatia, a fact that strongly colored their emotional reactions to the wars there in
the 1990s.
These working class Serb migrants had little in common with the
displaced officer corps and royalist sympathizers who escaped Partisan-controlled
Yugoslavia after World War II. These post-War political exiles arrived in
Australia bitter about lost property and status, and convinced—not unlike
nationalist Australian Croats—that a victorious return to the homeland was
imminent. They had escaped Yugoslavia with Tito’s troops in pursuit and most
had pledged loyalty to the royalist supreme commander, Draza Mihailovic, to the
deposed and exiled king, Peter II, and to the Karadjordjevi_ blood line that had
ruled Serbia, and sometimes Yugoslavia, since it threw off the Ottoman yoke. To
the Australian Serbs loyal to the Mihailovic movement, their cause represented
anti-fascism and Anglophilia, since London welcomed King Peter who there
reconstituted a government-in-exile.
Creating New-Old Serbian Identities
When thousands of Serb refugees fled Milosevic’s Serbia for Australia
during the 1990s, they encountered a Serb diaspora community in a disoriented,
time-warped world locked in a bygone era—Yugoslavia circa 1950. And by all
accounts Milosevic had the Serbian diaspora in his sights even before the end of
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the Cold War. In the late 1980s, he relaxed some of the more draconian
restrictions on the visitation rights of political exiles and he hatched an ambitious
investment scheme to mine the Serb diaspora for long-term loans to purportedly
modernize Serbian industry. As it turned out, the sum of monies and remittances
financed Serbia’s part in the 1991-1996 war (Hockenos 2003, 5). And the
Australian Serb community—and not unlike the Croat diaspora—played along
and revealed chauvinistic instincts that rivaled the attitudes of their cousins in the
homeland, including regularly referring to Serb peace activists in Australia as
traitors and “Croat spies.”
Even old-school monarchists who had fled Yugoslavia in the sights of
communist rifles ironically excused Milosevic’s previous Partisan affiliations in
the hope of finally having their life-long dream materialize, and because
Milosevic spoke up for Serb interests. They initially promoted him as national
hero and a man who would create Greater Serbia, and aevenge them for the
atrocities that the Croatian Ustashe committed against the Serbs in Bosnia and
Croatia in the 1940s. In the early 1990s Milosevic became everything for
everyone. Serb historian Aleksa Djilas says that
For old-style communists he was as close as you could get to an old-style
communist. To Chetniks he seemed like some kind of neo-Cheknik. To
those who wanted to keep Yugoslavia at all costs he seemed like someone
who might be able to keep Yugoslavia together with the help of the army
and party. To those who were concerned about Serbian national interests,
he could protect Serbian national interests. And to democrats, well, there
was a certain liberalization that took place, for which he’s not given
sufficient credit today, but it did happen. He was also a banker who
worked in New York, so some people were expecting economic reforms.
They said here’s a young guy who is primarily a manager and
businessman rather than a party ideologue (Hockenos 2003, 126).
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The nearly 100,000 Serbian Australians, in contrast with their Australian
Croat counterparts, must normally return to the former Yugoslavia to vote and
engage in homeland politics. They were the focus of one of the most peculiar
twists of dual citizenship in action in recent times (Marinkovic, 2001). In 1993
Australian-based Bosnian Serbs voted overwhelmingly against the UN-proposed
Vance-Owen peace plan which would divide war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina into
10 autonomous ethnic regions. More than 10,000 of the estimated 22,000 eligible
Bosnian Serbs turned out to vote at special polls authorized by Bosnian Serb
leader, Radovan Karadzic.53 Voting was theoretically open to Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian Croats living in Australia, but since most of the polling stations were
set up in Serbian Orthodox churches and Australian-Serb clubs, few Bosnians of
other ethnic designation exercised the option.
The most remarkable feature of the referendum was that many of those
voting were not born in Bosnia nor other parts of the former Yugoslavia, had
never visited the country, and were too young to remember many of the World
War II atrocities which have partly caused the bloody civil war. Some Bosnian
Serb Australians thus voted to support Karadzic and his policies only two months
after the 1993 Australian Federal election. But while the Serb diaspora had a key
role to play in Milosevic’s script he, unlike Croatia’s Tudjman, never reimbursed
                                                 
53 See multiple stories in The Age, 17 May 1993, regarding the Australian Serb vote. The
Karadzic referendum on the Vance-Owen Plan was lopsided with 89% of the Bosnian Serbs
nationwide voting “no” and fully 99.5% of the community in Melbourne voting “no.” See also
Neales (1993).
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the diaspora for their troubles with diasporic appointments to his inner circle, nor
provided the political support for a pro-Serb lobbying campaign in the West.
The Serbian government was not prepared for a lobbying contest and thus
failed to engage public relations firms to fight the media war as did the Croats.
When the SNF sent press releases to all the major Australian papers in 1991 and
1992 arguing the point that the right to national self-determination granted to the
Slovenes, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims, was denied to the Serbs who were
relegated to second-class citizen status in the newly formed Bosnia and reformed
Croatia, it did so without homeland government advice or oversight.
During the Cold War years royalist émigrés in groups such as the Serbian
National Defense Council (SNDC) and the Serbian Unity Congress (SUC) built
anticipation for the day when nationalist Serbs would overthrow Tito and
Communist Party rule in Belgrade. Behind the guise of Yugoslav brotherhood,
they charged, Tito’s ambition was to tie Serbia’s hands and to keep it fractured
and weak. Even during these early years, Australian Serbs expressed indignation,
especially when Labor controlled government, that Australia and other Western
powers could support, or have friendly relations, with Yugoslavia. Adopting a
strategic Cold War perspective was near impossible for nationalist-minded Serbs
with recent memories and stories of their humiliation. Many could not fathom
how Australia could back communists rather than their movement, even though
Mihailovic and his fighters rescued more than 500 American and British airmen
trapped behind enemy lines in Serbia in 1944 (Hockenos 2003). Australian Serb
dismay at Western forgetfulness played out again in the 1990s. Nonetheless, only
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occasionally did diaspora Chetniks mimic the overzealous stunts of their Croat
counterparts.54
For their part, the SNF warned that Australia could face serious unrest
from Croat and Serb communities when “volunteers” from both sides returned
from fighting in the former Yugoslavia. To their credit, the SNF suggested
Australia enforce the Foreign Incursions Act from the 1970s to keep returning
soldiers from causing havoc.55 But Australian curiosity was instead captured by
tales of the notorious “Captain Dragan,” the nom de guerre of an Australian of
Serbian origin leading a Serbian paramilitary group in southern Croatia.56 Dragan
shocked Melbourne and Sydney newspaper readers with claims that he believed
“in democracy and freedom of speech” because he was “brought up in a
democratic society,” but that “[w]hen the Croatian side uses hospitals or police
stations in their villages as fortified positions, I’m sorry, I just have to massacre
them.”57
                                                 
54 A few of these incidents regarding Serbs in the United States, including a handful of bombings
of Yugoslav facilities and how Serbian émigrés helped to finish off the decorated diplomatic
career of George Kennan are recounted briefly in Chapter 5.
55 This anti-mercenary law makes it an offense for Australian nationals to engage in activities
hostile to another country without state sanction.
56 Some reporters believed Dragan to be former Australian SAS, but Melbourne police believed
him to be Daniel Pavic, a.k.a. Daniel Snedden, a small-time Melbourne criminal who once ran a
chain of suburban call girl services.
57 See multiple stories on the notorious “Captain Dragan” in the Sydney Morning Herald, 30 July
1991, and The Age, 6 August, 1991.
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Moving Beyond Pariah Status
The result of bad press, no homeland support, and the shock of becoming
a pariah community, suggests one former executive of the SNDC’s Melbourne
branch, was a very successful media campaign by the Croat media machine in
“demonizing” the Serbs throughout the world and a one-sided public view where
the Serbs were “the guilty party for everything…like an open hunt.”58 That
demonization was felt by Australian Serbs and led to claims of anti-Serb
discrimination in the workplace, at schools, and by the Federal government.
Moreover, the one-sided Australian sanctions against Serbia made it very difficult
for Australian Serbs to send money or aid to their loved ones and also made travel
and contact by mail and phone more difficult than necessary. Glisic suggests that
[Serbs] had a pretty rough trot since the civil war broke out in the former
Yugoslavia. Apart from the media bias, the main concern to the
community is the injudicious handling of issues by the Government. The
Serbs of Australia have in large measure been left to their own devices and
resources to defend the community against, if you can believe it, the
Government and, of course, the media.59
SNF executives met with Bob Hawke and Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, Gareth Evans on several occasions. They warned of the dangers of
premature recognition of independent states in the former Yugoslavia and
predicted the enormous tragedy that would befall the people in the former
Yugoslavia if secession was not dealt with appropriately. Glisic reported that his
warnings fell on deaf ears and that Hawke and Evans proceeded to follow the
                                                 
58 Author interview with Glisic, 3-5 March 2002.
59 Author interview with Glisic, ibid.
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errors of the international community and wanted to acknowledge the breaking up
of the former Yugoslavia based on the principle of recognizing the internal
community designed republican boundaries as new international borders, which
would leave Serb populations stranded in Croatia and Bosnia.
This, the Australian Serbs leadership warned, had happened before:
The decision to run blind and particularly recognition of internal
administrative areas as new internal states precipitated an enormous
human, cultural, and historic tragedy. Just look at what they did with the
FYROM recognition. It almost resulted in an all out ethnic revolt never
seen before in Australia. There was also a lot of insensitivity and bias in
the Governments approach to the humanitarian aid dispatch to refugees
created by the war. About half of the refugees displaced by the war fled to
Serbian territories and those territories were under severs sanction by the
world community. We explained this in person and in writing to the
Government, but they did little to assist in facilitating aid transfer to those
refugees. I think the numbers were something like $20,000 out of $3
million went to Serbs, that’s .7%.60
The SNF also applied for visas for prominent Serbs to visit Australia to
assist with humanitarian fundraising, but the Government denied them entry visas.
The denial of a visa for Dr. Biljana Plavsic, a Serbian parliamentarian was
challenged in Federal Court and overturned, but Serbs could not believe they had
to go to such great lengths to pressure the Government to take an even-handed
approach. Several Australian Serbs claimed in the course of interviews that the
other Balkan communities had virtually unhindered access to their people
overseas, and that alleged war criminals have been granted visas to enter
Australia. This was, of course, an oblique reference to Tudjman’s visit and the
Croatian HDZ party members’ frequent trips to the Australian Croat community.
                                                 
60 Author interview with Glisic, ibid.
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With tensions running high and relations among Australian Croats,
Australian Serbs, and the Australian government turning sour, how was Croat-
Serb conflict curbed?
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Chapter 4: Australia’s Informal Success
CHANNELING DIASPORA POLITICS
The contemporary Australian mindset has shifted from the navel-gazing of
earlier generations when Australia felt isolated geographically and politically,
toward a more outward-looking, regionally interested perspective. So much so,
suggests Jerzy Smolicz, that Australia is now a prime example of a country that
“claims to be building a multicultural nation and state on the basis of the cultural
contribution of over one hundred ethnic groups” (Smolicz 1998, 5). For the most
part, Australia’s scattered migrant communities have shown a determination to
both preserve their cultures and to integrate into the existing political and social
framework of the country. This effort, however, is not always simple and there
remains the dilemma of reconciling immigrants’ (and their descendents’) love for
their homelands and its cultures, on the one hand, and their desire to adapt to
Australian society and politics, on the other.
As noted in Chapter 3, a substantial percentage of immigrants from
diverse sources arrive in Australia with problematic homeland baggage. Ethnic
nationalist kin living outside the borders, but still actively engaged in the affairs
of their homelands, expose a persistent and increasing challenge to maintaining
peaceful inter-ethnic relations (Constas and Pliatis 1993; Huntington 1996;
Sheffer 1986). And a number of events during the last half-century indicate that
underneath Australia’s well-publicized veneer of peaceful inter-ethnic relations all
is not rosy and that the relatively harmonious state of affairs is, in fact, hard won.
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The concept of institutional channeling (see Chapters 1-2) suggests that
immigrants’ forms of political participation in host countries relate to the specific
political opportunity structures which immigrants face. The more inclusive the
political system is, the more the activities are channeled into that system and
shaped accordingly, rather than taking place outside the system in more
confrontational or extra-legal forms (Ireland 1994; Soysal 1995). However,
studies that explicitly use an institutional channeling approach mainly focus on
immigrants fighting for their rights in the host society, and do not pursue the
dimension of homeland politics in a similarly systematic fashion. To what extent
is the concept of institutional channeling also applicable to the integration of
homeland political interests and activities into the political system of the
migrants’ receiving country? And when migrant communities’ homeland interests
are not compatible, how are inter-ethnic conflicts managed or curbed?
In order to answer these questions, this chapter traces the multi-level
strategies that Australian Croats and Australian Serbs carried out in their host
country. It demonstrates how some in each community used confrontational
strategies, while others employed more institutional participation. Croats and
Serbs in Australia are certainly anchored in their local political institutional
context. Many in both communities usually exercised a combination of formal
and informal, confrontational and cooperative strategies. Australia is not a free
haven for all kinds of activities, and the extent of Australian tolerance and
attentiveness to Croat-Serb relations ranged from forbidding some demonstrations
to ignoring diasporic connections to actively lending support to one community or
the other. To the extent that the Australian political system, and the foreign
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policymaking apparatus in particular, appeared to be closed to input of Australian
Serbs and Australian Croats, each community increasingly vented their
frustrations in public, and sometimes that frustration spilled-over into overt
confrontation that seemed to augur even more intense, and perhaps bloody
conflict.
Considering this, I argue that the choice of diaspora mobilization strategy
and the contours of inter-diaspora relations are related to the communities’
agendas as established by their respective leaderships, and especially by the extent
to which they are compatible with that of host country political officials and
aligned with host country norms and expectations. I contend that the rapid
deterioration of the former Yugoslavia and the real and imagined ties between
ethnic kin there and abroad provided the necessary spark and fuel for intensified
Croat-Serb relations in Australia. But field interviews, press reports, and public
documents also reveal that the changing public perceptions of Serbs and Croats in
the Australian media and among political officials sometimes provided an
accelerant for conflict escalation.
This contention complicates the functionalist understanding of the
significance of the receiving country’s political opportunity structures. A key
aspect of this analysis suggests that the concept of institutional channeling
presupposes a “boundedness” of the political dialogue between migrants and their
host state. Yet, it is the unbounded nature of Croat and Serb orientation and ties to
their homelands that are their key defining features. Australian Croats and
Australian Serbs regularly draw upon, and are exploited by, their political and
ethnic counterparts in the Balkans and in other diasporic contexts.
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The absence of regular, systematic and overt violence between Croats and
Serbs did not mean that ethnic relations were necessarily well managed by
Australian authorities. It meant only that tensions often failed to take a visible,
collective form. While inter-ethnic tensions and violence between Serbs and
Croats did not spiral out of control, there were “near misses”—there were fertile
conditions for violence and participants feared violence may become
unmanageable and get out of hand (Horowitz 2001). The feared levels of violence
never materialized in any systematic way. And inter-community conflict led to the
evolution of effective mechanisms to control it.
I suggest that these mechanisms arose from the mundane influences of
liberal values in Australia. The lesson is straightforward: liberal democracies
accept dramatic forms of political participation like protests and demonstrations,
but they also grant their citizens civil and political rights, making discrimination
less likely. For this reason, the most drastic forms of political protest are often not
required, and violence and domestic conflict are less likely.
The Australian political context conditioned the rival communities and
habituated them to recognize they not only had matters in dispute, but also had
interests in common. Serb and Croat leaders in Australia essentially “saw the
writing on the wall,” calculated their interests, and chose to de-escalate and
temper the inter-ethnic conflict in Australia in an effort to improve their public
image and to maintain intra-diaspora cohesion.
While formal political institutions, including Australia’s official
multiculturalism, channeled Croat and Serb community energies in varying
degrees, the crucial factor limiting inter-diasporic violence in Australia was the
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strenuous work of diaspora elites to direct group behavior according to the
expectations of the wider Australian host society. That is, ethnic community
leaders modified their own goals and hostility, and that of their followers, in order
to harmonize their causes with wider Australian political and social expectations.
The editor of the Croatian Herald, Tom Starcevik, suggests that Australian
Croats, and by extension Australian Serbs, were hyper-aware and careful to craft
positive public images:
The Croatian-Serbian problem is internationalized and we had an inability
to rationally discuss anything. Of course demonstrations were one way to
earn some recognition for our [Croatian] cause, but we knew we had to be
careful about where and how to demonstrate, and what to say.”61
In other words, Australian Croats engaged in self-censorship, formed new
community goals, or redefined their foreign policy and homeland interests ever
cognizant of the judgment of Australian political officials and especially the
media and public.
The following analysis considers four main dimensions of interaction
between Croat and Serb homeland political interests and the communities’
political-institutional context in Australia. The first and second sections describe
how the Australian Croat and Australian Serb communities engaged in
confrontational participation with each other. Some Croats and Serbs used
Australian public space for extremist activities, such as violent campaigns, on the
wrong side of Australian law, while others organized demonstrations, mass-
meetings, fly posting, graffiti, and civil disobedience. A minority of Croats and
                                                 
61 Author interview with Tom Starcevik, 9 November 2001.
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Serbs lashed out at one another with violence or threats of violence Others
engaged in more constructive institutional participation, including letter writing
and direct lobbying of Australian officials, whereby Croats and Serbs worked
with or sometime even within Australian political institutions or pan-ethnic
organizations.
I then examine the roles, and varying success, of Australian public
officials and state institutions mitigating Croat-Serb tensions. Finally, I assess
how Australian Croat and Australian Serb elites tailored homeland and
transnational ties in conjunction with the expectations of the Australian public and
public officials to police their communities and limit the potential for inter-ethnic
violence.
ETHNO-NATIONAL CONFRONTATION
“There are two main types of activist reactions to discontent with
organizations to which one belongs or with which one does business,” suggests
Albert Hirschman, “either voice one’s complaints, while continuing as a member
or customer, in the hope of improving matters; or exit from the organization, to
take one’s business elsewhere” (Hirschman 1978, 90). Exit, voting with their feet,
is what both nationalist Croats and Serbs did in emigrating from the former
Yugoslavia, where their grievances found little voice, to Australia, where they
found more. But to the extent Australia, too, provided little access to foreign
policy makers in the 1990s, Australian Croats and Australian Serbs were
conflicted. Exit back to the former Yugoslavia was one option, as was taking
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advantage of new opportunities to send funds, demonstrate, or organize on the
Internet. A few individuals in both communities, however, chose to increase the
“pitch” of their “voice” and opted for extreme strategies to gain attention, punish
their rivals, and vent their fears and hatreds.
Extremist and Illegal Activities62
For casual observers and news watchers in the 1990s, the outbreak of
Croat-Serb conflicts in Australia seemed sudden; but as demonstrated in Chapter
3, the escalation of tensions was the result of many gradual changes. Certainly,
only a fraction of Croats and Serbs resorted to extremist or illegal activities in the
1990s. Nonetheless, in the early 1990s there was continuous tension between
Croats and Serbs in Australia. And this was sometimes manifested in the form of
Molotov cocktails, attacks on migrant organizations and community centers, and
violent incidents when demonstrators clashed in the street.
Earlier generations of violence within Australia’s greater Yugoslav
population, presented in the previous chapter, were largely intra-communal (e.g.
nationalist Croat v. Yugoslav Croat), and thus were watched by Australian police
                                                 
62 My Australian fieldwork (1999 and 2001-2002) was a journey in search of a story about
conflict; most of the people I interviewed met with me face-to-face, though often reluctantly at
first. I promised on more than one occasion that I wished to understand their actions and
motivations, and that I would present them as accurately as I could, even if I disagreed with their
politics or their actions, which was often the case. I have tried to honor that pledge. Some
interview subjects began with self-serving, one-sided narratives of their involvement in world
events and their roles in their respective communities. Other lied blatantly. Still others proved
remarkably candid, so convinced of the righteousness of their cause that they reasoned that a
genuinely nonpartisan person of sound mind could not help but agree with their arguments and the
actions taken. There were some who surely suspected I was not sympathetic with their positions.
Nevertheless, most of those with whom I spoke at length won a healthy measure of my respect.
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and security forces, but otherwise received relatively patchy attention among the
wider Australian public.63 The violence in the 1990s, in contrast, seemed more
like an ongoing feud of retaliations between two now different Australian ethnic
communities—Croat and Serb—mirroring the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
This larger, more forbidding row was more widely publicized and scrutinized, and
served to stigmatize both the Australian Croat and Australian Serb communities.
From 1990, the Croat community actively pressured the Australian
government to recognize an independent Croatia. Croatian National Congress
officials went on television and radio to declare they were “sick to the gills” with
their treatment in Australia and promised to develop a voting bloc for any
politicians who would support the cause of an independent Croatia. This
community goal was reached in 1991, but by December of that year the
Australian weekly, The Bulletin, warned Australians of a “local Balkan war” and
spiraling violence within the Australian Serb and Australian Croat communities.
In fact, within days of the Croatian and Slovenian declaration of
independence from the former Yugoslavia, tensions among Australians with ties
to the region intensified.64 Nicolas Procter reports that “conflict over the
ownership of land in the Balkans was palpable in the streets and suburbs” of
Australia once the homeland conflict made the television news (Procter 2000, 67).
Headlines, such as “Heading for the Front Lines,” “Serbs in SBS Protest,” “Fans
                                                 
63 Aarons (2001) also provocatively argues the development of Croat right-wing émigré political
groups was facilitated by Australian government agencies that provided them with resources and
protected their leaders from extradition as war criminals.
64 Increase in tension is documented in articles from Srpski Glas, 19 July 1991 and Hrvatski
Vjesni, 29 November 1991 in DIMIA’s Multicultural Media Summary.
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banned from Soccer Match,” “Divided by a Foreign War,” and “ASIO Chief in
Terror Warning,” in the country’s major papers reflected often conflicting and
shallow impressions of the state of Serb-Croat relations in Australia.
While relations among the ethnic communities may not have been perfect,
Australians were told, they appeared far better than the historical experience of
the United States, where Americans were accustomed to hearing repeated, dire
predictions about ethnic violence. Australia was again a lucky country that
managed to bring most Balkan migrants into the fold of Australian partisan
politics. Electoral participation, for example, was viewed as real progress and
proof of Australia’s multicultural policy success. Historically, the Australian
Labor Party rhetorically supported the Tito regime and garnered support from
self-identified Yugoslavs who routinely voted Labor more often than their social
mobility would normally suggest. The Liberal/National Coalition was more
supportive of the “Captive Nations” communities, and drew support from both
nationalistic Serbs and Croats who, in turn, tended to vote more conservatively
than their class position might otherwise indicate. But these counter-intuitive
voting patterns indicate the perennial importance of homeland politics.
And for the next half dozen years, while war raged in the former
Yugoslavia, there were hundreds more accusations and counter-claims of physical
intimidation, menacing and hateful graffiti, pig heads stuck on church gates,
defaced and decapitated statues, drive-by shootings, pipe bombings, and a regular
barrage of threatening phone calls to community members in Australia (See
Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Incidents of Croat-Serb Violence




































Source: Numbers of incidents are only roughly tabulated using mainstream
newspaper reports (Sydney Morning Herald, The Age, The Australian, The
Australian Financial Times, The Canberra Times, The Courier-Mail, etc.) and
estimates provided by the staffs of the Croatian Herald and the Serbian Voice.
Despite increased public interest, most of the violence and the actual level
of persistent fear and concern in the Serb and Croat communities never reached
the attention of the Australian public. Behind the scenes lines were drawn,
relations worsened, and suspicions and tensions ran high. Early in 1991, the
Yugoslav Consulate General in Melbourne was firebombed. By July, Croat and
Serb spectators were banned from attending soccer matches between Croat and
Serb clubs, and by spring rallies of Croats several thousand strong demanded both
Australian sanctions against Belgrade and recognition for an independent Croatia.
Federal police in Canberra responded to threats against Yugoslav diplomats,
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gunshots rang out at a Croatian Catholic church in Brisbane, and a Serbian
Orthodox church in Melbourne was routinely vandalized. Numerous reports
similar to this revealed the high level of tension and concern about the capacity
for Australian authorities to contain conflict between the communities.
Even when there was recognition of a common interest on both sides to
find a way out of the conflict, movement toward negotiation and settlement
proved hampered by mutual suspicion. Anxious to curb violence, Victoria Police
Commissioner, John Frame, for example, held separate meetings with Croat and
Serb community leaders in Melbourne. He was warned that joint meetings were
not advisable and would likely result in shouting matches. He concluded at that
time that both sides were diplomatic and that “relationships with Serbs and Croats
are pretty low key in Australia.” But, Frame added tellingly, “we think it is better
left that way.”65
INSTITUTIONAL UTILITY
Legal conditions and political institutions—at the local municipal, state,
and national levels—shape, limit, and direct forms of socio-political mobilization
and participation among immigrants (Ireland 1994). That is, institutions affect
patterns of human choices by structuring incentives. Specialized political
institutions, such as pan-ethnic roundtables or Australia’s ethnic affairs councils,
are often viewed as key instruments for managing conflicts among ethnicities or
migrant communities, as well as conflicts between the government and those its
                                                 
65 See Frame’s comments in multiple stories in The Age, 19 Oct 1991.
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governs. However, those policies and institutions most often coupled with
effective management of inter-ethnic conflict, and most championed by public
officials and academics in Australia, carry little currency in either the Croat or
Serb communities. They instead appear a mixed blessing at best, or a malignant
complication at worst, to the development of positive inter-diasporic relations.
Policymaking, Participation, and Incentives
In liberal democracies institutional configuration theoretically affords
ethnic groups opportunities to shape and participate in the policy process.
Politically organized communities often pursue their interests through electoral
politics, lobbying, or control of local or regional governments. In general,
Australia allows its ethnic and migrant communities to mobilize and there are few
legal barriers to political action by ethnic groups through such things as their
associations, churches, hiring lobbyists, and the political roles played by official
and unofficial ethnic leaders. But mobilization regarding diasporic interests
represents a change in kind from run-of-the-mill domestic issues. Political
opportunity structures still bound the range of choices available to diasporic
community leaders, but these preferences are themselves generated by dynamics
often external to the foreign policy process of the host country (Putnam 1988).
The Australian system centralizes the foreign policy apparatus and the formation
of foreign policy is highly concentrated in a few hands. This insulates foreign
policy elites from diasporic lobbying and pressure, but encourages more extreme
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efforts by diasporic communities to voice concerns and influence host country
policies.
Finding Federal Friends
In the 1990s, both Croat and Serb elites lobbied policymakers with
varying results. When Yugoslavia began the process of dissolution into separate
nations, the Australian Croat community, in particular, lobbied the Hawke and
Keating Governments to support their cause for an independent republic and
humanitarian aid throughout the homeland wars.66 Croat community leaders now
feel these efforts were frustrated by a lack of political savvy within the
community and were largely ineffective.67 The effort, however, did produce some
marginal success, especially when compared with the paltry effort by, and results
for, the Australian Serb community.68
Given the precedence of Australian support for self-determination and the
independence of the Baltic States from the former Soviet Union during the Cold
War, Australian Croats successfully worked to help form the Parliamentarians for
Croatia and Slovenia. This cross-party group of Federal MPs lobbied internally
                                                 
66 See Chapter 3 for review of the Croat diaspora’s direct role in the establishment of the
independent Croatian state. By 1991 overseas Croats had raised US$30 million to fund the war for
independence and over the next few years the Tudjman government received more than US $4
million for the HDZ election campaign (Glenny 1996; Masanauskas, 1991).
67 Author interview with Tom Starcevik, 19 November 2001.
68 In 1992, Ilija Glisic, then President of the Serbian National Federation, met with Prime
Minister Hawke and Foreign Minister Evans to discuss the interests of Australian Serbs and their
concerns for kith and kin living in the former Yugoslavia. Glisic reports that this meeting was
cordial, though later requests to meet with high-ranking officials where dismissed, leaving Serbs
feeling that their interests were misconstrued and shelved by public authorities.
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for the Government to recognize and rhetorically support the right of self-
determination of the Croatian and Slovenian peoples.
In October 1991, co-chairs Labor MP Andrew Theophanous and Liberal
MP Paul Filing forwarded a report to the Hawke Government calling for
recognition of an independent Croatia—a goal echoed that month by an estimated
10,000 Australian Croat demonstrators in Canberra. For their part, Australian
Serbs protested outside Theophanous’ Melbourne offices in October and
November. They demanded he address them on his support for Croatian
independence and many waved placards, shouted anti-fascist slogans, and accused
Theophanous of siding with a foreign country against the interest of Australian
citizens. Neither he, nor any other federal politician, granted them an audience or
offered an explanation.
This reversal of fortunes for Australian Croats was a vindication for many
community leaders who endured public pressure and the stigma of fascism and
terrorism for much of the period since the Second World War. To have Serbs
publicly reviled as extremists and “un-Australian” was viewed, said one 1990s
Croat student leader, as “not something we wanted, but it helped us make our
point that we were about freedom and that Milosevi_ was a monster.”69
THE OFFICIAL STORY: EXTERNAL CONTROLS AND SUCCESSFUL POLICY
The Australian public was thus made aware of the Yugoslav war through
emotional media coverage and sometimes impassioned rhetoric by Australian
                                                 
69 Author interview with Iljia Sutalo, 16 November 2001.
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government officials, political leaders, activists, journalists, and media pundits.
As television screens captivated audiences with images of the war, violence, and
human suffering, Canberra’s foreign policymaking elites and activists jumped to
present their views on television, radio, and other public forums. Media attention,
and television in particular, gave the impression that the war was thoroughly
investigated and that all perspectives were being explored. As the ethnic turmoil
intensified, front lines were set up between those who supported more restrained,
conservative action by Australia, and those who pushed for active Australian
intervention and pressure on behalf of one Yugoslav community or another.
Most key politicians, lacking sufficient information on both Yugoslavia’s
complexities and the effect of homeland politics on Australia’s migrant
communities, also presented views on the subject that reflected assumptions
generated by individuals who presented clear and concise answers. This made the
Australian foreign policy establishment and policymakers vulnerable to the views
of advocates of the cause of certain Yugoslav warring parties. Australian Croats
and Australian Serbs understood the implications of Canberra’s naiveté regarding
Yugoslav issues and attempted, with varying success, to gain advantage of the
situation to present their own views to Australian decision makers and the media.
In the end, both communities expressed deep disappointments with both
their own efforts and with the receptivity of federal and local officials. Serbian
community leaders, for example, generally felt that the Australian government
sympathized with the Croat and Muslim causes. Father Miroslav Hadzi-Popovic,
parish priest for the Serbian Orthodox Church of the “Holy Trinity” in Melbourne
complains that,
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Australian politicians did nothing about the Croatians who had Nazi
records. We did not do a good job convincing them who the real criminals
are in Yugoslavia, but we did what we could. Most of my parish are not
politically sophisticated and couldn’t change peoples’ minds. It was really
disappointing so we focused on ourselves and how to get more support for
refugee placement.70
Croats, too, reported that despite efforts to rehabilitate their public image
and apparent success lobbying for a pro-Croatian independence policy in
Canberra, the police still spy on Croatian community centers and their members.
Australian public officials generally tell a different story. Attorney
General, and former Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998-
2001), Philip Ruddock recalls that,
the turmoil in the former Yugoslavia affected both communities. I
remember the demonstrations and their efforts to influence public opinion
and policy. The Serbs reported property damage, verbal harassment, and
abusive telephone calls. There was tension during ANZAC day marches
and some incidents of assaults and bomb threats throughout the
1990s…but their public attitudes to each other were very civilized and
formal.71
To his knowledge, when potential issues of violence emerged, Croat and
Serb community leaders met to discuss ways to avoid the violence. And
Ruddock’s understanding is that leaders of both the Croat and Serb communities
say they always had open and constant access to Federal Government Ministers
both during the period of the Labor Government and during the reign of the
Coalition Government. The previous Minister for Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs (1993-1996), Nick Bolkus, also reports that he regularly met with Croat
                                                 
70 Author interview with fr. Miroslav Hadzi-Popovic, 12 February 2002.
71 Author interview with Philip Ruddock, 19 March 2002.
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and Serb community members to “help calm their nerves” and to express both an
“appreciation for their cultures, but also to ask them to appeal for calm and
patience within their communities.”72
Uncovering the extent of constituent-representative interaction is
problematic. In fact, most DIMIA archival material paper files relating to this
period (1991-1996) were culled and destroyed. However, some records still show
that a few members of parliament at the time met with representatives of both
communities separately.73 Labor parliamentarian Kim Carr was one who worked
directly with his nervous and distraught Serb constituents. He offers that “there
was really little that I could do” and that he accepted the responsibility to provide
some “moral boosting,” but that the communities had to do the work
themselves.74
Extant paper records show that during the break up of Yugoslavia, both
DIMIA and ASIO were also aware of public violence between Serb and Croat
communities centered around church buildings and particularly at soccer games.
But the claim that when potential issues of violence emerged, mainly among
youth, that Croat and Serb adult community leaders reportedly met to discuss
ways to avoid the violence is highly questionable. The Victorian Police
Multicultural Advisory Unit records only a handful of official meetings with
                                                 
72 Author interview with Nick Bolkus, 13 March 2002.
73 Unfortunately, many official electronic documents regarding these high level meetings can no
longer be accessed by any of the word processing software currently in use in DIMIA.
74 Author interview with Kim Carr, 2 March 2002. Serbian Orthodox priest, Hadzi-Popovic
revealed that Carr was the sole public official who seemed to understand the Serb perspective and
to offer any real encouragement that Serb voices were heard at the federal level.
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either Serb or Croat leaders, and federal officials only rarely became directly
involved with the community leaders in efforts to diffuse tensions.
Victoria Police spokesman, Savas Augoustakis, could recall only two or
three scheduled meetings with Croat and Serb leaders to discuss fears about
increasing tensions between the two communities. On no occasion could he recall
the two leaderships sitting for a face-to-face meeting and the Multicultural
Advisory Unit counseled public officials that such a meeting would, under any
circumstances, be unproductive and likely digress to a shouting match.75
Ruddock, however, recounts a single exception: a 2001 incident in
Melbourne when DIMIA Melbourne staff became involved following an incident
at a Saturday language school in the Dandenong suburb. Australian Croat youths
allegedly attacked some younger Serbian students. The issue was resolved when
one Australian Croat youth was charged by the police and the Education
Department and the Victorian Police were persuaded by DIMIA staff to become
more aware of the need for pro-active, preventative security measures around the
region.76
Multiculturalism and Cultural Space
Al Grassby, as Minister of Immigration in the Whitlam Government for
the brief period until 1974 (and later as Commissioner for Community Relations),
was the first national political leader to articulate a public policy of
                                                 
75 Author telephone interviews with Savas Augoustakis,  January-February 2002.
76 Author interview with Ruddock, 19 March 2002.
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“multiculturalism.” It was envisaged as part of a new Australian nationalism,
which owed less to any Anglo dominance than to a celebration of the continuity
of diverse traditions and loyalties, all of them by implication equally legitimate.
The bipartisan status of multiculturalism was established when adopted by the
government of Malcolm Fraser, which added Ethnic Affairs to the title and
functions of the Department of Immigration. The core of Fraser’s ethnic policy
emerged from the report of a Review of Post-Arrival Programmes and Services
for Migrants, known after its chairman as the Galbally Report. Among the
programs and policies to emerge from that report, some continuing the Grassby
initiatives, were Commonwealth funding of a range of activities such as teaching
of English and homeland languages, promotion and preservation of migrant and
ethnic communities’ cultural forms, and the formation of pan-ethnic councils to
both gather input from diverse sources and to help better manage the integration
of new migrants.
Whether Australia’s official multicultural policy exacerbates or provides a
foundation upon which to resolve domestic ethnic conflicts is hotly debated.77
Theophanous extends the question and suggests that “multiculturalism serves as
an instrument to reduce or overcome” inter-ethnic conflicts that originate in
overseas troubles through the “enormous power that its central doctrines of
tolerance, respect for human rights and commitment to social justice have been
                                                 
77 Critics on the left, made suspicious perhaps by its ready acceptability to conservative
politicians, claim that multiculturalism is another attempt to obscure fundamental class-based
inequalities. Yet conservative critics are even more vocal. Their argument include a claim for the
superiors values of Anglo culture, criticism of aspects of the ethnic cultures, warning about the
divisiveness which many accompany social pluralism, and so on.
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able to exercise” (Theophanous 1995, 195, 209). Some ethnic community leaders
publicly agree with Theophanous’ thesis. Australia’s principal Islamic leader, for
instance, suggests that, “Australia is our compassionate mother and I say to every
person living in Australia…love this country or leave it; shape up or ship out”
(Henderson 2004). These comments, supported in large measure by political
officials on either side of the Liberal-Labor party divide, indicate that in the minds
of many officials that Australia’s official multiculturalism is working. In other
words, the existence of an official policy of multiculturalism in Australia appears
to mitigate ethnic tension.
But these claims fly in the face of much political theory as summarized in
Dahl’s exposition about the political necessity for common, not diverse,
perspectives in building liberal communities:
It is reasonable to suppose, then, that the prospects for polyarchy are
greatly reduced if the fundamental beliefs and identities among the people
of a country produce political conflicts and are correspondingly increased
if beliefs and identities are compatible and therefore not a source of
conflict. Thus as the strength and distinctiveness of a country’s
subcultures increase, the chances for polyarchy should decline.
Subcultures are typically formed around ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic,
or regional differences and shared historical experience or ancestral
myths…The stronger and more distinctive a subculture, the more its
members identify and interact with one another, and the less they identify
and interact with nonmembers…Thus when members of one subculture
come to believe that their common life is seriously endangered by the
actions of plans of others, their situation is not unlike that of people in a
country whose existence is threatened by a foreign power. Like people in
such a country, members of a subculture will strongly oppose any
settlement on terms that fail to ensure the preservation of their subculture
heritage. If their opponents also constitute a separate subculture whose
members feel equally threatened by their opponent sin the other
subculture, then the conflict is certain to be even more explosive (Dahl
1990, 254-255).
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The 1977 landmark report on Australian multiculturalism did indeed
advise that if a policy of multiculturalism was to add to national unity and social
cohesion the right to express and share cultural identity must accompany
responsibilities to do so within the rule of law and a with a primary commitment
to Australian national interests and fellow Australians. But Jerzy Zubrzycki, the
architect of official multiculturalism in Australia who advised the Fraser
government to adopt the policy in the 1970s, publicly worried about the direction
it was taking in 1994:
Loyalty to Australian core values comes first—any differences can be
resolved within that framework and that is the framework of the rule of
law. What people are doing now is outside the rule of law… We must
remember that loyalty to Australian core values comes first, ethnic rights
come second and the two can quite sensibly co-exist… Regrettably this
tension between these two opposing drives is being stirred by irresponsible
politicians…who are seeking temporary electoral advantage by appealing
to divisiveness.78
While Australian multicultural policy codifies liberal principles and in
theory cannot respect any element of a culture that contains within it notions of
racial or ethnic superiority, the reality is that some ethnic and migrant
communities utilize the political space generated by the policy to defend
ethnocentric distinctions and historical enmities, and to perpetuate these attitudes
to their posterity. For the most part, Australian Croat and Australian Serb leaders
view official multiculturalism as a benefit that has allowed them to more fully
concentrate on homeland affairs and to maintain homeland identities. They do not
deny that a homeland fixation may be locally divisive and impede the
                                                 
78 See multiple articles about the future of multiculturalism and the comments of Zubrzycki in
The Australian, 19 March 1994.
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development of a strong Australian national identity, nor that homeland ethnic
affinities are often ranked before allegiance with fellow Australians.
For many Croats and Serbs living in Australia, the recurring motifs of
Australian life—sun, beer and sport—do not necessarily connect with their
migrant experience. Nor do the myths and legends of outback Australia have the
same resonance. Notions of mateship and egalitarianism do resonate more
universally, but they are not enough to drive home a feeling of being Australian.
For example, every second-generation Australian Croats and Australian
Serbs I met and spoke with in the course of fieldwork had an Australian accent
and many had degrees from Australian universities. Despite having plenty of
postive things to say about Australia as a country and affirming a sense of
gratitude for the opportunities they were given, many of the “youth” felt they
could never be accepted as an Australian, that they would remain on the cultural
fringes. A leader of the Croatian Students Association expressed the sentiment
this way:
I was born in Australia, so that’s a given. But Croatia is in here (hand over
heart) and that is where my loyalty is. You know, it’s always Croats
versus Serbs, or wogs versus Aussies. I probably live more like Serbs or
Greeks or Italians here, but I don’t feel for them what I feel for Croatia.”79
What might such sentiments portend for the future and what do they
suggest about the efficacy of multiculturalism to build community and enhance
social cohesion across inter-diasporic divisions? The language of Australia’s
official multiculturalism is corporatism and refers to attempts by the state to
                                                 
79 Author interview, name withheld upon request, 8 December 2001.
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employ the moral relationships of society. But, suggests David Brown, under an
official policy of multiculturalism, the state
puts itself into the untenable position of being the target of ethnic
discontent, the negotiator of the non-negotiable, and the ‘umpire’ who is
seen by each team as plying for the other side. Far from de-politicizing
ethnic issues as intended, the dynamics of corporatism tend to heighten the
politicization of ethnic contention. The problem of course is that
‘communal cleavages are so potentially explosive that they can probably
only be accommodated into the interstices of politics while the politicians
ostensibly fight one another over quite different issues. …the state seeks,
therefore, to avoid explosion by routinising ethnic politics in corporatist
institutions….But the limitation of this strategy is that the deflection of
contention on the elites who hold office in the corporatist ethnic
institutions weakens their capacity to control their ethnic constituents
(Brown 1997, 259).
This description and the experience of Croat-Serb relations in Australia
leads to questions about the utility of official multiculturalism. What is its use for
managing external conflicts that, nonetheless, have internal repercussions?
Diasporas are ethnic groupings that champion the interests of one ethnic
group—their own—and, as Polish exile writer Eva Hoffman explains, “It may
often be easier to live in exile with a fantasy of paradise than to suffer the
inevitable ambiguities and compromises of cultivating actual, earthly places”
(Hoffman 1999, 63). Extremism, moreover, is a greater option when identification
with the host country either no longer seems tenable or is simply less desirable.
Other ethnicities either fail to appear on their radar screen at all or do so as
competitors at best or enemies at worst. When ethnic community leaders perceive
multicultural policy to consent to the maintenance of homeland hatreds and ethnic
separation, the policy at best is an ineffective policy to contain inter-diasporic
conflict. Diaspora politics evades the accountability to constituencies demanded
under the Australian official multiculturalism scheme.
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In fact, the complex effect of war in the Balkans on Australia’s Croat and
Serb communities was regularly downplayed and sometimes denied by Australian
authorities. In particular, two decades of rhetoric about multicultural “success”
blurred the view of Australian authorities and the public to the extent of conflict
and its repercussions in the Croat and Serb communities. In a speech welcoming
Croatian President Tudjman during his 1995 visit to Australia, for instance, then
Prime Minister Paul Keating declared that,
Australians have been touched by [the war in the Balkans]. We understand
the pain the conflict causes citizens of communities with links with parts
of the former Yugoslavia. With suffering and horrors which have been
deeply felt there, it has been a tribute to those of former Yugoslavian
descent to not allow the pressures and tensions of this appalling conflict to
spill over into this country (Keating 1995).
Of course, the “pressures and tensions” of the conflict did spill over into Australia
and political leaders were aware of these tensions for some time. Speaking
elsewhere in 1995, then Foreign Affairs Minister, Gareth Evans, acknowledged
that
the presence in Australia of so many people with strong links with, strong
memories of, and strong identification with, various overseas homelands
sometimes means that disputes and conflicts in those homelands resonate
loudly in Australia” (Evans 1995).
Seven years earlier, then Prime Minister Bob Hawke urged immigrants to
forget their prejudices and “act like Australians” following the shooting of a 16-
year-old Australian Croat during a rally outside the Yugoslav Consulate in
Sydney.80 Newcomers have a right to demonstrate, added Hawke, but “we do not
                                                 
80 The 27 November 1988 demonstration of an estimated two thousand Australian Croats and the
subsequent shooting resulted in a diplomatic row, whereby Australian authorities demanded an
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want to see Australia become a battleground in terms of people trying to live out
and act out ancient rivalries that might still to some extent bedevil their places of
origin” (Hawke 2000).81 Time and again, Australian public officials failed to
acknowledge that ethnic community funding on the public nickel, under the guise
of multiculturalism, propped up ethnic rivalries and supported the goals of long-
distance nationalists.
THE REAL STORY
Weak and unsuccessful lobbying efforts did not effectively control the
emotions of the Australian Croat and Australian Serb communities. And the
utility of the policy of multiculturalism, for all the rhetoric, was marginal. How
then was tension and violence between rival Croat and Serb communities curbed?
Review of the Australian Serb experience provides some clues.
Fear and Loathing
There can be no more acute dilemma for an immigrant group than when
its host society goes to war with its homeland. For Australian Serbs in the 1990s,
                                                                                                                                      
explanation for the shooting from the Yugoslav ambassador and temporarily closed the Sydney
consulate. Yugoslav officials retaliated and expelled three Australian diplomats from Belgrade.
81 Prime Minister Hawke’s concern echoes, suggests Andrew Jakubowicz, the “fear of ethno-
nationalisms re-igniting in Australia marked much of the public rhetoric about White Australia
and assimilationism in the years after the Second World War. Governments, the media and the
broad popular culture proposed that immigrants should immediately drop previous allegiances and
cultural practices…[t]he ethno-nationalisms that emerged in that early post-war period were of
two kinds, each a fall-out from the war—one was associated with the establishment of
organizations of extreme nationalists from the countries of eastern Europe, the other focused on
the development of the Zionist movement and its support for the state of Israel” (Jakubowicz
1994, 23).
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Western intervention generally, and Australian participation specifically, on
behalf of Croatian and Bosnian goals and in opposition to Belgrade was a time of
intense conflict and deep personal anguish. Australian Serbs had to deal with both
an unprecedented level of hostility emanating from their host society and the
trauma caused by events in the Balkans. The effect of rhetorical attacks in the
press and physical attacks by rival Australian Croats was felt throughout the
community as a sharp rejection, producing in many a sense of alienation and
vulnerability. Individuals born in Australia of Serbian ancestry experienced a
crisis of identity and felt under threat from accusations of disloyalty.
For Australian Serbs, two themes ran especially clear. First, they were
quick to perceive a threat from the re-emergence of Croat nationalism. More than
eighty percent of Australian Serbs come from regions now in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Croatia’s Krajina region, where historical enmity ran deepest. It is Serb folk
wisdom that every Krajina Serb family lost at least one member at the hands of
Croatian Ustashe atrocities in the 1940s. These anxieties were refreshed by
television images and new reports from Europe in the 1990s. One Melbourne
professional of Serb origin recapitulated the distress, “Not all Croats were
Ustashe, but all Ustashe were Croats,” and proceeded to explain that the
Australian Croat community was rife with Nazi sympathizers.82
Another younger generation Serb expressed his fear of a resurgent Croat
nationalism thus:
                                                 
82 Author phone interview with Angela Wallace-Smith, 6 February 2002.
129
Everything our parents taught was coming to pass. I mean, we watched
TV constantly, trying to get a little news from home. And it was all bad,
and the Croats were killing us in Krajina and somehow we were the
problem. We fought on the right side, with Australia and America in
World War Two, so it was really hard on the older generation to think the
Croats could get away with it.83
Still another second generation Australian Serb described his initial
reaction to fighting in the Krajina region and its effect in the Australian Serb
community in this way:
We wanted to get the Croat bastards, really hurt them because all the
“oldies” recognized the fascist symbols and were scared. You know, at the
Dom in Footscray, [Croats] have pictures of the war criminal Pavli_ right
on the wall… When it all blew up my friends all talked about growing
beards and we wore Chetnik hats… One friend didn’t think Tito was such
a “baddie,” but when he saw it all on TV, he said, “your dad was right all
along.”84
The second theme was a condemnation of the role of the international
community and the perceived bias of the Australian government. Australian Serbs
were depressed by Australian policy in the Balkans, and perceived widespread
harassment in Australia. Indeed, some Australian Serbs saw a link between the
two. Most Serb interviewees thought that the Hawke and Keating Governments
bent over backwards to appease the Croats and support their secessionist
demands. This was asserted by even the most moderate Australian Serb voices:
The Serbian community was totally unorganized. And the Croats had a
number of lobbyists and the active support of an energized and focused
                                                 
83 Author interview with Peter Marjanovic, 5 February 2002
84 Author interview, name withheld upon request, 5 February 2002. The Australian Croat club,
known as The Dom (Our Home) in Footscray does have an inscription on its façade bearing the
name of Ante Paveli_ and there are pictures and portraits of the accused war criminal on the walls
inside. The Australian Government finances the center annually though the multicultural grant
scheme.
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diaspora. Australian officials were taken in by the images of freedom-
fighters and didn’t seem to question the problem with their backgrounds.85
The SNF also repeated time and again that their complaint was not with
the Croatians who live in Australia, but with the Australian Government, which to
their understanding created a potentially explosive situation time and again
through ignorance and divisive politics: “They even invited Dr. Tudjman to visit
Melbourne” reminds SNF executive, Glisic, “How could they think this would not
cause problems?”86
Australian Serbs, not unlike earlier generations of nationalist Australian
Croats, felt that Serbs and Serbia were consistently and systematically
misrepresented in the media coverage of the conflict. Many in the Serb
community felt that the media failed to provide balanced coverage of events and
issues related to the Balkans; and that in some cases this constant bias actively
contributed to stereotypes of Serbs. Regular contrasts were made between the
blanket coverage of Serbian atrocities and the lack of attention given to Serbian
refugees, especially the mass expulsion of the Krajina Serbs in 1995. Some
Australian Serbs report that they only watched Yugoslav television, which began
broadcasting to the diaspora by satellite in 1991, to counterbalance the Australian
media. And on several occasions, Australian Serbs held demonstrations in
Canberra and Melbourne to protest the Special Broadcast Service (SBS) coverage
                                                 
85 Author interview with Monash University professor, Slbodanka Vladiv-Glover, 26 February
2002.
86 Author interview with Glisic, 3-5 March 2002.
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of the Yugoslav war and voice concern about the spread of homeland violence to
Australia’s communities.
But most Australian Serbs felt simply powerless and alienated in the face
of Australian government sanctions imposed on Serbia and negative Australian
press coverage of Serbian actions in the Balkans:
What Serbians just could not accept was the misinformation that was
being widely spread. The message not getting across was that Serbs were
being slaughtered. The Australian Government and the media were among
those that accepted the rumor that there were Serbian regular soldiers
fighting in Bosnia when the fighting was really being carried out by
Serbian-Bosnians who were once in the national army. But what could we
do, no one was listening to us at that point.87
The Western and Australian media vilification of the Serbs in the Balkans
corresponded with the perception within the Australian Serb community that they
became an easy domestic target for whom the usual rules of political correctness
did not apply. People making the physical attacks on Serbs were rarely identified
or charged. And recourse, especially to Federal officials, provided little
assistance.
Related to this was the experience of most Australian Serbs of occasional
remarks by friends, work colleagues, classmates, or simply people they had given
their name to, along the line of “What’s up with you Yugos?” or  “Bloody Serbs,
un-Australian, and up to no good.” Many Australian Serbs assumed a collective
responsibility for Serbian action in the Balkans and felt that they had to readily
accept abuse for, and regularly respond on behalf of, homeland kin. One
Australian Serb respondent scoffs, “Australian people, even my parents’
                                                 
87 Author interview with Glisic, ibid.
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neighbors, sometimes remarked that they were surprised to learn that we were
Serbian, because we seemed pleasant.”88
Cooperation, or Agreeing to Disagree
Fear and contention were rife in the Australian Serb community,
especially when reports of vandalism and assault at schools, churches, and
community centers increased from 1991-1993. By mid-year 1993, suggests Glisic,
the Serbs had almost reached their breaking point. By his perception, Australian
Serbs had borne the brunt of attacks by Australian Croats, including repeated fire
bombings of churches and attacks on a churches and clergy:
We were pretty sure about who was doing what, but we couldn’t just
accuse people. And the attacks were in line with rising hostilities in
Yugoslavia. We made of point of telling the youth not to respond to any of
the attacks, but many people were getting desperate.”89
In response to claims of Australian Serb victimhood, Croatian leader Tom
Beram also voiced fears about “well-organized attacks by [Australian] Serbs,”
and that,
a tipping point is fast approaching and that there is going to be a tragedy.
There is talk in our community that we have to organize protection for our
community. If this is going to happen time after time, we have no other
way than to retaliate.90
These charges and counter-charges raised the attention of ASIO Chief,
David Sadleir, who publicly cautioned against complacency about Croat and Serb
                                                 
88 Author interview with Peter Marjanovic, 5 February 2002.
89 Author interview with Glisic, 3-5 March 2002.
90 This response and additional exchanges of threats and fears are reported in the Sydney Morning
Herald, 17 April, 1993, p.3-4.
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“terrorism” in Australia and the Victorian Police Protective Security Group was
placed on alert in case violence flared in Melbourne on the eve of American and
British strikes against Serbian forces in Bosnia.91 In the end, the tensions between
the communities in Australia were much less than might have been expected
given the destructive passions roused in the homeland region. Why did the
relationship develop in this way rather than drawing the two communities into
even more violent confrontation?
Internal Controls: Self-Policing
Ignorance of, and frustration with, the Australian political system coupled
with a lack of access to policymakers conceivably could be partially responsible
for increased levels of conflict between the rival diasporic communities. The fact
that both Croats and Serbs perceived that they had little or no “voice” in the
foreign policy process explains the pursuit of interests and venting of community
concerns outside the institutional and organizational frameworks established by
the state, using means such as marches, demonstrations, and at the fringes of the
communities, violence to express their pain and anger.
But features of the Australian system also had a positive, if indirect,
influence on the containment of Croat and Serb contention. Australia’s liberal
political values and the right to legally voice even unpopular views allowed the
Croat and Serb leaderships to manage tempers and tensions. The leaderships of
                                                 
91 See The Age, 22 April 1993, for coverage of attacks against Serb forces and the possible
repercussions in Australia.
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communities were most interested in favorable reputations with mainstream
Australia and preached restraint in speech and deed to community members. To
this end, community leaders regularly used public forums to channel the passions
of community members.
Serb demonstrations in Melbourne and Sydney were organized by the SNF
and the SNDC for the express purpose of allowing rank-and-file community
members to “blow off steam,” while phone chains or call lists were used to
restrain responses to vandalism and threats, and to engender solidarity.92
Australian Serb leaders, and the Serbian Orthodox Church, in particular, worked
overtime to control extremist views from spilling-over into more extensive
violence.93
Serb leadership acknowledged that there was some limited work done by
(mainly local) government people to help bring calm, but government efforts were
not highly regarded by the Serb community. Instead, suggests Glisic, Serb leaders
throughout the country appealed for peace and restraint:
There are all sorts of instances…that have taken place. What we are trying
to do is play that sort of thing down because there are elements in both
communities who are doing stupid things. We are not in a position to start
retaliating . . . we would address that sort of matter through the police.94
The efforts of Australian Croat leaders mirrored the self-policing of the
Australian Serb community. Though ineffective as a lobbying tool, Australian
Croat letter-writing campaigns “kept people’s hands busy” and “expended energy
                                                 
92 Author interviews with Glisic, 3-5 March 2002 and Marjanovic, 5 February 2002.
93 Author interview with Hadzi-Popovic, 12 February 2002.
94 Author interview with Glisic, op cit.
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that could have boiled over.”95 While the real battles were thus fought by
surrogates thousands of miles away, Australia’s Serbs and Croats necessarily and
routinely considered the reactions of their host country—especially the Australian
government and broader Australian society in order to gain support or lessen
opposition.
Internal Controls: Self-Segregation
Moreover, Croats and Serbs in Australia were allowed to voice their
concerns and interests without direct involvement with each other. No party was
forced to come to the table. Neither conferences nor “peace talks” were scheduled
by Australian officials to conclusively solve the problem of inter-diasporic
conflicts. Separation, suggests Yuval Elizur with regard to Palestinian and Israeli
segregation, provides breathing space to both sides—which should make former
sticking points easier to resolve (Elizur 2003). In fact, Serbs and Croats in
Australia also went to great lengths to avoid each other and to find much need
space to vent. This desire for physical distance is understandable in communities
which have experienced high levels of violence. Obviously, the principal
advantage of segregation is the reduction of inter-community violence. But what
this means for Australian society is unclear. Two exceptionally tense diaspora
communities effectively reduced the level of local violence, not through
conference or compromise, but by turning their backs to each other.
                                                 
95 Author interviews with Ilija Sutalo, op cit., and Starcevik, op cit.
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What is clear is that ethno-national political mobilization is inherently
rational, predictable, and understandable because it is premised on individual
calculations of what is in one’s best interest. That is, individuals behave rationally
in that they act instrumentally within institutional limits of constraint to gain the
most benefit at the least cost. What the Australian Serb and Australian Croat
communities did was a response to the actual and anticipated moves of its
opponent, and to the anticipated response of Australian officials and the
Australian public. Diasporic politics thus may often intensify conflicts by creating
a spiral toward unrestrained violence. In this case, however, the same reciprocal
process controlled rather than stimulated the spread of violence. This is less the
consequence of these two groups’ inability to remove the other, as was
accomplished in their respective homelands, and more the consequence of the
overriding desire among Croat and Serb community elites to improve their
position and image in Australian society.
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Chapter 5: Self-limiting Conflict in the United States
Richard Clarke, former National Coordinator for Security and
Counterterrorism at the White House, describes the alarmed reaction among some
high-ranking, Clinton administration policymakers following the 1993 bombing
of the World Trade Center as fear that war-time events in the Balkan might
become an American domestic crisis:
The large, white telephone console blurted. I had never heard it ring before
and wasn’t initially sure what the noise was. In the little window on the
console a name popped up: “Scowcroft.” Brent Scowcroft, the National
Security Advisor to the first President Bush, had left the White House the
month before, along with almost all of his staff except me and a few other
holdovers. How was he calling me now on this highly secure phone? I
reached for the handset.
“Did the Serbs do it?” It was Tony. I had no idea what he was talking
about. “Did the Serbs bomb it? Was it a bomb?”
“I don’t know yet, Tony.” I faked it. “We’re checking. Let me get back to
you as soon as we have something, soon” (Clarke 2004, 73-74).96
The suggestion that Serbs—whether American citizens, resident aliens, or
foreign nationals, who would necessarily be shielded or aided by Serbian
Americans—had anything to do with the bombing was wildly off the mark. But
the exchange does reveal at least a tangential awareness and an underlying fear
among American policymakers that the United States involvement in the Balkans,
and a perceptible White House bias against Serbian interests, raised the ire of
                                                 
96 The “Tony” referenced in Clarke’s account was Clinton’s National Security Advisor, Tony
Lake.
138
American Serbs and underscored the possibility that ethnic conflicts abroad could
spill over into American politics in dangerous ways.
Politics, Americans used to tell themselves, ends at the water’s edge. But
as more scholars and policymakers recognize the ability of American ethnic
groups to influence international affairs, especially by affecting United States
foreign policy, it is necessary to examine how such influences affect ethnic
relations inside the United States. This chapter explores the extent to which Croat
and Serb commitment to ancestral countries threatened to “Balkanize” American
foreign policy and impeded domestic cohesion during the 1990s. It also reveals
how American officials and institutions structured Croat-Serb relations to curb the
more contentious and violent byproducts of long-distance nationalism.
The chapter provides a necessary point of comparison for understanding
inter-diasporic conflicts and the effects of long-distance nationalism. Both host
country cases indicate how Croat and Serb ethno-national loyalties to real or
symbolic homelands affect domestic inter-ethnic relations. The comparison thus
reveals how similar countries subject to the same stresses differ or converge and,
therefore, might teach something about cause and effect (see Gourevitch 1986).
As in the Australian case the key questions are:
• To what extent and how do events abroad either enhance or
impede constructive inter-ethnic relations?
• What institutions, strategies or activities by policymakers in the
United Sates were adopted in order to channel Croat and Serb
community relations in non-confrontational directions?
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• Did ethnic community leaderships help or hinder these efforts by
American policymakers?
THE NEW AMERICAN CONTEXT FOR ETHNO-NATIONAL PROMOTION
As discussed in Chapters 1-2, the large and growing presence of self-
conscious ethnic groups in the United States is an important issue for many
scholars and observers of American politics. Much of the debate in recent decades
has focused on ethnic strategies in electioneering, the limits of diversity and
threats of disloyalty or conflicted identities inherent in the granting of dual
citizenships, and the country’s capacity to absorb and assimilate diverse peoples.
What characterizes these concerns is a growing acknowledgement that the
United States is a multicultural country, not by force of policy, but by organic
evolution; and anxiety that new emphasis on diverse and sometimes divergent
ethno-national or ethno-cultural values undermine a fragile, shared American
identity (see Glazer 1997, Huntington 2004, Schlesinger 1992). Since the United
States is a nation of immigrants, but also characterized by protectionist and at
times even nativist concerns, migrants’ and ethnic community leaders’ motives
and the influence are regularly questioned.97
With the recognition of the reality of multiculturalism and the growing
presence of the United States around the globe during, and more so following the
                                                 
97 Former United States president, Bill Clinton, ironically referred to immigration restrictionist as
“un-American” and asked fellow citizens to join with him to warmly greet newcomers who are
“the most innovative and most industrious people” in a 1998 speech. See the Clinton quote in John
Harris, “Clinton Assails State Restrictions on Immigrants as Un-American,” International Herald
Tribune, 15 June 1998
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Cold War, it also makes sense that cultural developments in United States
domestic politics now affect foreign policy and have real consequences for
international conflicts (Ambrosio 2002; Shain 1999). This means that United
States-based diaspora communities’ role in American foreign policy and
homeland affairs will likely have significant consequences for United States
domestic affairs.
On this issue, suggests Shain, champions and critics range from those who
maintain that ethnicity in foreign affairs confuses the real U.S. national interest,
creates sub-national loyalties, and opens the door for outsider influences,
including foreign states, to dictate American policies, to those who consider the
phenomenon to be in the true spirit of American history and liberal democratic
values (Shain 1999). He comes down squarely on the latter side, and further
suggests that:
The diasporic mobilization on homeland-related affairs, which takes place
mostly through “official channels” of U.S. foreign policy—that is, the
electoral system and the lobbying of decision makers—has the potential to
direct ethno diasporian energies in ways that are conducive both to
assimilation or reinforcement of basic American values, such as freedom
and pluralism, and to overall diasporic integration into American society.
The successful struggle for a legitimate foreign-policy voice is a process
that relieves ethnic alienation by helping to create a more positive view of
the American inclusionary process and of America’s absorptive capacities.
Empowerment, in turn, generates new responsibilities, which come with
the shedding of outsider status, involving diasporic integration into
established practices and institutions (Shain 1999, 199).
Shain does acknowledge that small numbers of diaspora members from
the United States have been involved in illegal, underground, or clandestine
diaspora activities by providing illicit arms or funds, or even warm bodies and
trigger fingers for several militant groups abroad, including the Provisional Irish
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Republican Army in Northern Ireland, Sikh separatists in India, Arab terrorist
organizations such as Hamas in Palestine, the Jewish extremist Kahane
movement, and, importantly for this project, Croat militias. He downplays,
however, the extent to which these individuals and groups, and their conflicts
abroad may spill over into the domestic American arena. Whether this is actually
the case is, of course, an empirical question.
Institutional Channeling American Style
American immigrants are no longer required to be “Americanized” by
exchanging their primary identity or sole allegiance from their homeland-acquired
ethnicity, first language, or country and state of origin. Since they are less and less
inhibited by charges of disloyalty, ethnic community leaders and their
constituencies in the United States are more inclined to reconstitute or strengthen
their ties with their ancestral countries. In fact, many ethnic elites have discovered
that, by focusing on political causes in their countries of origin, they are better
positioned to mobilize their communities for domestic empowerment in the
United States (see Ahrari 1987).
Homeland oriented, ethnic politics were once viewed as perilous. Louis
Gerson, for example, described diaspora politics in the 1950s and 1960s as an
“emotional umbilical cord” and warned that a multinational state, such as the
United States, open to foreign-based ethnic politicking would not and could never
be fully united (Gerson 1964, 235). But the traditional melting-pot concept that
stressed assimilation into, and conformity with, a Protestant Anglo-Saxon culture
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has given way to the pluralist creed and recognition of diversity as an integral
component of American life.
The United States, like Australia, is not a free haven for all kinds of
activities, and American tolerance and attentiveness to diasporas’ information
campaigns spans from ignoring them altogether, actively lending support for
diasporic causes, to seeking out diverse American diaspora communities to help
facilitate relations between the United States and homeland states. Banning or
otherwise outlawing ethnic community information blitzes, public relations stunts,
or lobbying campaigns, however, is not deemed an acceptable “American” option
and is now widely viewed as incongruent with American liberal values.
This new tolerance is not without problems. There are, of course,
numerous instances of diaspora politics driving ethnic rivalries inside the United
States, which may prove Huntington’s contention that the persistence of “kin-
country” loyalties run much deeper than traditional American assimilationists and
contemporary multiculturalists are willing to admit (Huntington 1996; 2004).
Smith usefully sums up the challenge to synthesize both perspectives in the
United States and other migrant receiving liberal democracies as follows:
On some occasions ethnic hatred set nation against nation; on others it
sparked furious internal conflicts as tribal passions were released in ways
that led to race murder. Democratic states, with their ingrained tolerance
of social diversity, were considerably better that other types of political
regimes at containing, indeed at overcoming in a way that strengthened
their cosmopolitan character, the fear and loathing that ethnic difference
can inspire. Yet there were also serious challenges within the democracies
themselves from those who would exploit these primordial feelings to
destructive ends. And who can pretend that we are now past the worst, that
somehow we have figured out how to deal with the deep-set tensions of
making one people out of many in a way that respects difference, in fact
that prizes the benefits of diversity” (Smith 2000, 131)?
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Ethnic group involvement in United States foreign policymaking, and
ethnic rivalry regarding the appropriate direction of that policy, is controversial,
yet pervasive and regular. Relative to other democracies, Smith continues, the
American state is porous, “lacking in autonomy”, and hence, “highly penetrated
by interest groups that are capable of making their agenda that of the government”
(Smith 2000, 101).
But, in general, diaspora politics are recognized as legitimate political
practices licensed, if not expressly encouraged, by the nature of the American
party system and the power of each congressional representative. Moreover,
ethnic lobbying in the United States continues to exemplify an important tenet of
American democracy: namely, those who are able to organize themselves into
effective pressure groups are able to influence decision making and policy.
The question is whether long-distance nationalism and diaspora politics
introduce additional and problematic wrinkles for American policymakers
charged with the management of diverse, sometimes rival ethnic community
interests. A system and political culture that allows for, or encourages, diverse
ethno-national voices regarding the formation and articulation of United States
foreign policy may also provide fertile, new ground for planting seeds of conflict
between rival ethnic communities. Can the liberty and capacity to mobilize and
lobby in support of diaspora interests with regard to United States foreign
policy—even the opportunity to successfully “capture” policy toward
homelands—have a positive effect on inter-ethnic or inter-diasporic rivalries in
the United States?
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CROATS AND SERBS ENGAGE THE AMERICAN SYSTEM
The concept of institutional channeling (see chapters 1-2) suggests that
immigrants’ forms of political participation relate to the specific political
opportunities which immigrants face. The more inclusive the political system is,
the more the activities are channeled into that system and shaped accordingly,
rather than taking place outside the system in more confrontational forms (see
Ireland 1994; Soysal 1994).
Broadly speaking, Croats and Serbs in the United States tried to influence
outcomes in their homelands in two ways: directly and indirectly. Direct influence
came through giving economic, political, or even military support to ethnic or
political counterparts in the homeland. Some American Croats and American
Serbs went to their homelands to vote when possible and allowed. Many other
Croats and Serbs never left the United States, but voted in absentia on various
peace initiatives during the war from 1991-1996 and in homeland elections
afterward. Other Croat and Serb cultural and political organizations collected
funds among their supporters for political counterparts in the homelands.
American Croats in Chicago, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis, for example, sent regular
shipments of clothing, flour, rice, canned goods, toiletries, non-prescription
medicines, and baby food and formula to needy ethnic kin during the war.
Newspaper reports suggest that some individuals and families donated as much as
$100,000 for supplies.98
                                                 
98 See “Croatians Here Ship Food, Medicine to Yugoslavia,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 25
November 1991, Five Star edition.
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Not all of the diaspora mobilization was for humanitarian and educational
purposes. A few Croat and Serb organizations in the 1990s were known to recruit
guerrilla fighters for the war, just as occurred in Australia.99 And funds were
shuttled to the homeland to support military endeavors. In mid-August 1991, for
example, United States Customs arrested four Croat members of a nationalist,
Chicago-based group who illegally attempted to by more than $12 million worth
of American made weapons for export to Croatia.100
On occasion, these homeland “deposits” brought real access and “returns”
for the American-based diasporas. For example, Zagreb rewarded American
Croats with rhetorical praise and, eventually, with increased political access. In
1996, capital-poor Croatia opened at considerable expense a plush consulate in
Chicago to serve the many thousands of nationally loyal Croatians living in the
area. Croatia also managed to staff a small Cleveland consulate, working out of
the American-Croatian Lodge, as reward for local support shown during the war
in the former Yugoslavia.101
But a large part of the homeland political work of Croat and Serb
organizations played itself out in the United States, as the communities tried to
influence politics in the Balkans indirectly though discussions and information
campaigns aimed at the American public and policymakers. As in Australia, the
United States context in the 1990s was rife with opportunities for local Croat and
                                                 
99 Author interview with Anthony Peraica, President, Croatian-American Association, 8
November 2002.
100 For a thorough review of the level and effect of Balkan smuggling during the 1990s, see
Marko Hajdinjak (2002)
101 Author interview with Peraica, 8 November 2002.
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Serb organizers to mobilize their communities around homeland disputes. Such
information campaigns ranged from low cost fly-posting at night, to letter writing
drives, to targeted lobbying of key policymakers in the United States House of
Representatives and Senate.
Political institutions in the United States also influenced domestic Croat-
Serb relations and conflicts both indirectly—by providing a particular context that
shaped the expression of tensions; and directly—by encouraging attempts at
intervention by public officials and cooperation among public officials and ethnic
community leaders as the latent tensions transformed into clear conflicts of
interest and competition in the 1990s.
The United States’ competitive policymaking process and culture of
openness to ethnic lobbying profits the well organized and the well behaved, and
worked to shape and control the develop of relations between Croats and Serbs.
Indeed, from the beginning of tensions in 1991, through the climatic events of the
Dayton Accords that officially ended the homeland fighting, the ever-present
flurry of community organizing and lobbying campaigns by community elites lent
Croat-Serb conflicts in the United States the distinct characteristic of active,
systematic engagement with public officials.
Angry voices and raucous demonstrations filled the streets and ethnic
community social halls of Chicago, Cleveland, and Pittsburgh on occasion from
1991-1996. But unlike in Australia, violent threats, counter-threats, and dire
predictions about bloodshed by Croat and Serb community elites never became
the regular currency of Croat-Serb conflict in the United States. Given liberal
access to policymakers, Croats and Serbs expressed their rival interests more
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regularly as protest against, or petition for, current United States policy toward
events and parties in the former Yugoslavia.102 Only rarely were Croat-Serb
conflicts manifested as direct confrontation with the rival ethno-national
community, and reports of violence hardly ever provoked broad community
mobilization or generated bullying or threats of retaliation. Instead, the leadership
of both the Croat and Serb communities sought other outlets for tension.
This personal politics—the management of conflict by
individuals—played more than a background role in curbing violent conflict.
Throughout the period under study, local and national public officials in the
United States invited Croat and Serb community representatives to tell their
stories, share information, make their case for particular options, and let it be
known that petitioning and lobbying representatives, even with regard to foreign
policy issues, was acceptable. Examining the ways these players inter-acted
makes for more than an interesting story. When compared with the experiences of
ethnic kin and policymakers in Australia, it also suggests avenues for theory-
building and policy prescription.
Early Diffusion of Discontent to the United States
The first significant wave of Serbs arrived in Chicago during the First
World War era, settling on the South Side and working in the steel mills,
                                                 
102 Author interviews with Peraica, 8 November 2002 and with Slavko Panovic, President,
Serbian National Defense Council of America, 7 November 2002.
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alongside an earlier generation of Croatian migrants.103 It was not uncommon to
find a Serbian Orthodox church on one corner and a Roman Catholic Croatian
church on the next. These pre-Second World War Croat and Serb communities
tended to include simple, working class immigrants who had little homeland
political interest and who were most concerned with blending in, and contributing
to, their adopted country. The two groups were far from home in a strange land.
They spoke the same language—even though they wrote it with different
alphabets—they enjoyed the same food and music. They generally could put aside
their differences, live together and even intermarry. Similar to the changes in the
Croat and Serb communities in Australia, the experience of the Second World
War affected inter-ethnic relations. In Chicago, Serbs and Croats stopped
speaking to each other.
The War refugees from the former Yugoslavia included the Balkans’
disinherited bourgeoisie. They were often educated, urban, royally connected, and
members of the banned Chetnik and Ustashe political movements. Filled with
                                                 
103 Serbs are not a large part of the United States population. In fact, they are not among the top
25 most populous ethnic groups Serbs were identified as the 75th largest ethnic group in 1990.
There were roughly 117,000 Americans of Serbian ancestry nationwide, according to the 1990
census, with the largest concentrations in Illinois and Pennsylvania. As with the Australian census,
determination of accurate figures for Serbs and Croats is problematic. The 1990 Census lists
categories for Yugoslavs, Serbs and Croats. The Croats were by far the largest group,
outnumbering Serbs and Yugoslavs combined nationally and statewide, though many Serbs may
have described themselves as Yugoslavians, or even Croatians due to place of birth. Figures for
Illinois show 15,503 Serbians, 19,145 Yugoslavians and 61,284 Croats. Chicago may have the
largest Serbian community in the United States—home to about 250,000 people of Serbian
descent. In all cases, local ethnic community leaders estimate their numbers are much higher, e.g.,
Ivana Duric (2001) records that there are approximately 1-2.5 million diasporic Croats in North
America.
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rancor and regret, they created insular micro-societies in the United States, and
other host countries, in the 1950s and 1960s and lived, as one scholar puts it,
[i]n disoriented time-warped worlds, their present overdetermined by their
past. Like a stagnant swamp, these communities bred infectious cultures of
paranoia, hatred, and far-fetched theories of conspiracy. The inhabitants
remained wedded to the brittle nationalist ideologies that, as young men,
they had been prepared to die for in the trenches (Hockenos 2003, 10).
Each newly nationalized diaspora community, much as their kin in
Australia and in other host countries, was strongly opposed to Tito’s Yugoslavia
and staunchly anti-communist. But the reality of a common enemy did not make
them friends. Instead, both the American Croat and American Serb communities
turned inward-looking and engaged in the same sorts of intra-community
competition that plagued their ethnic kin in Australia. In the Serb diaspora in the
United States, royalist organizations dreamed of restoring the Serbian monarchy.
These more extreme groups and movements elbowed aside the established
benevolent societies and cultural clubs of the old-timer immigrants.104
Among diasporic Croats, groups like the Croatian Liberation Movement
and the Croatian National Resistance kindled fantasies of a resurgent neo-fascist
state. These organizations were very much in favor of Croatian secession from
Yugoslavia, a sentiment expressed well by N. Bilandzich in a letter to editor of a
North American Croatian newspaper:
…Those elements in Yugoslavia which are at present in control must
understand that the Croatian people will never give up their rights to
                                                 
104 For example, prior to the war, the Serb American community had little tradition of political
organization. Sources of community groups like the Serbian Benevolent Society and the Serbian
National Federation had established chapters in Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Los Angeles, and Chicago,
but their focus was predominantly religious or cultural.
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liberty, justice and self-determination. We want freedom and
independence, and for this we do not owe an apology to anyone. In
today’s Croatia, foreign elements can sing and hoist their flags, but if the
Croatian people do the same, they are declared an enemy of the state and
placed in jail. Mr. Editor, we Croatians are slaves in our own homeland. If
you examine our historical past, I am sure that you will be able to
conclude that we Croatians have done so much to advance the cause of
Slavism and Yugoslavism, which has brought us nothing more than
oppression and misery. For this reason, I am and always well be for
Croatian independence and liberty.105
American Croats: Overcoming Shame
American Croats had a tough row to hoe. In the decades following World
War II, emigration from Croatia to the United States increased. Internal economic
and political pressure under the communist Yugoslav federation led many Croats
to seek economic and political freedom abroad. And the demise of the United
States Immigration quota system in 1965 fostered even more migration. But the
legacy of the Ustashe created a stigma that American Croats, not unlike their
Australian counterparts, felt they were forced to combat at every turn throughout
the Cold war years. This stain, suggests the president of the Croatian-American
Association, Anthony Peraica, meant that “it became an early and common goal
of almost all the Croatian émigré groups to polish that image by becoming good
Americans, getting involved in local events and politics, and sports leagues.”106
                                                 
105 “Letter to the Editor,” Fraternalist, 9 January 1985, p. 2.
106 Author interview with Peraica, op cit.
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“Only Unity Saves a Serb!”107
With the establishment of communist rule in Yugoslavia, the American
Serb diaspora also came to be treated as a "hostile force" by the homeland. The
following decades saw subsequent waves of emigration, first sparked by political
motives, and later shifting more towards socio-economic grounds. These émigrés
often struggled with conflicted identities that threatened to fracture the diaspora
community in the United States. Particularly damaging for diaspora unity was an
internal split between Chicago's WWII Serbs and anti-Communist political
refugees at odds with both older generations and later arrivals of Serbs who had
accepted communism but left the former Yugoslavia as economic refugees. The
split was so deep it extended into the churches, which on more than one occasion
had to go to court to settle which faction controlled which property.
During the Cold War, royalist émigrés in organizations like the Serbian
National Defense Council (SNDC) worked to keep alive the vision of an
independent and greater Serbia. The obvious obstacle to a Chetnik revival was
Tito who, American Serbs charge, was a murderer bent on keeping Serbia and
Serbs humbled and weak. Occasionally, an extreme fringe of the American Serb
diaspora would engage in open contention with the Yugoslav state.
In fact, in 1975 a SNDC member bombed the home of the Yugoslav
consul in Chicago. The perpetrator was apprehended in 1979, but in a dramatic
effort worthy of Hollywood, he managed to free himself and hi-jack his American
                                                 
107  “Only unity saves a Serb!” is a slogan used during the political demonstrations at the
beginning of the latest round of wars in the Balkans, but the phrase dates back to 1389 and the
Battle of Kosovo.
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Airlines flight to Chicago were he was to receive his sentence. From there he
redirected the plane to New York, and finally across that Atlantic and on to
Ireland. His plan, before being talked down by his lawyer, was to crash the jet into
Tito’s headquarters in Belgrade.
The United States’ cautious friendship with Tito infuriated both the Serb
and Croat émigré communities, which tried to thwart and sabotage relations at
every opportunity. Among their few accomplishments during the Cold War was
the American Serb and American Croat diasporas’ role in ending the long and
illustrious diplomatic career of George Kennan (see Hockenos 2003). Appointed
by Kennedy as ambassador to Yugoslavia in 1961, Kennan quickly established a
solid, working relationship and good personal rapport with Tito, and he promised
the Yugoslavian president that special trade conditions and a Most Favored
Nations (MFN) commercial status would continue without a hitch. But in 1962,
the United States Congress ended the long-standing preferential trade treaty and
threatened to rescind MFN. The episode, suggests Kennan in his memoirs, left
him looking weak and forced him to step down. Moreover, these Croat and Serb
groups, he claims,
were not slow to wrap their demands, to suit Washington-congressional
taste, in the relatively respectable mantle of a militant anti-communism,
denying the Yugoslav independence vis-à-vis Moscow, denying the
unique qualities of Yugoslavia as a Marxist-Socialist state, and doing all in
their power to establish the thesis that Yugoslavia was, to all intents and
purposes, not different from the Soviet Union. They were opposed to the
maintenance by the United States government of relations with
Yugoslavia; they would happily have seen us become involved in a war
against that country. This being so, they never failed to oppose any move
to better American-Yugoslav relations or to take advantage of any
opportunity to make trouble between the two countries. And this they
succeeded, with monotonous regularity, in doing (Kennan 1972).
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Thus, by this account in the 1970s, American Serbs and American Croats
were already players in the formation of United States foreign policy; already
adept at lobbying for their diasporic and foreign interests; and already accepted by
policymakers eager to appear both tough on foreign ideological foes and happy to
oblige good Americans only voicing their concern to their elected representatives.
Political Opportunities and Institutions in the 1990s
Proven political skills and connections came in handy in the 1990s. The
Yugoslav civil war received global attention because of its importance to
countries with political, cultural, and religious interests in the region: the United
States, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Muslim world. The
breakup of the Soviet Union in 1989-1990 allowed the United States to emerge as
a triumphant leader in the post-Cold War world. As such, the United States was
keen to demonstrate its leadership in European political and security matters.
Washington aimed to show that a European crisis, such as the Yugoslav conflict,
could not be well managed without substantial American advice and United
States-led action.
The American public was thus made aware of the Yugoslav civil war
through customarily emotional media coverage and impassioned rhetoric by
United States officials, European political leaders, self-appointed ethnic activists,
and American journalists. As in Australia, American television screens captivated
audiences with images of violence and suffering, and the extraordinary attention
to the Yugoslav conflict gave the impression to the American public that the war
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was being thoroughly investigated and that all perspectives were explored. Yet, as
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia intensified, the United States media
presented ever more neatly packaged sound bites describing the conflict. The
shallow level of understanding of the complexities on the ground led one Serbian
commentator to retort that “never before has there been so much talk about Serbs
yet so little knowledge about them” (Beckovic 1991).
While activists and pundits publicly debated the costs and benefits of
particular United States action in Yugoslavia, behind the bluster and rhetoric
another, more structured debate occurred. A “war of words” among ethnic group
lobbyists took place in Washington, and also in the mid-American cities where
Croat and Serb migrants settled generations earlier. In the initial days of the war,
suggested one pro-Serb commentator,
Washington was a blank slate on which nearly any plausible story could
be written. Information about the Yugoslav conflict provided by Muslim
and Croat governments in the early days of the war was welcomed by
executive branch analysts and members of Congress facing the daily
burden of sorting out complex international issues (Sremec 1999, 4).
President Clinton invited both American Croat and American Serb
officials to meet with him and selected Cabinet members to explain his position
on the war in the Balkan, and to ask the community representatives to do all they
could to support peace in the region and at home. The meetings were only
partially successful. One Serb leader explained that he “understood that there are
many groups in America and that the President can’t know about everyone. But
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[the Adminstration] didn’t know anything. And they didn’t ask for advice. They
just told us what they were going to do.”108
The lack of sufficient information and knowledge about Yugoslavia’s
complexities among high-ranking policymakers made the United States foreign
policy making establishment vulnerable to the views of ethnic advocates on all
sides. But while the Yugoslav issue was still relatively unknown in 1990-1991,
and thus likely the most effective time to apply pressure in Washington, American
Serbs were comparatively silent and reacted slowly to the changing dynamics
within Yugoslavia and within their host country. SNDC’s Slavko Panovic
suggests that the American Serb community was caught off guard, unprepared,
and stunned by their reversal of fortune:
During the Communist rule in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe we
had many friends in the Senate and the House who shared the same goal:
freedom... But when war in Yugoslavia started, even our friends
disappeared. The Serbian nation was portrayed as the bad guy. Every day
the same story in the papers; they kill, they rob, they rape. There was
never any balance. There was never anyone to stand up for the Serbs and
to tell other politicians about how the Serbs were also victims.109
With the assistance of American Croats, the Tudjman government in
Zagreb, on the other hand, hired American public relations firms in 1991 to lobby
the United States Congress in support of Croatia’s succession aims.110
                                                 
108 Author interview with Slavko Panovic, 7 November 2002.
109 Author interview with Slavko Panovic, ibid.
110 The primary public relations firm used by Croatia was Ruder Finn, Inc., which would later
represent in Washington the Bosnian Serb government in Sarejevo, as well as the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) in their bid for Albanian sovereignty in the Serbian province of Kosovo.
Serbian Americans, too, established a “war lobby” though by most accounts Serbs lost the lobby
war. See Blitz (1996) for analysis of Serbian and American Serb lobby efforts in the United States
and Europe.
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Tudjaman’s spokeman, Ante Kloinovic also appealed directly to American Croats
to express their dissatisfaction with the level of support for the new Croatian state
in 1991:
We ask that you serve as winesses and interpreters in you respective
countries.... If you can, in any way, please influence the White House and
Official Representatives of the U.S. Government because the People of
Europe are waiting to see what the BIG BROTHER has to say.111
American Croats responded and initiated numerous written petitions,
telephone campaigns, and visits to Washington. Although, the United States did
recognize Croatia’s independence in early 1992, and assisted in the deployment of
United Nations troops, an arms embargo on Croatia remained in place. In 1993,
American Croats called for a “united Croatian front,” and formed a coherent
Croatian lobby, the National Federation of Croatian Americans, which then
scheduled annual “Croatian Days on the Hill” celebrations.
But the efficacy of these efforts is also questioned in hindsight by
American Croats:
[T]he question should be asked: How effective is the Croatian diaspora in
Washington today? The answer depends on its goals. If the goal is to get
together one or twice a year to show official Washington that American
Croatians love newly independent Croatia and, as a bonus, experience an
emotional charge for doing a patriotic act, the answer is positive. But if the
diaspora’s goal is to influence U.S. policies toward Croatia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina, it is apparent, the effectiveness of the Croatian diaspora
is marginal at best (Cuvalo 1999).
The perception of failure to move United States foreign policy in the
direction, or to the ends, desired by either the Serb or Croat diasporas was real
                                                 
111 Another appeal issued by the Croatian government urged American Croats to inform and
educate their local, state, and federal officials. See “To Croatians in the USA and Canada,”
Fraternalist, 3 July 1991, p. 14.
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and still frustrates community leaders. But the opportunity to meet with
policymakers did have a positive effect on the relations between the two rival
communities. Evidence of this lesson is provided below.
Contentious Croat-Serb Interaction during the 1990s
The following analysis presents the main dimensions of the interaction
between Croats and Serbs. I first describe how Croats and Serbs in the United
States engaged in confrontational participation. Some Croats and Serbs used
public space in the United States for extremist activities, while others organized
demonstrations, mass-meetings, and sit-ins. The next section then describes
instances of institutional participation, whereby Croat and Serbs worked with or
sometimes even within host country political institutions and organizations.
Extremist and Illegal Activities
Many Americans of Serbian or Croatian descent experienced the war in
the former Yugoslavia as other Americans—without significant ties to the
Balkans. The “old-timers” whose ancestors arrived in the United States prior to
1945 reacted differently to the Balkan turmoil than the “newcomers” who arrived
after 1945, and who suffered through the Second World War and its aftermath.112
Yet even among those Croats and Serbs in the United States personally
touched by the horrors of the Second World War, very few resorted to extremist
                                                 
112 For more on the intra-community differences in Chicago, see Raymond R. Coffey, “City
Offers Peace For Serbs, Croatians,” Chicago Sun-Times, 8 August 1995.
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or illegal activities. This is especially apparent when compared with their
counterparts in Australia, where the number of recorded violent and criminal
incidents involving the two ethnic communities numbered in the many hundreds.
The war in the Balkans did, however, create a battleground of sorts on the
streets of Chicago. There were bomb threats, arson attacks, and bricks thrown
through the three plate-glass windows of the Serbian National Defense Council of
America in Chicago. As in their war-torn lands, the hatred between the diasporic
Croat and Serb factions fractured lives and embittered neighborly relations. The
Yugo Inn, a Chicago club dependant on both communities prior to 1991 went out
of business soon after the war in the former Yugoslavia began. By 1992,
community club soccer matches between Serb and Croat dominated clubs were
halted after police were called to intervene between battling fans on several
occasions.
In the early and mid-1990s, a few members of both communities in
Chicago exchanged threats and perpetrated considerable property damage to
community centers and churches. Local officials expressed periodic concern
about increased tensions, but otherwise these activities received relatively little
attention among the wider American public.
The following list is representative of the nature of inter-diasporic
incidents that were cause for concern:
• Swastikas and Ustashe checkerboards painted on a Serbian
Orthodox Church in Chicago in 1991.
• Vandalism of a Serbian monastery in Libertyville, Illinois in 1991.
• Fire bombs thrown at a Croat party in San Francisco in 1992.
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• An arson attempt at the Serbian National Defense Council in
Chicago in 1992.
• Cleveland Police feared violence, but reported no incidents and no
arrests, at a Croat social club when the Croatian president visited
the club in 1991 and 1992.113
• Serbian churches and a community center in Chicago were
vandalized and church officials received death threats in 1995,
after Chicago’s Catholic Cardinal Bernardin likened the situation
in the former Yugoslavia to the Holocaust and called the bombing
of Serbs "morally justified".114
• In August 1995, Chicago police reported vandalism to cars owned
by Serbs in the parking lot of a Serbian club and bricks thrown at a
Croat social club.115
• Cleveland police made public announcements to the effect that a
visit by the Croatian minister of the interior, Ivan Jarnjak, to
Cleveland’s American Croatian Lodge in 1996 might make the site
                                                 
113 See Thomas Ott, “Eastlake Develops Anti-Terrorism Plan”. Plain Dealer (Cleveland), 20 July
1996, Section B.
114 Serbian church and community leaders publicly denounced the comparison of Serbs and
Nazis as “inappropriate, irresponsible and inflammatory,” a “perversion of moral standards,” and
an “absolute abomination.” Following these remarks, rocks marked with the letter “U”—a
reference to the Croatian fascist Ustashe army of World War II—were tossed through Serbian
Orthodox church windows in northwest Chicago. These incidents prompted Orthodox Church
leaders to hold candlelight prayer vigils in front Bernardin's house. See Andrew Herrmann and
Jorge Oclander, “Bernardin Supports Bombing By NATO,” Chicago Sun-Times. 8 September
1995; Jorge Oclander, “Church Leader Here Gets Death Threats,” Chicago Sun-Times, 11
September 1995; and Andrew Herrmann and Deborah Alexander, “Serbian Orthodox Stake Out
Bernardin's Home in Protest,” Chicago Sun-Times, 15 September 1995.
115 See “Confrontation Surfacing Here,” Chicago Sun-Times, 7 August 1995, Late Sports Final
Edition.
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a “terrorist target” and set the local Croat and Serb communities on
edge. No incidents, however, were reported.116
A Bloodless Diaspora War?
The one domestic Croat-Serb incident that garnered the most media
attention, in addition to Cardinal Bernardin’s comments listed above, resulted in
no known violence. Chicago area Croats accused Rod Blagojevich of “dual
loyalty” and labeled him a “stooge for Slobodan Milosevic” after he wrote a
fundraising letter to his "Dear Brothers and Sisters" in the Serb community and
pledged to be their voice in congress. Blagojevich, then a Congressional
Representative and after 2003 governor of Illinois, is a first generation American
Serb raised in the Serbian Orthodox faith and was active in Serbian community
cultural activities as a youth.117 His fundraising letter stated that “the Serbian-
American community needs a voice in Congress." Ante Cuvalo, president of the
protesting Croat group, responded that Blagojevich “wishes to become the
spokesman for a specific ethnic group” and was “an apologist for the Serbian
cause.”118
                                                 
116  See Thomas Ott, “Eastlake Develops Anti-Terrorism Plan,” Plain Dealer (Cleveland), 20
July 1996, Section B.
117 Blagojevich’s Serb roots, personal connections, and political power later proved useful for the
release of three captive United States soldiers. At the height of the Balkan conflict, he traveled to
Belgrade with Rev. Jesse Jackson to persuade Yugoslav authorities to release the three men. After
several days of negotiations and a three-hour meeting between Blagojevich, Jackson and Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevi_, the soldiers were freed. Milosevi_ later stated that the presence and
efforts of Serb Americans convinced him to emancipate the Americans.
118 See Steve Neal, “Blagojevich Letter Gets Him Trapped In Ethnic Crossfire,” Chicago Sun-
Times, 18 August 1995.
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Several Croats interviewed in the course of fieldwork suggested that a
“spirit of revenge” was constant in the early 1990s and that one day in the future a
woman walking down the street would see the face of a rapist or killer from the
former Yugoslavia and would shoot him. But no one interviewed in the course of
this project could report an actual incident in any way similar to this.
One young American Serb reports that he drove a car with a Serbian
bumper sticker, and that on one occasion in the early 1990s he stopped at a light,
looked in his rearview mirror, and saw a passenger behind him raise two fingers
and a thumb (a sign Serbs use to denote the trinity). The man then used his other
hand to slap down the three fingers in what he took to be a show of defiance. The
car then followed him until he lost it on side streets.119 Harassment is where most
Croat-Serb inter-action ended.
Instead, both Croats and Serbs report that from the outbreak of violence in
1991, they would gather at their respective social clubs each night to watch news
broadcasts beamed by satellite to their local hangouts. They listened anxiously to
news commentary about the war, and cheered for the advances of their homeland
kin, yelled patriotic slogans whenever they saw video of the checkerboard, red
and white Croatian flag or, alternatively, a Serbian white eagle. Some admitted
that they also laughed at, and ridiculed, from thousands of miles away,
vanquished enemy soldiers shown on video being held at gunpoint by their
captors. One young interviewee reports that his parents would return from these
gatherings and hug him and his sisters. They also “told us that the Serbs are
                                                 
119 Author interview, name withheld, at the SNDC, 7 November 2002.
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nothing but brutal thugs. They massacred members of my family and thousands of
my countrymen."120
A young, American-born Serb who reports that he now feels more Serbian
than American, recalls hearing his father and grandfather cursing over the NATO
air sorties of the Serbian positions:
I was just another American kid and didn't think much about my Serbian
origins. But now I see and I feel what it has done to my mother and my
father and my grandfather. I can’t imagine what it was like over there.
And I can’t understand how the United States can turn on its old Serbian
allies to favor Croatia, they backed the Nazis during World War II.121
When asked if he ever felt like he should do something with his rage, such
as go to Serbia, or if he ever considered lashing out against Croats down the road
or at school, he simply replied, “No.” But Croats and Serbs in Chicago did battle
each other in another way. All sides in the conflict mounted a heavy public
relations war to win United States public sentiment.
In this cause, the United States and United Nations sanctions against
Serbia and the Serb nationalists fighting in Bosnia dismayed many American
Serbs, who could not, or would not forget that Croatia sided with, and fought
alongside, Hitler. Their rather selective, self-aggrandizing visions of the Second
World War led many American Serbs in the 1990s to conclude that Serbia and
Serbs are, by their very nature, anti-fascist, anti-communist, and pro-Western.
Slavko Panovic at the SNDC insists that “the United States and Serbs are natural
allies."122 The unspoken message is, of course, that Croats and Bosnian Muslims
                                                 
120 Author interview, name withheld, at the Croatian-American Association, 8 November 2002.
121 Author interview, name withheld, at the SNDC, 7 November 2002.
122 Author interview with Panovic, op cit.
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are perhaps naturally or genetically disposed to fascism and are “genocidal
peoples” according to Serb propaganda.
Another SNDC executive stated:
It was very difficult for Serbs to watch the lynch-mob mentality in this
country. We felt wounded, we felt betrayed. We were the ones who fought
with the United States in World War I and World War II. We protected
downed United States airmen when the Croats and Muslims were shooting
them down. Now the situation has been reduced to a white hat/black hat
mentality. We are cast as aggressors when we believe we are the victims.
The atrocities committed by our side were exaggerated and the atrocities
committed against [us] were ignored. We got blamed for everything, for
things we never did. It's the big lie. Television shows bodies of Serbs and
says they are Muslims. Cartoonists show Serbs as barbarians, Serbs as a
pigs crawling out from the pit beneath an overturned outhouse. They have
satanized and demonized us. Our people felt nothing short of what the
Japanese in this country felt during World War II.123
When questioned about homeland atrocities committed by Serbs in the
1990s, another American Serb leader responded,
Look, we were the allies in the First and Second World Wars, any attacks
on unarmed civilians, while regrettable, are unavoidable, this is a civil war
and these kinds of things, within the context of a civil war, are very, very
common. It goes with the territory.124
For their part, Chicago’s Croat leaders also largely deny any real Croatian
responsibility for death and destruction in the former Yugoslavia, but do not see
fellow Americans of Serbian descent as the problem:
Who are the people committing the atrocities? It's not the Croatians.
Animosity between the Serbians and the Croatians and Bosnian Muslims
spans the generations in my neighborhood, even here in Chicago. I can tell
you this, I’d rather die than marry a Serbian woman! But the great thing
about America is everyone can do what they want.125
                                                 
123 Author interview, name withheld, at the SNDC, 7 November 2002.
124 Author interview, name withheld, 8 November 2002.
125 Author interview, name withheld, Croatian Cultural Center of Chicago, 8 November 2002.
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CURBING BALKAN NATURES
Given the level of bitterness and animosity between American Croats and
American Serbs, how was more intense conflict and violence avoided? What
institutions or strategies of American policymakers managed to curb Croat and
Serb community relations in non-confrontational directions? The relations
between Croats and Serbs in the United States in the 1990s suggest that long-
distance nationalism and diaspora politics do, in one sense, “balkanize”
multiethnic communities. But this does not necessarily lead to uncontrollable
violence, nor to anything approaching a “war on our streets.”
Shain contends that domestic peace is supported by policymakers
shunning favoritism abroad and by ensuring equal access to foreign policymaking
circles for diaspora communities domestically (Shain 1999). But neither equal
access nor equal levels of favor were granted in this case. The SNDC and the
Serbian Unity Congress gained some weak support for their positions from
congressional representatives Helen Delich Bentley and Dan Burton, among
others, but in the end “missed the PR boat” (Hockenos 2003, 128). In comparison,
the Croats, supported by the Catholic Church and invigorated by lobby campaigns
on Capital Hill were more visible.126
                                                 
126 For more comprehensive review of the lobbying efforts of both the Croat and Serb
communities in Washington see Blitz 1996 and Paul 2002. Croats, too, had access to key
lawmakers, including Bob Dole, whose foreign policy adviser, helped train Croats on successful
lobbying techniques (See Radielovic Baratta 1999)
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Nevertheless, the perception of access and the eligibility to lobby were
powerful factors affecting Croat and Serb identities and actions. Both Croat and
Serb leaderships “wrote to the White House and to the Congress and asked our
communities to write about our history and about how our interest was America’s
interest.”127 And Ante Cuvalo suggests that local and national politicians did not
play much of a role in helping temper Croat passions, but that Croats elites
worked hard to remind authorities that Croats in the United States are an
“hardworking, self-reliant, and family oriented community” (Cuvalo 1999).
Moreover, the freedom to engage in American foreign policymaking
provided American Croats and American Serbs with incentives to strongly
identify with the United States and to self-regulate their reactions to one another
according to their host country environment. The testimony of the SNDC’s
president highlights a consciouness attributable to both Croats and Serbs:
It pained me to see my new homeland bomb my former homeland. Our
efforts are to educate about the truth, to gain the support of our friends
here in America, and to maintain our culture and Serbian values… We
tried to influence the American public and politicians through letters and
debates that always encouraged fairness…We never held Croatian
Americans responsible and we tried to control the youth who could get a
little hot about the issues. We told them if they wanted to fight, we’d buy
them the plane ticket, but that they couldn’t do that here. Not in
America.128
This experience is different from that of Croats and Serbs in Australia,
where official multiculturalism tended to freeze the fluidity of Croat and Serb
identities. American economist, Glenn Loury highlights this difference in his
                                                 
127 Author interview with Panovic, op cit.
128 Author interview with Panovic, op cit.
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discussion of the distinction between Australian official multiculturalism and
informal American multiculturalism:
On a recent trip to Australia, I spent some time with a group of economists
and sociologists at the local Bureau of Immigration and Multicultural
affairs. They were eager to explain to a visiting American how well their
country was managing its immigration policy. They stressed two main
goals: to encourage newcomers to seek Australian citizenship, and to
promote the ideas of a multicultural identity, so that these newcomers will
not feel it necessary to abandon their cultural heritage as the price of
adopting a new nation. What struck me about this policy was its seeming
incoherence. In what precisely did these analysts imagine Australian
national identity to consist? Why would anyone feel loyalty to a country
that required so little of him on order to join it (Loury 1995, 80)?
The significance of Loury’s statement, confirmed in this study, is that the
provision of access to foreign policymakers in the American system seems to
come with the expectation or demand that all who choose to lobby should be
Americans—undifferentiated in loyalty and commitment from each other. This is
not, of course, always the reality, but it is the normative ideal. In the American
context, Croat and Serb diaspora elites worked to keep their domestic relations
and responses circumscribed within the bounds deemed acceptable by United
States policymakers, law enforcement, and the American public. They did this not
out of coercion or fear of repercussion and loss of prestige, but because the
American institutions and values had become their own.
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Chapter 6: Diasporas Forever or “At Home Abroad”?
Jasmin Dizdar's internationally acclaimed film about Balkan refugees
abroad, Beautiful People, opens on a London bus. Passengers politely ignore one
another as people file in and out, until an enormous, disheveled, bearded man
climbs aboard. He sits for a moment, then seems to recognize another passenger.
He calmly steps over to the man and begins to brutally punch him. The bus driver
stops the bus and pulls them apart.  The man explains in broken English that he is
attacking a fascist, the Nazi who destroyed his Bosnian village. The shocked and
perturbed bus driver calms him down with the repeated counsel, "We don't do that
here!", and returns to the wheel. A moment passes. The Serb and the Croat glare
at each other and the fisticuffs resume. The two are thrown off the bus and end up
brawling their way through the city's streets in a scene that changes from tension
and drama to crude slapstick. Several excruciating, unfunny minutes later, the pair
eventually winds up in the same hospital room, recovering from their wounds,
where they continue their hostilities.
The two men are not the film’s primary story, but as their feud continues it
serves as the film's lasting statement: the relentlessness of Balkan conflicts and its
imperviousness to outsiders.129
The dramatization of that insight is supported by the research conducted in
this study. For Croat and Serb migrants, refugees, and their descendents, the
                                                 
129 Viewers never learn whether the "Nazi" is Serb or Croat, Christian or Muslim. In another
telling scene, a nurse picks up slippers worn by the Serb and Croat. After holding them up and
inspecting them, she remarks that they are "exactly the same."
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1991-1996 war in the former Yugoslavia was a centrifuge that flung their lives
into turmoil. The real drama of war and its aftermath were not limited to
combatants in Croatia, Serbia, or Bosnia, but were transferred to the day-by-day
struggle to live with its losses, scars, displacements and self-knowledge in the
overseas Croat and Serb communities.
This study analyzes the Croat and Serb refugee and immigrant experience
and its relations to the homeland war; and—similar to Beautiful People—it also
explores the ways immigrant host societies are touched by the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia through the lives of migrants. It provides a snapshot of some
of the processes of long-distance nationalism and, notably, the controls of inter-
ethnic conflict it may require.
The implications of this research are important given that these challenges
are likely to gain greater prominence in the future. For many observers, the
tragedy of September 11, 2001, and the unnerving revelations about the breadth of
the Al Qaeda organization, brought into stark relief the sinister potential of
international networks, transnational undergrounds, and the abuse of democratic
orders. Enhanced ability to transgress time and space enable a more immediate
and more efficient transmission of nationalism around the globe, which also
means the theoretical distinction between local and global politics is increasingly
blurred. This research thus has obvious relevance to Canada, New Zealand,
Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and other immigration receiving




This study began with a puzzle. When war in the former Yugoslavia
became reality in the 1990s, many scholars, journalists, participants, and other
interested observers expressed fear, and in some cases, real concern that the
character of the fighting and the intensity of the passion on all sides would lead to
an international spread of the conflict. Authorities in neighboring countries and in
Western and Eastern Europe were particularly disturbed given the catalytic nature
of Balkan problems and their capacity to generate animosities and enmity across
Europe, and also because many European countries host Croat and Serb
communities that looked certain to engage in the homeland war from their relative
positions of security in countries not immediately party to the conflict.
For a brief moment, far-flung Croats and Serbs across oceans in the
United States and Australia also seemed prepared to participate in the homeland
war in whatever capacities they could develop. This diasporic politics led to
increased tension and conflict, and sometimes violence, between some members
of the Croat and Serb communities in both countries. Host country concerns rose
to fears that violence and bloodshed might spill-over into ethnic communities that
were raw and suffering from the emotional and psychological turmoil of
witnessing the horrific war among ethnic kin.
But while there were some direct clashes, much property damage, and
many threats, the inter-ethnic tensions in both Australia and the United States
were much less than some, including many within the rival communities,
imagined and feared. Moreover, there were significant differences in how these
170
inter-ethnic relations played out in each host country, and the variation in the roles
of Australian and American political authorities and political institutions in
channeling Croat-Serb relations in more peaceful directions.
This project thus presents inter-ethnic conflict from an angle rarely taken.
Namely, to explain why ethnic violence is often not as severe as expected and to
show how inter-ethnic conflicts energized by diaspora politics were managed
differently by the United States and Australia. It is useful to return to the initial
questions posed in Chapter 1, before reviewing the lessons revealed in these
cases:
• How was the feared “war on the streets” averted?
• What effects do host state institutions and policy processes play in
exacerbating or mitigating inter-ethnic tensions?
• What strategies and actions, if any, did American and Australian
policymakers adopt in order to channel migrant community
relations in peaceful directions?
• And how did ethnic elites and political entrepreneurs in the
migrant and ethnic communities aid or hinder these efforts by host
state policymakers?
Elementary answers to these questions are now apparent. Homeland state
policies affect migrant identities and can motivate émigrés and their descendents
for many generations. But host state political institutions, despite rumors of their
increasing irrelevance, still matter. In fact, the experience of Croats and Serbs in
Australia and the United States suggests that even for those who are most attuned
to homeland politics, and those who might clearly fall into the category of a
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diaspora—those with a sense of displacement, hope of return, and identities
distinct from their host society—are greatly influenced by the social and political
conditions prevalent in their host country.
The exogenous effects of war and homeland chaos certainly did animate
migrants and individuals of Croatian and Serbian descent to mobilize on behalf of
homeland interests, but their enthusiasm was curbed and channeled by the local
context in which they live. By 1996, even the most agitated Croats and Serbs
made local accommodations to modify and diffuse their hostility towards their
rivals. Ethnic elites—community newspaper editors, social club presidents,
political party representatives, and professionals—expressed a desire for, and
worked for, acceptance in the broader Australian and American societies. The
confirmation of successful management of inter-ethnic relations in these diaspora
contexts has several implications.
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: DIASPORA POLITICS
Diaspora politics and migrants’ transnational networks and practices gnaw
at the bone of one of the central and defining issues within political science: the
fading dichotomy between domestic and international politics. The research in
this study raises important questions about how international phenomena
influence domestic ones, especially regarding the effect of catastrophic events,
war, political intrigue and change in migrants’ homelands on immigrant host
societies and cultures.
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The efforts of diasporic Croats and Serbs to lobby policymakers in their
host countries and to better inform (as they see it) their host societies, taps into the
large and still growing theoretical debates about how globalization affects
domestic politics and how mobilized ethnic communities increasingly shape
foreign policies of multi-ethnic democracies. To the extent that they are
successful at altering policy or changing public perceptions, diasporas challenge
rigid assumptions about the limits of political communities and cast doubt on the
effectiveness of host country public policies that ignore the influences of
homeland politics and other exogenous factors on immigrant and ethno-national
communities.
One of the underlying goals of this project was to reveal the logic of
ethno-nationalist processes and the way they are capable of survival and growth in
migrant host country environments. There is no doubt that diaspora politics is
often a controversial kind of politics. Long-distance nationalism in host country
settings often takes on a life of its own, at least semi-independent from
developments in migrants’ homelands, but constantly making reference to them.
This study reveals that when Croat and Serb migrants and their descendants
engage in politics of their homeland, they perceive themselves as both outsiders
on the inside of American and Australian politics, and insiders on the outside of
Serbian and Croatian politics.
Moreover, the manipulative power of homeland governments and political
organizations can be considerable, though the cases reviewed in this study
strongly suggest that the capacity to mobilize ethno-national kin abroad is not
only far from absolute, but also regularly fails to produce the homeland-desired
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effects among émigré communities. Likewise, while diasporic migrants “try to
shape the policies of their homeland governments,” many engage in negative
forms of politics that “act counter to Shain’s assertion regarding the promotion of
democratic practices in the homeland” (Huntington 2004, 284-285).130 In other
words, diasporic politics presents challenges to both homeland and host country
governments and societies, but there are no hard-and-fast rules to help determine
the particular direction diasporic mobilization will proceed.
In fact, though the concepts of “diaspora” and of “transnationalism” have
been used throughout this study as part of an exploration of the effects of migrant
homeland politics on inter-ethnic relations inside host societies, it is important to
use these concepts with care in the case of the Croat and Serb communities (see
Brubaker 2005). Certainly, the mobilization of first-generation migrants and their
descendents has a transnational dimension in the sense that migrants and refugees
are informed by events or are in contact with political officials and policy
practitioners in the former Yugoslavia.
To the extent that Croats and Serbs in Australia and the United States
perceive themselves as exiles with continued interest in their homelands and
exclusively preserve identities around those interests, they are diasporas. But it
must be emphasized again, that not all Serb or Croats are engaged in transnational
politics. A Croat or Serb organization, for example, is not diasporic—or homeland
political—by definition, but only so far as it works for interests in the Croat or
                                                 
130 Huntington’s question about the efficacy of ‘marketing of the American Creed’ is a reference
to Shain (1999).
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Serb homeland. Croat and Serb immigrant politics is a much broader field of
study than the focus of this project which is limited to highlighting how homeland
engagement and orientation affects ethnic relations in their host countries.
It is difficult to first discern, and then generalize about, effects of long-
distance nationalism on inter-ethnic relations in host societies. Migrant and ethnic
groups vary by size, historical experience, and nationalist memories, the state of
current events in both homelands and host countries, and many other factors. In
fact, they do not necessarily share the reality of the long-distance transmission of
ethno-nationalism. Given this recognition, Rogers Brubaker usefully suggests that
a diaspora not be conceived as a bounded entity or unified group,
but rather as an idiom, a stance, a claim. We should think of diaspora in
the first instance as a category of practice, and only then ask whether, and
how, it can fruitfully be used as a category of analysis. As a category of
practice, ‘diaspora’ is used to make claims, to articulate projects, to
formulate expectations, to mobilize energies, to appeal to loyalties. It is
often a category with a strong normative charge. It does not so much
describe the world as seek to remake it (Brubaker 2005, 12).
This study’s comparison of Croats and Serbs is true to Brubaker’s
conception of diaspora. It explores and explains less about who Croats and Serbs
are in both Australia and the United States, and more about what some Croats and
some Serbs actually do. They are neighboring ethnic groups in their homelands,
and migrant Croats and Serbs choose to live in close proximity in their host
societies, too. They share historical experiences in the post-Second World War
period, yet their self-consciousness as diaspora communities in the past, and in the
present, differs considerably. Levels of interest in homeland politics and
transnational engagement come and go among Croat and Serb migrant
organizations and communities.
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For Croats in Australia, the tendencies to engage in homeland politics
were strong since the Second World War. For Serbs in Australia, from the late
1940s through the 1980s, there was a tendency to engage towards more immigrant
politics with a focus on making something of themselves in Australia than on
homeland politics. The 1990s outbreak of violence and war in the former
Yugoslavia changed the dynamic for the Serbs in Australia. In the United States,
both the Croat and Serb communities settled on a balance of immigrant and
homeland politics.
In fact, the communities had become so “American” by the time of the
1991-1996 war that both groups felt at ease engaging in homeland politics
through the American political system. In one sense, therefore, Croats and Serbs
in the United States were less “diasporic” than their peers in Australia. Activists
for homeland causes and the committed diasporic factions of Croats and Serbs in
Australia were in, but not of, Australian society. They had less access to political
channels and felt more estranged from their host society, while American Croats
and American Serbs were comparatively more comfortable thinking of
themselves as Americans.
POLICY LESSONS FOR MANAGING CONFLICT
An important lesson of this study is that different host state and society
opportunity structures channel diasporic behavior in diverse ways. The experience
of Croats and Serbs in Australia and the United States suggests that the
mobilization strategies that contentious diasporic communities employed to
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advance their causes were largely a function of the opportunities, or lack of
opportunities, provided by the host country political systems.
In this vein, ethnic and migrant community efforts to penetrate foreign
policy making processes in host countries, suggests Shain, contributes to a
diffusion of ethnic tensions inside the host countries:
Thus, just as the American government’s openness to influence of
ethnicity has guided diasporic groups to champion the creed of democracy
and human rights around the globe, it also, indirectly, makes them more
committed to liberal pluralism domestically. As ethnic elites gradually
find their ways into the American mainstream via the diasporic channel,
their affinity with radical isolationist and extreme multiculturalists in their
own community becomes awkward (Shain 1996, 110).
Huntington, in contrast, retorts that diaspora politics is inherently unstable
and increasingly clouds the articulation of host country foreign policies given
that:
The nature of American government and society enhances the political
power of foreign governments and diasporas. Dispersion of authority
among state and federal governments, three branches of government, and
loosely structured and often highly autonomous bureaucracies provide
them, as it does domestic interest groups, multiple points of access for
promoting favorable policies and blocking unfavorable ones. The highly
competitive two-party system gives strategically placed minorities such as
diasporas the opportunity to affect elections in the single-member districts
of the House of Representatives and at times also in statewide Senate
elections. In addition, multiculturalism and belief in the value of
immigrant groups’ maintaining their ancestral culture and identity provide
a highly favorable intellectual, social, and political atmosphere, unique to
the United States, for the exercise of diaspora influence (Huntington 2004,
285-286)131
                                                 
131 One of Huntington’s prime concerns is the appearance of political unaccountability in actions
and positions, such as this 1995 statement by the American Jewish Committee: “Although
geographically dispersed and ideologically diverse, Jews are indeed one people, united by history,
covenant, and culture. Together we must act to shape the Jewish destiny; let no one, in Israel,
America or elsewhere, erect barriers among us” (Huntington 2004, 276).
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The results of this study suggest that both assessments are partially
accurate. There is a basic link between perceived legitimacy and social conflict
within the host country setting. Where political legitimacy of the political system
is widely accepted by diaspora leaders, conflict between the community and the
host state is minimized. The same holds true for inter-diasporic conflict: when the
legitimacy of the host state increased in the view of Croat and Serb diaspora
community members, conflicts between rival and competing ethno-national
communities were controlled at minimal levels of intensity. In fact, some degree
of inter-diasporic conflicts can actually be desirable, if it comes in the right forms.
Turning up the volume in the course of lobbying host country policymakers and
working within established norms of behavior may prevent inter-diasporic
tensions from spilling over to mass violence.
Host society political cultures and values, in tandem with the positive
effects of access to policymakers, were the crucial factors that restrained Croat
and Serb diaspora contention, encouraged ethnic community leaders to make
constructive decisions, and eased the efforts of Australian and American
policymakers to discuss and manage the inter-diasporic tensions. In particular,
liberal political values and the right to legally voice even unpopular views in both
the United States and Australia allowed the Croat and Serb community
leaderships to better manage tempers and tensions. Croat and Serb elites regularly
credit the need to protect their personal reputations and the reputations of their
respective communities as the chief reason why they worked so hard to repress
inter-diasporic tensions.
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This study confirms the proposition that an increased perception of access
for ethnic community leaders to policymakers, in order to voice diasporic interests
and express concerns about host state foreign policies, muzzles inter-group
tensions. Certainly, ignorance of, and frustration with, host country political
systems, coupled with a lack of access to policymakers seems at least partially
responsible for Australia’s more intense levels of conflict than in the United
States. The fact that both Croats and Serbs perceived that they had limited “voice”
in the Australian foreign policy process explains the greater pursuit of interests
outside the institutional and organizational frameworks established by the state,
through use of contentious demonstrations and, at the fringes of the communities,
violence in order to express pain and anger.
This comparison suggests that simply listening to diaspora community
concerns is important in host country contexts. The opportunity for each diaspora
groups to relate—to vent—the history and present state of the inter-ethnic conflict
as they see it to policymakers helps placate fears and suspicions. To the extent
that Croat and Serb contention in either Australia or the United States became a
debate with established rules of participation about host country foreign policy
towards the respective homelands, the level of inter-group conflict waned.
But does this mean that diasporic politics between Croats and Serbs or
other communities is inconsequential? Much of Croat and Serb diaspora politics
in both the United States and Australia, and in particular the relations of the
diasporas with each other, was greeted by silent disinterest. This is understandable
to some extent. Pragmatically speaking, the efforts of Croat and Serbs in each of
these countries to influence host country foreign policy, win the hearts and minds
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of fellow citizens, and even the more troublesome and dangerous interactions
among them caused relatively little damage and disturbance of public law and
order.
Granted, much of diaspora politics and, indeed, much of the tension and
pain caused by events abroad and within the diasporic context is hidden from the
public eye. It happens in ethnic organizations, sports clubs, cultural halls, over the
phone, on the Internet, in circles of friends, at church, and within families. It
results in votes for foreign governments, cash and donations in kind for overseas
kin, political parties, warring militias, and refugees.
In fact, this research proves precisely what Anderson (1992) and others
claim about the nature of long-distance nationalism; namely, that it creates serious
and unaccountable politics. In fact, suggests one Australian sociologist, there is
nothing innocent about it, although this is easily overlooked. Most long-
distance nationalists believe that their politics is the right kind and that
what they do is precisely what they should be doing. They invariably
believe in the righteousness of their cause. The illusion and rigidity of this
stand becomes clear when one studies their opponents. They, too, believe
in the righteousness of their cause (Skrbi_ 1999, 187).
The Croat and Serb diasporas, too, are charged with engaging in politics to
further their interests, but without paying the same costs of those interests as their
homeland kin were forced to do:
transnationalism does not render diasporas one iota more accountable for
their projects than before. The means for diasporas to participate in the
political, economic, and cultural life of the home countries has never been
greater. But émigrés still do not live the consequences of their
undertakings, which are often motivated by high-minded ideals rather than
pragmatism. The Balkan diasporas sprang to the defense of their nations in
time of war, spending millions for arms, but have proved frugal and
uninspired when it comes to postwar economic initiatives and building the
institutions of their young democracies. Too often their faulty vision—or
self-interest—causes them to act contrary to the interests of the people
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they profess to love so deeply. Even in an age when dual nationality is
becoming more commonplace, most émigrés do not vote, pay taxes, or
hold elected positions in the homeland; they act, but without the
responsibilities of citizenship or office (Hockenos 2003, 365).
TRADE-OFFS
Inviting contentious ethno-national communities to participate in host
country foreign policy lobbying efforts appears to direct community energies
towards host state and society involvement and positively structures inter-ethnic
competition. In particular, access to policymakers provides an incentive to
impress host country officials and to steer clear of inter-ethnic conflict within the
host society. This is roughly the pattern of Croat and Serb engagement in the
United States during the 1990s.
In the Australian system, in contrast, foreign policymaking institutions
have been designed to discourage open conflict over foreign policy goals,
precisely by ensuring that an inner circle of policymakers would dominate
decision-making. However, the disconnection of policymaking authorities from
societal groups and constituents means underlying societal tensions are not
institutionalized and remain unresolved.
Lobbying for narrow foreign policy interests by diasporic groups,
however, leads to the broader concerns raised at the beginning of this study
regarding host country “national interests” and the “capture” of host state foreign
policies by sub-national groups acting on behalf a foreign state or provincial
interests, rather than broader, shared host state welfare.  This provides
policymakers in host societies with important trade-offs: less access to
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policymakers and policymaking results in less “capture” of foreign policy and a
clearer articulation of national interests. But this policymaking structure is also
correlated with more diaspora community frustration and possibly more
contentious inter-diaspora relations.
The overall conclusion of the empirical case studies is that diaspora
politics is a phenomenon in the making, as political authorities in both the host
country and homeland realize the potential of, and threats posed by, diasporic
political activities. The United States, and increasingly Australia, are known for
their inclusive policies towards migrants. But the cases of Croats and Serbs in this
study add a note caution to the current enthusiasm. By introducing Balkan politics
into the United States and Australia, Croats and Serbs forced host country
policymakers to combine foreign policy with domestic integration policy, and to
confront for good or ill, the little Croatias and little Serbias in their midst.
While foreign ties will increasingly influence the configurations of many
immigrant communities, states still have the power and resources to determine the
choices that are available to people. The key point is that for members of
diasporic communities there are two or more states involved. And with interests
in both homeland and host country affairs, intense loyalty to any one country is
unlikely to remain static. While diasporas may develop and mobilize without the
assistance of homeland states, most efforts to organize politically are likely to be
influenced by the extent to which homeland governments establish relationships
with their diasporas.
Moreover, the social strains of immigration are often those of conflict
between communities. These conflicts should be anticipated by governments, but
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they rarely are foreseen, let along consciously managed and minimized.
Immigrant receiving host countries would be wise to incorporate these
contingencies into their perspectives on immigration and ethnic policies. The
findings of this study should thus be viewed as a warning—not away from
diversity—but toward more care in handling it.
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